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The Russian experience with irregular warfare runs deep. Russian forces used 
irregular warfare to defeat Napoleon’s army in 1812. Russia conquered vast territory in 
the latter half of the 19th century, defeating irregulars with impressive economy of force. 
The Soviets employed partisan guerrillas with increasing skill during the Bolshevik 
Revolution and the Great Patriotic War. In Afghanistan, the Soviets avoided a Vietnam-
like collapse while employing irregular tactics fighting against the Mujahedeen. Russia 
was at first defeated by, then learned from and turned the tables on, insurgents and 
irregulars in Chechnya. 
The experience Russia gained across the past two centuries of irregular warfare 
left an indelible mark on and shaped Russian forces for their invasion of Ukraine in 2014. 
Understanding the roots of Russian irregular warfare—their experiences and how they 
adapted to unique challenges—could prove invaluable to understanding the future of it. 
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I. RELEVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE WITH 
IRREGULAR WARFARE 
On February 3, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter identified countering 
Russian aggression as America’s foremost national defense priority and requested a four-
fold increase in spending in Europe for the 2017 defense budget.1 This reversal comes 
only a few years past President Obama’s “reset with Russia.”2 Secretary Carter’s 
comments are a result of Russian resurgence. In a Joint Force Quarterly article, General 
Joseph Votel, Lieutenant General Charles Cleaveland, Colonel Charles Connett and 
Lieutenant Colonel Will Irwin published a paper in which they concluded that the United 
States has a national policy gap in our own ability to wage “unconventional warfare in 
the gray zone.”3 That statement amounts to an acknowledgement that the United States 
does not know how to counter what it saw unfold in Ukraine. 
While the United States, NATO, partner nations, and many allies have been busy 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia successfully prosecuted a war with Georgia, conducted 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Chechnya, launched an offensive 
cyber operation in Estonia, and annexed Crimea while fighting a proxy war in Donetsk. 
Russia seems to have come into its own with the skillful Ukraine campaign. Russia’s 
current form of irregular warfare, called New Generation Warfare, or the Gerasimov 
Doctrine—after Russian General Valery Gerasimov—or simply Russian hybrid warfare, 
seems to have capitalized on experiences of the 1990s and 2000s.  
But this “new” way of war is deeply rooted in the Russian irregular warfare 
experiences of the past two centuries. A better understanding of the current Russian 
                                                 
1 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Breedlove in the Pentagon,” Department of Defense, 
accessed March 17, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/
683817/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-breedlove-in-the-pentagon-briefing. 
2 “Reset with Russia,” White House, April 1, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/04/01/
reset-with-russia. 
3 Joseph L. Votel, Charles Cleaveland, Charles Connett and Will Irwin, “Unconventional Warfare in 
the Gray Zone,” National Defense University Press, accessed February 14, 2016, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/
Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-zone.aspx. 
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means and methods of irregular warfare will come from a more full understanding of past 
Russian experiences and challenges in irregular warfare. 
A. CURRENT STATUS OF RUSSIAN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
The publication of General Gerasimov’s “The Value of Science Is in the 
Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of carrying out 
Combat Operations” in February 2013 and the nearly prophetic protests against the pro-
Russian government in Ukraine set the stage for Russian involvement in Ukraine. 
Russia’s action against Ukraine gave rise in the United States and Europe to a flurry of 
articles about and media attention to Russian irregular warfare.4  
Most Western analysis of recent Russian action—specifically in Ukraine—have 
made the argument that Russian so-called hybrid warfare is not new, but simply a new 
label made by Western authors and analysts who struggle to define a complex problem.5 
Aside from the fact that Russia seemed to be sponsoring war on the European continent, it 
was the form of warfare—bold and swift covert action backed by unflappable information 
operations and, when necessary, conventional forces—that was most troubling to the West. 
Despite the West’s parsing of terms and labels, Russia continues to be involved in 
combat and related actions in Ukraine while NATO continues to feel threatened by 
Russia. For its part, Russia feels threatened by NATO’s consistent expansion since the 
Soviet Union collapsed and by the addition of the now-persistent military presence 
                                                 
4 See Kipp and McDermott, Nikolaevich, Jones, and Deep for their arguments that hybrid warfare is a 
new label for an old idea. James Kipp and Roger McDermott, “The Bear Went under the Mountain: Is 
Russia’s Style of Warfare Really New?” accessed February 5, 2016, 
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-bear-went-under-the-mountain-is-russias-style-of-warfare-
really-new_2263.html; Ruslan Pukhov Nikolaevich, “Миф О ‘гибридной Войне,’” accessed February 5, 
2016, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html. Sam Jones, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” 
Financial Times, August 28, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3zYAYU9ME; Alex Deep, “Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques,” Mar 2 
2015, accessed February 3, 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-
techniques. 
5 Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 
2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/. 
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(thanks in large part to United States European Command’s Operation Atlantic Resolve) 
along the “Eastern Flank” of NATO, in the Russian near abroad.6 
Impressed by Russia’s casual violation of international law when it invaded 
Ukraine, Jonathan Eyal remarked, “[w]e have spent nearly 200 years defining rules about 
conflict. Sending in soldiers without markings, introduced in such a cavalier way, 
denying their existence with absolutely no blush and saying anyone can buy a uniform in 
a shop – and a month later rewarding them with medals – we have to go back a long way 
to see something like that.”7 That is exactly the point. Perhaps fewer people would have 
been taken aback by Russia’s “new” actions and methods if those actions and methods 
were placed in their historical context. 
Certainly the problem has been identified. Frank Hoffman, Max Boot, Dave 
Maxwell, Nadia Schadlow, and William Nemeth have all written on Russia’s current form 
of irregular warfare—call it what you will—and have identified the fact that the “long-
standing Russian concepts of protracted conflict…are not well understood by Americans.”8 
One could say the same about long-standing concepts of Russian irregular warfare. 
While the West is still struggling to identify and label Russia’s current form of 
irregular warfare, Russia is surely adapting and refining its forces and techniques from 
the lessons they have learned in Ukraine. While it would be foolish to try and predict 
exactly what form Russia’s next military adventure will take, it will certainly be informed 
by their experiences, recent and historical. 
                                                 
6 Jorge Benitez, “Commander of U.S. Military in Europe Sees Signs of Russia Preparing Another 
Offensive,” Atlantic Council, accessed February 7, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/
commander-of-us-military-in-europe-sees-signs-of-russia-preparing-another-offensive; Paul Sonne, 
“Russia Threatens NATO Over Missile Shield,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2015, sec. World, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-threatens-nato-over-missile-shield-1429185058. 
7 Jonathan Eyal is the international director at the Royal United Services Institute, a prominent 
London-based military think-tank; as quoted in Jones, “Ukraine.” 
8 Frank G. Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, 
and Hybrid Modes of War,” The Heritage Foundation, 29, accessed February 3, 2016, 
http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/. 
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B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
If Frank Hoffman is correct that Americans do not understand Russian irregular 
warfare well, then it is all the more important to study the Russian experience now, 
especially if one’s experience is a foundation of learning. As Albert Einstein said, 
“the…source of knowledge is experience.”9 It would be difficult to understand the Russian 
modus operandi in irregular warfare without knowledge of their foundational experiences. 
Perhaps more important for a study of other’s experiences is Voltaire’s query “is 
there anyone so wise as to learn from the experience of others?”10 While there is no 
claim to wisdom in this thesis, the point to take away is that in order to know what 
Russian irregular warfare has to offer in the way of experiential teaching, one must know 
what their experiences have been. That knowledge may prove vital for developing 
counters to current Russian irregular warfare or to learning from it.  
C. THESIS APPROACH 
Luckily, studies like Alexander Hill’s The War Behind The Eastern Front have 
been expanding and revising the record with newly available source material since the fall 
of the Soviet Union.11 This additional scholarly scrutiny (in Hill’s case of the Great 
Patriotic War era) brings further clarity to the Russian experience in irregular warfare. To 
paraphrase Robert Schaefer’s introduction in The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus, irregular warfare is the war of choice in the future for Russia and most other 
countries—something Generals Joseph Votel and Valery Gerasimov agree with. In order to 
understand where the future lies, we must understand the path Russia took to get to 
today.12  
                                                 
9 V. Taras and M. Gonzalez-Perez, The Palgrave Handbook of Experiential Learning in International 
Business (New York, NY: Springer, 2016), 12. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Alexander Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West 
Russia, 1941–1944 (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2005), 3. 
12 Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad 
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 1–3. 
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This thesis will cover key Russian experiences in irregular warfare. The cases 
addressed will be the Russian victory over Napoleon’s Grande Armée in the early 19th 
century; the Great Game; the Great War and the Bolshevik Revolution; Soviet partisans 
in World War II; the Soviets in Afghanistan; the Insurgency in the Caucasus; and 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. 
1. Defeat of Napoleon 
If winter did not defeat Napoleon’s army in 1812, as more than one author claims, 
what did? The all too obvious answer is the Russians.13 Although students of Russian (or 
French) military history know about Russia’s scorched earth policy—leaving no 
resources for the advancing army—few have studied the irregular nature of the campaign 
waged against Napoleon. Napoleon’s overstretched logistics and the elusiveness of 
decisive battle—Borodino notwithstanding—precipitated his retreat from Moscow. But it 
was the constant pressure by the irregulars, enabled by their mobility, flexibility and 
decentralized command, later combined with the environmental factors that turned his 
retreat into a rout.14  
2. The Great Game 
In the middle of the 19th century, Great Britain continued to expand its already 
impressive colonial and economic holdings. Expansion into Central Asia by the “British 
diplomatic and commercial contacts in Central Asia during the 1840s sparked a strong 
competitive response from Russia.”15 Tsar Nicholas I dictated Russia fill the “empty 
space” by subduing the tribal societies of Central Asia. The Russian forces did exactly 
that with remarkably few soldiers, adopting novel tactics, tailoring units for specific 
missions and employing and empowering local proxy forces. He approved a “systematic 
                                                 
13 Theodore Dodge, Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1907), quoted in Allen F. Chew, 
“Fighting the Russians in Winter Three Case Studies,” Leavenworth Papers No. 5 (1981): 3:479, 507.  
14 Jakob Walter, The Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), xix, 
92. 
15 Robert F. Baumann, “Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan,” Leavenworth Papers, Number 20, April 1993, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/107/
107-1/index.html, 57. 
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Russian advance employing forward based fortifications and mobile ‘flying detachments’ 
to subdue local resistance.”16  
3. The Great War and Russian Civil War 
The First World War and the Russian Civil War showcased the impact an 
irregular force can have on a battle or campaign. Among others, partisan forces provided 
critical support to the Reds while they campaigned against the White Russian and Allied 
forces in the winter of 1918–1919. Partisans prepared the environment for future 
conventional operations, gathered intelligence and conducted small operations supporting 
the Bolsheviks.17  
4. Soviet Guerrilla Warfare 
Once Operation Barbarossa was underway, Stalin gave a speech in which he 
called for action against the Nazis, saying in part that “diversionist groups must be 
organized to combat enemy troops to foment guerrilla warfare everywhere.”18 Where the 
Soviet Army was pushed back, the Soviet partisans rose up against the Wehrmacht. The 
Soviet partisan detachments fought German forces and overbearing, centralized control to 
land significant blows against Nazi occupation and supply forces.  
5. Soviets in Afghanistan 
In both Afghanistan and the first Chechen war the Soviet-turned-Russian Army 
fought a counterinsurgency via conventional methods.19 Russia displaced or killed 
millions of civilians trying to bomb the insurgency out of Afghanistan. Along the way, 
the Russian military made significant improvements in tactics and equipment based on 
lessons they learned; lessons Russia had already learned in previous conflicts. 
                                                 
16 M. V. Frunze, na frontakh, 289, telegram, 27 Augu st 1920, quoted in Ibid. 
17 Allen F. Chew, “Fighting the Russians in Winter Three Case Studies”, 5, 10–11. 
18 Joseph Stalin, Radio Address of 3 July, 1941, quoted in Nik Cornish and Andrei Karachtchouk, 
Soviet Partisan 1941–45 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2014). 
19 Carl Van Dyke, “Kabul to Grozny: A Critique of Soviet (Russian) Counter‐insurgency Doctrine,” 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 9, no. 4 (December 1996): 689–705. 
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6. Russians in the Caucasus 
Russia has a long history in the Caucasus going back centuries. During the “First” 
Chechen war, Russia fought an irregular force with conventional tactics and was Russia 
was soundly beaten because of it. However, and perhaps more interesting than Russia’s 
failure is the success later had in the “Second” Chechen war. Russia began to use 
irregular tactics and then Moscow enlisted the Chechen strongman Kadyrov to fight 
insurgents. Russia’s modern divide-and-conquer strategy is amplified by the lessons they 
learned in both conflicts. 
7. Russian Irregular Warfare in Ukraine 
George Kennan described Soviet demonstrative diplomacy as a way to 
“embarrass other governments and stir up opposition among their own people.”20 
Demonstrative diplomacy includes the use of military posturing (maneuvers, exercises, 
shows of force etc.) without actually (openly) conducting military operations.21 Before 
Russia’s war with Ukraine, few scholars would have argued that Soviet doctrine 
remained relevant to modernizing Russian forces, especially after the Chechen and 
Georgian wars. However, as Putin stated to Russian audiences in 2005, the fall of the 
Soviet Union was “a major geopolitical disaster.”22  
It is therefore not surprising to see Russian military exercises and demonstrations 
along NATO and Ukrainian borders. And while Moscow never admitted to invading 
Ukraine or supporting the separatists, it annexed Crimea after what Russia described as 
“friendly people” seized key government infrastructure.23  
                                                 
20 G.F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, NJ: UP 1989) pp.74-75, quoted in Carl Van Dyke, 
“Kabul to Grozny,” 690. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation” (The 
Kremlin, Moscow, April 25, 2005), accessed 01 March 2016, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/
04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml. 
23 Ruslan Pukhov Nikolaevich, “Миф о ‘гибридной войне,’” (The Myth of ‘Hybrid Warfare’), 
accessed February 5, 2016, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html. 
 8 
Now Russia is in Syria, razing Aleppo and violating international treaties by 
deploying nuclear-capable ballistic missiles into Kaliningrad.24 
                                                 
24 Dmitry Solovyov and Andrius Sytas, “Russia Moves Nuclear-Capable Missiles into Kaliningrad,” 
Reuters, October 8, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-missiles-confirm-idUSKCN1280IV; 
Max Fisher, “Russia’s Brutal Bombing of Aleppo May Be Calculated, and It May Be Working,” The New 
York Times, September 28, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/world/middleeast/russias-brutal-
bombing-of-aleppo-may-be-calculated-and-it-may-be-working.html. 
9 
II. ROOTS OF RUSSIAN IRREGULAR WARFARE
To understand modern Russian irregular warfare—especially events as they have 
unfolded in places like Crimea and the Caucasus—one should look at Russian irregular 
warfare in previous wars. Although history is an imperfect teacher, in that events will 
never repeat exactly as they once occurred, it would be folly to assume that past events 
have not shaped the character and narrative drawn on by modern practitioners of warfare. 
As Robert Jervis says of applying historical lessons to international relations, “[w]hat one 
learns from key events in international history is an important factor in determining the 
images that shape the interpretation of incoming information...[and] a range of 
imaginable situations and allow him to detect patterns and causal links that can help 
him understand his world.”25 Indeed most cultures venerate their heroes and draw 
inspiration from glory long past, but never forgotten. Such is the case in the U.S. 
military, where Rogers’ Rangers, General Greene, J.E.B. Stuart, and Larry Thorne 
(among a host of others) are celebrated and studied. Such is also the case for 
Russians and their irregular warfare history.  
In reference to Russia’s operations in Ukraine, some have stated that the irregular 
warfare tactics used were refreshed versions of old Soviet tactics.26 They may well have 
been, but before they were Soviet, they were simply Russian.27 As Russianist James 
Sherr claims, “today’s Russian state has inherited a culture of influence deriving from the 
25 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 215. 
26 Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West,” Russia and Eurasia Programme 
(London: Chatham House, March 2016), 2, 5–6, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/
publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf; as an example, Maria Snegovaya argues that 
Russian information warfare in Ukraine simply dusted off Soviet military disinformation tactics due to “the 
lack of innovation.” She goes on saying that all of the Russian disinformation techniques in Ukraine came 
directly “from Soviet toolkits.” Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins 
of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare” (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2015), 12–13, 
http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-russias-hybrid-
warfare. 
27 Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West.” 
10 
Soviet and Tsarist past…not simply the product of ‘Cold War mindsets.’”28 But the roots 
of Russian irregular warfare are not so shallow as to be merely Soviet doctrine 
reinvented. They go much deeper. The roots of modern Russian irregular warfare—and 
therefore some of what may have been impressed upon contemporary leaders like 
Gerasimov—reach back to Russia’s victory over Napoleon in 1812. 
A. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812 
When Napoleon crossed the Niemen River in June of 1812 he embarked on what 
would be his most ill-fated military campaign. His half-million man army chased an 
enemy that would not stand and fight deep into the Russian heartland. As the Grande 
Armée advanced throughout the summer, the lead elements skirmished with the rearguard 
of two separate Russian armies, as they retreated deeper into her heartland.29 As the 
Russians continued to withdraw, they consumed or destroyed most everything in their 
path. The significant distance of that path can been seen in Figure 1. 
28 James Sherr, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion Russia’s Influence Abroad, The Means and Ends 
of Russia’s Influence Abroad (London, UK: Chatham House, 2013), 17–18. 
29 At that time, Russia had First and Second Army of the West under separate command, both facing 
Napoleon’s invasion. Each army acted independently, as separate entities, subordinate to Tsar Alexander I. 
To further complicate things, the First army was headed northeast while the Second was headed south. 
Engagement with Napoleon while the armies were split invited wholesale destruction of both armies. A fact 
which was pointed out by Colonel Carl von Clausewitz to the Tsar himself. The Russians retreated for 
another month before giving battle. Curtis Cate, The War of the Two Emperors: The Duel between 
Napoleon and Alexander -- Russia, 1812 (New York, NY: Random House, 1985), 157–59. 
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Figure 1.  Map of the Russian Campaign of 1812 Showing the Route of March to 
and from Moscow.30 
The march alone took its toll on Napoleon’s forces. As Jakob Walter, a German 
draftee within Napoleon’s Grande Armée remarked crossing into Russia, “daily the 
hardships increased,” later remarking of the condition of the march that “the men were 
growing weaker and weaker every day…in most districts there was no water fit for 
drinking, so that men had to drink out of ditches in which were lying dead horses.”31 The 
exhaustion of combat and military service was not the sole station of Napoleon’s troops.  
                                                 
30 Source: J. Hart, “Map of the Russian Campaign 1812.” Map. Washington, DC: Library of Congress 
Geography and Map Division. Accessed November 7, 2016. https://loc.gov/resources/g7011s.ct001046/. 
31 Walter, The Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier, 40, 44. 
 12 
Nadezhda Durova was a unique cavalry officer in the Russian army; she hid her 
gender so she could serve her nation.32 During the 1812 campaign, her unit served as 
rearguard through the summer retreat. Several times she mentioned the complete 
exhaustion she felt as the Russian rearguard fought “minor clashes” while protecting the 
army’s withdrawal.33 
Due to the hardships encountered by the French along the march and the need to 
leave garrison forces along the route, Clausewitz—who accompanied Tsar Alexander I’s 
imperial headquarters—estimates that by the middle of August, Napoleon’s force was 
near 130,000 men, a far cry from the 182,000 he estimated only a few weeks prior.34 A 
considerable depletion in manpower when compared to the low estimate Clausewitz 
made of 350,000 French soldiers that crossed the Niemen.35 Clausewitz noted of the 
invasion so far that “[t]he French had suffered considerably from privation and toil, and 
occasionally from fighting.”36 Tsar Alexander I finally unified the command of the 
Russian armies under General Kutuzov with the intention of fighting and defeating a 
worn-out French army deep in Russian territory.37  
With Moscow threatened, Russian elite demanded the city be protected. As 
Clausewitz stated, General Kutuzov probably would not have picked Borodino as the 
place of battle “if he had not been compelled to it by the voice of the court, the army, and 
the nation at large.”38 However, in answer to the “growing clamor of the Russian 
                                                 
32 Nadezhda Durova is a fascinating character. She ran away from home to join the military at a young 
age. To do so, she had to pretend to be a man under an assumed name. She eventually won a medal for 
valor (saving an officer’s life) which she received from Tsar Alexander I himself. Nadezhda Durova and 
Mary F. Zirin, The Cavalry Maiden: Journals of a Russian Officer in the Napoleonic Wars (London, UK: 
Indiana University Press, 1989), 19–21, 65–66. 
33 Durova and Zirin, The Cavalry Maiden, 131–133. At one point, Durova’s half of the squadron was 
given the order to sleep for half an hour, directly behind the battle line of the regiment. She was so 
exhausted that she was only awakened by a ball-strike to her helmet. Ibid., 139. 
34 Cate, The War of the Two Emperors, 195. 
35 Michael Adams, Napoleon and Russia (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), 407. Carl 
von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia (Hattiesburg, MS: Academic International, 1970), 11.  
36 Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 60. 
37 Felix M. Markham, Napoleon (New York, NY: Mentor, 1966), 193. 
38 Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 142. 
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nobility”39 General Kutuzov chose the fields some 70 miles from Moscow to make a 
stand against the Grande Armée. In a battle that was the Gettysburg of the 1812 
campaign, the armies slaughtered each other to crippling effect, but neither achieved the 
coup de main hoped for.  
The Russians packed troops into defenses along a narrow front, blocking the two 
main roads which led to Moscow, and creating a density of 9 to 16 men-per-yard across 
the front.40 The stationary battlefront, which would have been a bloody exchange, was 
made more gruesome by the intensity of the cannon barrage. Over half of the Russian 
infantry, some 70,000 men, were deployed, so that a battalion fought only one company 
wide, but three deep.41  
Once the battle was under way, one officer stated that “it was no longer possible 
to distinguish one cannon boom from another.” Another stated that the exchange “bore 
more resemblance to broadsides fired by men-of-war at sea than to an artillery 
engagement on land.”42 Durova recalls, “A hellish day! I have gone almost deaf from the 
savage, unceasing roar of both artilleries…Even those wounded by [bullets] did not hear 
them.”43 One author calculates the rate of fire at three cannon shots a second, and 430 
musket shots per minute—sustained for the ten-hour battle.44 Historian Michael Adams 
calls the battle, “the highest loss recorded in a single day’s fighting by any European 
army since Hannibal’s annihilation of the Roman force at Cannea over two millennia 
before, and it would not be surpassed in the modern era [until] the first day of the 
Somme.”45  
                                                 
39 David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoléon, Second (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1966), 793. 
40 Cate, The War of the Two Emperors, 223–24. 
41 Dominic Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace 
(n.p.: Penguin, 2010), 193. 
42 Cate, The War of the Two Emperors, 235. 
43 Durova and Zirin, The Cavalry Maiden, 143. 
44 Cate, The War of the Two Emperors, 235. 
45 Adams, Napoleon and Russia, 355. 
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The French finally won the day, but both armies suffered a nearly one-in-three 
casualty rate.46 Very significantly, the French ended the battle with less than one-third 
their original horse power, complicating their logistical supply lines.47 Neither Napoleon 
nor Kutuzov succeeded in striking a death blow at Borodino. Rather the battle “had 
damaged the Imperial army almost as much as Kutuzov’s.”48 Napoleon himself called it 
“the most terrible of all my battles” as echoed by the fact that musket fire and voice 
commands were drowned out by the incessant cannonade.49 Historian David Chandler 
called Napoleon’s victory at Borodino “an empty triumph for the French cause.”50 
The Russian army limped back to and then through Moscow as the French 
continued the advance. The damage done to both armies at Borodino was evident by the 
fact that an “informal armistice between the opposing armies” existed along the front.51 
But along the flanks and rear of the French army, there was no peace; “not a wagon could 
pass, not an ounce of forage could be brought in unopposed.”52 Russian and French 
armies were bled white from losses, but it was the Russians who continued to gain an 
advantage. The inability for each still-massive army to strike a deathblow on the other 
provided fertile ground for another form of warfare. The gnawing of the Russian 
irregulars on the French army post-Borodino is the fertile ground in which Russian 
irregular warfare is rooted.  
1. Guerre à Outrance  
Just prior to the sting of the battle of Borodino, when the Russian army was 
considering where to mass and give battle to the French, Lieutenant Colonel Denis 
                                                 
46 Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 209;  Cate, The War of the Two Emperors, 255. 
47 Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 255. 
48 Adams, Napoleon and Russia, 396. 
49 Alan Warwick Palmer, Napoleon in Russia (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 125. 
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51 Philippe-Paul Ségur, History of the Expedition to Russia, Undertaken by the Emperor Napoleon, in 




Davydov proposed an idea that ran counter to establishment thinking at the time. 
Davydov’s idea was to separate cavalry into small “detachment[s] and send them to strike 
at the heart of the cavalcade following Napoleon.”53 Soviet Historian Eugene Tarlé 
stated that Davydov’s goal was to “harass Napoleon’s long line of communication…He 
proposed that constant attacks and sudden raids be made on this line, on the French bases, 
on couriers and food trains.”54 Davydov would use “these irregular units” “which would 
rapidly go into hiding and escape pursuit after each operation” as “points of concentration 
of armed peasants.”55 In other words, as John Arquilla wrote, “Davydov’s basic mission 
was to cripple the Grande Armée with deep raids far behinds the lines against small 
security outposts and supply lines.”56 
The fact that Davydov was bold enough to request and fortuitous enough to 
receive, a separate force is amazing enough. But what is more amazing is the fact that 
having asked for a few thousand troops and receiving only 50 Hussar and 80 Cossack 
cavalry, Davydov set out to execute his plan undeterred.57  
Acknowledging the necessity of the support by the local population, Davydov’s 
first action in his operational area was to garner the trust and support of the villagers. As 
he wrote two years after the conflict ended, “in a people’s war one must not only speak 
the local language, but also adopt their ways and their clothes.”58 In doing so, Davydov 
was initially able to increase his early warning and intelligence network; he later 
expanded his partisan force by arming villagers with captured weapons.59 Historian 
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Dominic Lieven called the former issue “the most important role of the civilian 
population” when writing about Russian partisan support to the campaign.60  
Davydov was methodical in instruction to the locals as well as networking the 
many small bands together. He was also tireless, recording numerous occasions when he 
attacked a superior force and routed it, thus receiving great spoils and capturing many 
prisoners.61 He distributed surplus weapons and spoils to the peasants, then instructed 
them on how to deal with the French.62 He told the peasants to receive the enemy 
warmly, providing them with food and drink. Then, when the opportunity arose, strike 
them down. Once killed, ensure that everything, bodies, clothes, and loot included, was 
buried secretly so that the peasants would not become victims of French reprisals.63  
In just over a month, his flying detachment experienced such success that he was 
able to incorporate several additional Cossack regiments (although not at full strength) as 
well as create and equip (via captured weapons and freed Russian soldiers) home guards 
through his area of operation.64 The most successful of these “resistance franchises”65 
occurred when the civil leadership partnered with Davydov’s irregular forces (or other 
military commanders).66 By the 12th of September, 1812 Davydov had, in partnership 
with civil leadership, armed multiple villages including a single village where the guard 
numbered 500.67 Davydov had also increased his core to over 300 riders.68 
Shortly after Davydov began his partisan campaign, its effects were felt by the 
French. As remarkable as the French logics system was at the time, when the French 
army captured Moscow it was simply overextended. French engineer and survivor of the 
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campaign, Captain Eugéne Labaume remarked of the Grande Armée occupying Moscow 
that “in the midst of our apparent victory, the whole army was discouraged and worn out 
with fatigue. The cavalry was nearly ruined, and the artillery-horses, exhausted by want 
of food, could no longer draw the guns.”69 Count Philippe Paul de Ségur, Napoleon’s 
aide-de-camp, said of the difficulties created by these partisan operations, “[e]ach 
measure of oats, each bundle of straw, had to be fought for, dragged out of the enemy. 
Even the peasantry began to be troublesome. We had war on all sides—in front, on our 
flanks, in our rear.”70 Denis Davydov and his growing band of irregulars were only 
beginning to reach full effectiveness.  
The rear and flanks of the French army were vulnerable as long as the army 
remained in Moscow, and the French soon found out how vulnerable their entire army 
was while on the march. Jakob Walter recalls in his diary shortly after leaving Moscow 
that the “Cossacks [were] in front of and beside us.” That “one no sooner thought of 
resting than the Russians fell upon our army and cut off many as captives.”71 Indeed they 
did. In under two months, Davydov alone had documents proving his small force had 
captured 3,500 prisoners then transferred them to the Russian army.72  
To achieve this feat of arms, Davydov employed novel tactics, deceit, and showed 
a penchant for learning quickly. He altered or adjusted his tactics after successive battles. 
In one example, after being severely bloodied in a small village by a determined French 
force, he used a handful of skirmishers to feign an attack, only to lure the numerically 
superior force into a waiting ambush.73 On another occasion, he dressed a willing 
subordinate in peasant clothes and sent him into a French-occupied village to gather 
intelligence.74 As part of his operating procedure, his unit would begin operations in the 
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early morning hours against their primary target, then follow leads and exploit the battle 
until after dawn.75 
However, as free as he was to conduct operations, he was still a Russian officer 
and subject to the convoluted Russian command. Even this, Davydov recalls, he felt 
obliged to circumvent to provide the operational flexibility needed to carry on the 
campaign.76 In order to control several additional Cossack units, Davydov submitted 
duplicate “official reports” to an adjacent commander, while he continued to send his 
actual reporting to his true commander. The adjacent commander succumbed to the 
flattery and was all too happy to unknowingly double-count Davydov’s successes as his 
own. Davydov’s deception earned him two additional Cossack regiments.77 
When the French found him intolerable, they sent two thousand cavalry to destroy 
his operation. By remaining mobile and well informed (thanks to the peasant support 
Davydov cultivated) he was able to exhaust, split and then defeat the French force even 
though it outnumbered him 4 to 1.78 
As the pace of the French retreat increased, so did the tempo and scope of 
Davydov’s operations. The Grande Armée was suffering greatly, more from the lack of 
food and forage combined with the ceaseless attacks, than from the looming winter 
weather. The retreating French army, which was at times a column nearly 50 miles long, 
found that the near-constant assault on the lines of communication by irregular forces 
jeopardized its connection with allied territory and France herself.79 As Captain Lebaume 
recalls of the horrid march in early November, “we were assailed by a population eager to 
avenge the horror to which it had been the victim.”80  
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There were other Russian raiding forces working against the now-dwindling 
French. Occasionally Davydov worked with fellow commanders of Cossack-centric 
irregular units, but generally, he used his force as he saw fit and on his own.81 Certainly, 
Davydov was not the lone Russian enlisting the help of the Russian serf, and for that 
matter in certain areas the peasants needed no prodding from authority to take vengeance 
upon the French. In one letter to Tsar Alexander, General Kutuzov said of peasant 
resistance to the French foraging parties: “[q]uite often even the women had helped to 
trap and destroy the enemy.”82 Tarlé credits the wife of a village elder in Davydov’s area 
of operation with displaying “no less valor than the men” when she “frequently attacked 
straggling French baggage wagons with pitchfork or scythe” killing or capturing “many 
French soldiers.”83 As Jakob Walter recalls in early December “the Russians pressed 
nearer and nearer from every side, and the murdering and torturing seemed about to 
annihilate everyone.”84 The slaughter continued through extreme winter conditions in 
Russia, then across the German states until Paris fell and the Tsar stood in Paris.85  
2. Strategic Necessity of Irregular Warfare 
The Grande Armée crossed into Russia with a half a million men. The 1812 
campaign claimed 475,000 losses or nearly 85 percent of that army.86 Napoleon lost 
100,000 soldiers to exposure, desertion or disease; he lost 125,000 killed in various 
battles, and he lost 190,000 captured.87 Of the army that departed Moscow—some 
95,000 strong—only “a few thousand men” left Russia.88 Certainly significant damage 
was done to the Grand Armée by the “perpetual pressure from the Cossacks” that 
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Chandler notes.89 The Russians, who fielded a smaller army, even when taking 
replacements into account, also lost horrible numbers of soldiers during the campaign. In 
total, Russian casualties were at least 250,000.90 Put another way, two-thirds of all the 
soldiers on both sides who served during the six-month campaign died.91 
Because of the massive wounding of both armies, the Russians were forced to rely 
on irregular tactics, rather than attritional, army-to-army conventional warfare to chase 
the French out of Russia. What emerged from the militarily crippling campaign was 
acceptance-through-necessity of a previously minor contributing factor—the irregular. 
While in General Dokhturov’s camp, Davydov spoke with Prince Kudashev, who 
implored him to “carry on as you are, and be guided by your heart as well as your head. I 
don’t care if you wear a cap instead of a shako, and a peasant’s overcoat instead of a 
uniform. There’s a time for everything.”92  
B. A MIGHTY BOGATYR 
Kutuzov was unable to strike the coup de grâce, even after both armies were bled 
white. Small raids, constant harassment, and supply denial operations conducted by 
irregular units like Davydov’s, supported by the population, provided the victory the 
regular Russian army could not. Finding that they had no other option, Russian 
commanders allowed Hussar-Cossack-partisan elements to work. In Davydov, 
contemporary Russians have an important example and hero—a mighty bogatyr—whose 
exploits should be understood by those seeking to understand the history Russian 
irregular warfare is rooted in. 
The lasting impact of Davydov is far from just the many tactical victories won or 
the significant operational effects brought to bear against Napoleon’s army. Denis 
Davydov provided Russia a successful and relevant example for irregular warfare. As 
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Neustadt and May point out, “[t]he future can never look exactly like the past…But past 
conditions can offer clues to future possibilities.”93  
Davydov’s use of a purpose-built force striking against a larger and more 
powerful enemy (before the Grande Armée collapsed) where he wanted, when he wanted 
is the archetype of Russian irregular warfare, long venerated in Russian circles. His use 
of deception at the tactical level was flawless and timely and showed a thorough 
knowledge of the opponents he faced. It provided the edge a smaller force like his must 
have over a larger one to be successful. His freedom of action—freedom from being 
directed by a higher, conventional command—provided the flexibility he needed to 
swiftly adapt and, when the circumstances called for it, rapidly exploit battlefield success.  
While Davydov brought his previous combat experirences to his role as 
commander of an irregular unit, he formed, refined and later recorded his prescription for 
success. Something every practitioner should be thankful for. Certainly, the 
circumstances were favorable for an irregular element to conduct partisan operations, but 
the circumstances should serve to enhance, rather than detract from the example recorded 
by Davydov.  
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III. RUSSIAN WARFARE AND THE GREAT GAME 
Before Russia defeated Napoleon, the British and Russian empires were 
thousands of miles apart. By 1876 they were less than one thousand and closing fast. At 
the close of the century, British India was only twenty miles—the width of the Afghan 
finger—from Russian territory. Most of the expansion was dictated by potentates but 
executed by officials far from any capital or European palace. Ambitious officers and 
explorers, many times one and the same, believed it was their duty to take action without 
waiting for specific direction from their superiors, as long as their actions positioned their 
country in favorable terms either with regard to the locals, the other great powers, or 
both.94 
This independence of action by local commanders characterized much of the 
exploration and many episodes of the Great Game. As it unfolded for nearly a century, 
the spread of Russian interest into Central Asia was dominated by military expansion. 
That expansion was both ruthless and patient. More often than not, decisions made by 
local commanders were based on what the commander believed was in the best interest of 
the Empire. The impact of these decisions was, at times, strategic and generally backed 
the government rather than hindered by micromanagement.  
A. RUSSIA AS A GREAT POWER 
In the study of international relations, one common belief about Russia is that it 
wants to be seen and recognized as a great power. It has a need to be validated by other 
powers who have been recognized as great. Iver Neumann makes the claim that Russia’s 
“quest” to be a great power “has taken on an importance that places it squarely at the 
center of Russian identity politics.”95 Neumann goes further to assert that “Russia has to 
be a great power, or it will be nothing.”96 Russian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Izvolsky, 
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a proponent of the Anglo-Russo convention of 1907, made the same claim over a 
hundred years ago when he commented that Russia’s “decline to the level of a second 
class power…would be a major catastrophe.”97 Russian President Vladimir Putin himself 
made a similar claim in 2005 when he said during the annual address to the Russian 
Federation that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a “major geopolitical disaster of the 
century.”98 Accepting at face value Russia’s “quest” for great power status as a central 
pillar of Russian foreign policy—a common theme of Imperial as well as modern 
Russia—adds great clarity to the situation in which Tsar Alexander I found himself in 
1815.  
In 1814, Russian troops were greeted as liberators in Paris after helping Europe 
push back Napoleon’s Grande Armée. Even though Russia played no part in Napoleon’s 
final downfall, Russia’s reputation was such that Tsar Alexander I gained a “Folk-hero” 
reputation “not only in France but in most of Europe.”99 It is no surprise, then, that Tsar 
Alexander I remained “intent on playing the role of a great power, with a correspondingly 
great army” even though “Russia had emerged from the Napoleonic wars militarily and 
politically triumphant but economically shattered.”100  
Although it remains the dominant theme of post-Napoleonic Europe, namely that 
“Britain and Russia had become global powers” and that “Russia’s immense power was 
felt in every corner”101 of Europe, not all scholars agree with that assertion. Paul 
Schroeder pulls from German sources to tamp down Russia’s great power status, saying 
“[t]he common view that Russia enjoyed an enormous and growing power and prestige in 
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Europe until the Crimean War broke the bubble is a great exaggeration.”102 But, what 
does remain true, even if Russia was not, in point of fact, a great power, is that Tsar 
Alexander I “felt free to play the role of arbiter of Europe.”103 
1. Russia Expands South Before Going East 
Before Russia’s attention turned to Central Asia, it was engaged in the Balkans, 
the Caucasus and Poland for much of the 18th and early 19th centuries. In fact, after the 
eastern Slavs were incorporated into Russia (as marked by the annexation of the “holy 
city” Kiev in 1667), Russian focus turned to the Ottoman border and Persian frontier 
around the Black Sea. The back-and-forth nature of Russo-Turkic military competition in 
the Caucasus moved permanently in Russia’s favor when it annexed the Christian country 
of Georgia in 1801.104 By the middle of the 19th century, after the Crimean War (1853-
1856), expansion into the so-called empty spaces to the east overshadowed Russia’s 
repeated attempts to subdue the mountain people of the Caucasus and push on the border 
with the Ottomans.105  
As Russia enjoyed successes in the early 19th century, the British were extending 
their control outward from India into the frontier along the Indus River:  
the effect was to transform [Russia’s] Southern Frontier and the core areas 
themselves [modern Central Asia] into frontier zones separating the 
Russian and the British empires. Every move by either one of the global 
powers triggered anxiety and called for a response in the other’s capital, 
and both powers began to probe for a line of an optimum of conquest to 
demarcate the outer boundary of their respective possessions.106  
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Russia continued to push on the Turks and Persians. In 1825 the Persian Shah, 
with the blessing of the Shi’ite clergy, called for a holy war against Russia for its ruthless 
treatment of Persia’s old frontier zones.107 In response, Russian forces under General 
Ivan Paskievich went on the offensive, moving toward Tehran.108 When the Shah came 
to the negotiating table, Great Britain offered to mediate. This offer was roundly rejected 
by Russia, stating that as a “general maxim” of Russian foreign policy, “Persian affairs 
belonged to the sphere of its ‘exclusive interest.’”109 If read generically, the passage 
could find its historic parallel in Syria or the Ukraine today. Again Russia dominated a 
weaker neighbor militarily and was able to extract its desired terms and gain territory.  
2. Russo-British Competitive Cooperation 
Greek Orthodox Christian minority populations under Turkish rule in the Ottoman 
Empire remained closely linked with Russia in the 19th century. By 1820, the Greeks, 
who had hitherto gained status and wealth by acting on behalf of the Ottomans, were 
heavily persecuted by them.110 Although Russia was connected to them through 
Orthodox Christianity and Byzantine history, Britain was connected to both the Greeks 
and Ottomans through trade, thus creating tension between the two great powers. When 
the Greeks revolted against the Ottomans in 1821, Russia, although sympathetic, 
provided no aid to the Greek rebels, whereas Britain did.111 
The rebels were massacred, although bands of Greeks moved into inaccessible 
places and pockets held out. The Greeks’ goal was “to prolong their resistance and create 
a condition in the Balkans that eventually forced the great powers to intervene.”112 The 
Ottomans, unable to route the Greek holdouts in the mountains, targeted the vulnerable 
Christian population in Constantinople. The head of the Orthodox Church, Patriarch 
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Gregory “along with some of his bishops was seized by a group of Janissaries and hanged 
in front of his own church” on Easter night.113 The Turks followed the hanging with a 
general massacre of Orthodox Greeks in the city. Tsar Alexander I wanted to avoid war 
with the Ottomans, so he also tried to frame the conflict as a “revolt of a people against 
their leader” rather than a Christian-Muslim divide.114 The allies offered to mediate a 
resolution to the “war of extermination,” but the Ottomans refused.115 An explosion 
during a tense naval standoff in Navarino Bay between the Ottoman navy and a flotilla of 
British, Russian and French ships led to fighting and ultimately left the Ottomans without 
a fleet.116 With help from the British, French and Russian governments, the Greeks won 
their independence in 1832.117  
Russia made it abundantly clear to the Turks that continued existence of the 
Ottoman Empire was only because the Russians wanted it so. In a secret circular from 
Russia to the Turkish government, Russia stated that “if [the Turkish government] is still 
able to live, it will be only the life that the [Russian] emperor is pleased to allow it.”118 
Russia’s positioning was clearly an attempt to pull the Ottoman Empire into Russia’s 
sphere of influence and away from Britain. The strategy worked for nearly two decades 
until it lead to the Crimean War.  
This “competitive cooperation” between London and Moscow characterized the 
initial portion of the Great Game. This period of the early 19th century saw Russia 
interacting with other European powers, albeit mostly France and England in this context, 
as peer great powers. It is a state of affairs and set of circumstances which “led to a 
situation in which Russian territorial consciousness and Russian national consciousness 
became deeply intertwined and where Russian values stressed the size and expansion of 
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Russia’s territory as national achievements.”119 This national identification and desire for 
expansion and buffer areas brought Russia into conflict with the other great powers. The 
relative peace and status quo of European power could not last long as each empire 
sought to expand into unclaimed or still-contested spaces.  
3. Russia’s Divided Attention 
During the middle of the 19th century, Russia was conducting business-as-usual 
for a European great power. Negotiation, high intrigue, and competition between 
European powers for influence and control of the weakening Ottoman Empire was 
balanced by Russia as it pursued expansion elsewhere. The Russo-British cooperative 
competition was not limited to Europe. Russian pressure on Iran is credited with Iran’s 
invasion of Afghanistan which the British took as a threat to its holdings in India.120 
Interestingly, Tsar Nicholas I attempted to resolve Ottoman-Egyptian tensions with the 
British by sending an emissary to London so that the great powers could arrange a 
settlement of the disagreements of the lesser powers.121 
Concurrent with the geopolitical episodes and the Anglo-Russo “competitive 
cooperation” over the Greeks and access to the Bosporus, Russia was militarily involved 
in subjugating the central Caucasus. From the earliest encounters, Russia had been 
fighting against tribes in the Caucasus. These tribes would be beaten back by the 
superpower of the day, the Mongols, the Huns, the Persians or the Russians.122 The Silk 
Road passages through the Caucasus (or in the case of Derbent, around them) were the 
subject of conquest after conquest. Each time a major power pursued the local 
inhabitants, they fled to the protection of the mountains. In Russia’s case, it was no 
different.  
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For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to point out the brutality of the 
conquest and the resources committed to it.123 Resources which were then unavailable 
elsewhere in the empire. Tsar Alexander I appointed a butcher of a general and hero of 
the Napoleonic Wars as Proconsul of the Caucasus. In a statement not long after his 
appointment, General Yermolov said, “I desire that the terror of my name should guard 
our frontiers more potently than chains or fortresses, that my word should be for the 
natives a law more inevitable that death.”124 Russia committed both regular and Cossack 
units, eventually having no fewer than 300,000 soldiers committed to the area, in order to 
anchor a series of forts and conduct the massive sweeping operations required to rid the 
mountains of Caucasian fighters.125 Although there were varying degrees of success and 
pacification, it never fully worked. 
B. RUSSIA AND THE KHANATES IN THE GREAT GAME 
General Skobelev, who was highly regarded for his conquests of Khiva and 
pacification of the Fergana valley, said of his approach to the region, “I hold it a principle 
that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon 
the enemy. Strike hard and keep on striking till resistance ends, then form ranks, cease 
slaughter and be kind to the prostrate enemy.”126 His comments illustrate the Russian 
approach to fighting any non-European force at the time, as well as the experience 
inculcated from Imperial expeditions and campaigns thus far. Skobelev’s excessive 
violence, followed by benevolence, can be seen as deliberately framed operations for 
their psychological importance. His approach can be seen as the road map Russia largely 
followed in dealing with the Khanates during the Great Game, though their methods and 
tactics were adapted along the way. 
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According to at least one author, the Central Asian “steppe is a land fit for 
nomads; and only nomads.”127 The tactics of mobility (feigned retreat, ambush, 
encirclement and indirect engagements) for the steppe nomads changed little but 
remained effective, even against the Russians, for quite some time.128 The nomadic 
tribes Russia encountered were accustomed to dry and seemingly barren terrain, but it 
would take the failure of Russian military expedition against Khiva in 1839 before 
military leadership appreciated the difficulties associated with the environment.129 
Figure 2 shows the vast expanse of the steppe between the Orenburg line and the 
Khanates farther south. 
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Figure 2.  Arena of the Great Game.130 
But as Russian focus turned toward the unique operating environment of Central 
Asia, the military adapted techniques to the environment and the enemy they faced. 
Logistics of a military campaign on the steppes “required months of planning to 
accumulate the necessary supplies” as Perovski’s ill-fated 1839 expedition demonstrated 
with a year and a half of preparation at Orenburg.131 This massing and preparation 
certainly had the effect of telegraphing intent to launch a military expedition, even if it 
was not clear where the pending expedition would head.132 Russia would later adapt 
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from these large expeditions requiring months or years to prepare for, opting for smaller, 
flexible forces. 
As Russia’s foothold strengthened in the Caucasus, and its position was 
established in Europe, Russia expanded south and west. General Perovski’s failed 1839 
expedition into Central Asia, and later, his establishment of a settlement on the bank of 
the Syr-Darya133 marked a decisive turn in Russia’s attention to what Tsar Nicholas I 
called the “empty space” of Central Asia.134 As an interesting historical footnote and 
striking parallel to part of Russia’s stated motives for going to war with Ukraine in 2014, 
General Perovski’s expedition had set out to rescue Russian citizens who had been 
enslaved by the Khan of Khiva. Although General Perovski’s expedition was defeated by 
weather, a young British officer was able to secure the release of all 416 Russians.135 In 
another interesting occurrence of the cooperative competition between the British Empire 
and Russia, the Russian ex-slaves were turned over to General Perovski and the British 
officer was thanked by the Tsar.136 The result was, as Robert Baumann states, Russia’s 
“rivalry with England served more as a stimulant than a deterrent to Russian expansion, 
impelling Russia to move preemptively in Central Asia.”137  
Russian strategist Nikolai Obruchev said of the prevailing outlook at the time that 
“Russia, leaning on Asia, seems with respect to Europe the greatest of powers, 
invulnerable either from the rear or the flank.”138 Russia was certainly enjoying all of the 
trappings of an Empire. As was the imperative at the time, Russia continued to advance 
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along its frontiers into contested or unclaimed areas of Asia. What the Russians found 
seemed backward to them, and feed the Imperial-racism attitude that was prevalent in 
Russia and Europe at the time. 
All of the preparation and adaptation of the Russian military seem almost 
unnecessary when one considers the weak condition of the armed forced of Bukhara (the 
strongest of the Central Asian states at that time).139 Reforms started in the 1830s were 
never completed, leaving Bukhara with a military force heavily reliant on conscription 
and “thus remained partly medieval in structure, technology and training.”140 Even as 
late as the 1860s, the Bukharan artillery was a mix of pieces, most of which could not be 
adjusted for elevation.141 The small arms were mostly matchlocks which allowed 
Russian forces nearly double the range of effective fires.142  
1. Military-Led Expansion 
Writing of the fort established by General Perovski in 1847, Eugene Schuyler 
notes that it is at “the junction of all the trade routes in Central Asia, as the road from 
Orenburg meets here with the Khivan, Bukharan, and Tashkent roads.143 Although 
General Perovski’s first expedition was not successful, it began an avalanche of 
exploration and expansion into Central Asia. 
Prior to General Perovski’s expedition, there had been sporadic military forays 
into Central Asia, going back to Peter the Great, with mixed results. Just as the Russians 
had done in the Caucasus, they established a line of forts along the border of the 
steppes.”144 These forts, guarded by Cossack settlers, served both as a deterrent to 
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Kazakh raiders, but also as launching points for Russian raids.145 This system of 
manning a series of outposts, then conducting patrols along the frontier areas, augmented 
by retaliatory raids was the Russian staple of dealing with the irregular threat until the 
Empire subsumed them.  
After years of chasing Kazakh raiding parties from the northern line of forts, 
Russians and Cossacks began to target the logistical support of the Kazakh raiders. 
Russian commanders directed “their punitive raids against Kazakh villages and 
encampments for the purpose of driving off cattle, destroying property, and demoralizing 
the populace.”146 Well before the Crimean War, the steppes were under the thumb of 
Russian-appointed chieftains (with a 200-man Cossack bodyguard) who reported either to 
the administration in Western Siberia or Orenburg.147 
The Russian belief that it must maintain the prestige of a Great Power, combined 
with the belief overwhelming initial violence as General Skobelev articulated, 
characterized Russian campaigns in Central Asia. Russia wanted to “inflict a cult of fear 
upon their opponents” in Central Asia.148 This initial harshness would stand in stark 
contrast to the treatment after the conflict; a policy that led to tactics which sought to 
make the battles violent and meter out “maximum destruction” for the “psychological 
effect.”149  
After the ill-fated rescue raid on Khiva, the Khanate of Kokand attempted to 
supplant Khiva as Russia’s largest threat in Central Asia. Tsar Nicholas I issued an order 
to solve “the difficulty of controlling a border territory inhabited by nomadic, semi-
barbarous tribes”150 by systematically advancing and subduing local resistance on the 
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steppe. Using a system of flying detachments sent out from the outposts, Russian forces 
continually spread into Kokand, defeating and pushing the nomadic inhabitants back.  
After 1847, campaigns crossing the Kazahk steppe would transit the Syr-Darya 
river during the summer, as opposed to waiting for winter to cross the great expanse.151 
Once underway, new regulations were passed which allowed “men to march in 
shirtsleeve order, carrying only a musket and a bag of ammunition across the shoulder. 
Their greatcoats and satchels were carried on carts or across artillery gun carriages and 
the men were allowed to march freely, without observing the rigid marching-step.”152 
Tactically, much was learned and transferred from the Caucasus experience to the 
Central Asian forces. Russian forces no longer preferred to travel in long column with the 
trains extended behind the main column and lightly guarded. Instead, Russian forces 
perfected the “technique of ‘carrying the column in a box’ as the only way to avoid defeat 
in detail” against the raiding parties that attacked and then vanished into the steppe.153 
General Skobelev stated that “the main principle of Asiatic tactics is to observe close 
formations.”154 These formations would then march toward their objectives “without any 
continuous defended lines of communication, moving rather like ships at sea.”155 In 
another deviation from the European norms of the time, expeditionary forces would have 
their advance guard within sight of the main body, and pickets of infantry or screens of 
Cossack cavalry would guard the logistics trains placed internal to the main body.156  
These alterations, which represented a complete departure from what the 
Orenburg line and West Siberian line forces were accustomed to, were learned over time 
and constituted best practices and “practical experience by the local unit 
commanders.”157 Even ruses were employed by the Russians to gain military advantage. 
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In 1857 a Russian military commander, when ambushed by Turkomans, “dispersed them 
with fireworks” effectively.158 Ruses aside, the revolutionary innovation in the 
military—the departure from European-style warfare—was critical to Russia’s success in 
Central Asia. As they faced irregular opponents they were forced to adapt irregular 
methods.  
Russia also brought the latest weapons technology to bear (when it could afford to 
do so), thanks to the Russian General Staff’s preoccupation with the scientific 
improvement of warfare.159 The flying detachments of Russian Cossack cavalry were 
armed with rocket batteries which are the “direct technological antecedents of the 
fearsome Soviet Katyusha rocket batteries.”160 These flying detachments and their newly 
found firepower proved “particularly effective in Central Asia in shattering the attack of 
the Asiatic cavalry.”161 One cannot help but see a resemblance between the Russian 
small, mobile detachments with impressive firepower and modern U.S. Special 
Operations Forces backed by close air support.  
The Russians moved from the mouth of the Syr River at the Caspian Sea inward, 
capturing Ak Mechet in 1853.162 In a large pincer movement, another force from the east 
moved from Siberia and encamped in what is now Alma Ata, creating a fortification 
named Vernoe.163 By 1864, Russia had nearly enclosed the entire steppe. In an effort to 
finish the job, a force from Orenburg under Colonel Verevkin and a force from Vernoe 
under Colonel Cherniaev set out toward Chimkent.164 Once Chimkent fell to the 
Russians in 1864, “the entire area was joined to Russia under the governorship of General 
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Cherniaev.”165 Russia spent a decade to learn, as one policymaker found, that “to take 
nomads as subjects is much easier than to hold them in obedience.”166 Russia now had a 
“line of garrisons” south of the Kazakh tribes and bordered against Khiva, Kokand, and 
Bukhara.167  
In an effort to calm the alarm Great Britain felt toward the Russian conquest, 
Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Gorchakov issued a memorandum in November of 
1864 stating that the  
position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized societies which 
are brought into contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing 
no fixed social organization ... the more civilized state is forced, in the 
interests of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to 
exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and 
unsettled character make most undesirable neighbors.168 
The problem Russia had was ambition in the form of military officers who wanted 
to make a name for themselves as well as the irascible political leadership of the 
Khanates. Almost immediately, military operations were mounted against Tashkent, 
which was taken by General Cherniaev in 1865.169  
The resistance Russian forces ran into were simply no match on the battlefield. 
When fighting, commanders would maneuver and fight independent of each other, with 
no single commander in charge. To complicate matters, these groups of fighters were 
divided by ethnic group.170 In one instance, at the battle of Irjar May 1866, supposedly 
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loyal units refused to fight alongside the main body of the Bukharan forces. It likely 
would not have mattered much as the Russian forces crushed the Bukharan army.171 
The Russian Chief of Staff replaced General Cherniaev with General D. I. 
Romanovski who continued to take territory in Bukhara, eventually controlling the fertile 
Fergana Valley, then Ura-tiube along the Syr River by 1866.172 The Russian conquest 
continued nearly unabated through hundreds of battles and skirmishes. Sensing the need 
to disrupt Bukhara’s growing influence in the region, Governor General Kaufman 
attacked and took Samarkand, followed by a destruction of Bukhara’s army.173 By 1869, 
Kokand and Bukhara were Russian protectorates.174  
A contemporary observer noted that “the steppe fortresses…have of late 
considerably lost in importance from the fact that there is no longer any danger of 
disturbance from the Kirghiz steppe, but far more, and almost exclusively, from the 
south, from Khiva and the steppe tribes who sympathize with the Khanate.”175 Governor 
General Kaufman was given the task of subjugating Khiva to “thereby gain control of the 
Amu River all the way to the Afghan frontier.”176 The well-planned attack on Khiva 
utilized five columns from five directions but was not without difficulty.177 It became 
obvious Kaufman’s forces were overwhelmingly powerfully compared to the Khivans—
the Russians lost only 17 Soldiers—forcing Khiva to surrender to Russia in 1873.178  
Subjugation meted out at the end of a gun was the order of the day. In a report by 
Pichugin to General Skobelev, Pichugin states “we do not need a police force…[i]nstead 
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we need the bayonet, military dictatorship, and for responsibility to rest with a 
commander who has unlimited powers over a defined area.”179  
Although by 1875 Khokand was a de facto protectorate of the Russian Empire, 
internal regime change threated the tacit loyalty of the elite and brought the fear of 
British-backed opposition to the Khanate.180 During the political leadership turmoil, 
raiders from the Ferghana Valley were harassing Russian outposts.181 The Russian 
military responded to the abstract political danger and the immediate security threat by 
mounting a series of punitive raids, beginning with the Khoqandi sanctuary of the 
Ferghana Valley.182 
The fighting was as brutal as any during Russia’s century of conquest in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus. General Skobelev’s force defeated a large Khokandi force on 
their way into the Ferghana Valley. Then, the Russians struck out viciously for nearly a 
month as they captured many of the population centers, including the capital city.183 A 
civilian on Governor General Kaufman’s staff wrote of General Skobelev that he “knew 
no bounds in [his] inhumane treatment of people” during the campaign.184  
Even though the punitive campaign against Khokand was successful in bringing 
about another treaty with the Khannate, Russia was unable to maintain much control over 
the area because of “internal strife and instability, in part fostered by the Russian 
presence.”185 It was not simply the Russian presence that was causing disturbance, but 
rather the Russian brutality without the second half of General Skobelev’s policy: 
kindness after defeat.  
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In response, Russia moved military garrisons into the area to control roads and 
passes from the Ferghana valley but never had much success using their conventional 
forts and raids technique. Khokand rebels would find refuge in small groups among the 
population and strike at will at the Russians, then return to their safe areas.186 This 
inability to control the supposedly subjugated people through conventional use of forces 
and fortresses caused the Russians to adapt tactics to the irregular foe. 
Governor General Kaufman ordered that a local commander, Mirza Abdullah, 
raise a significant number of forces to “look after the safety of communications between” 
two outposts.187 This local militia would eventually come under command of Colonel 
Pichugin who would combine rifle battalions, batteries of artillery, Cossack cavalry and 
local militia to form a raiding force which “carried out punitive operations in nearby 
villages on both banks of the” Syr-Darya river.188  
Colonel Pichugin decided to undertake the most significant of these punitive raids 
due to his growing concern of the support rebels were receiving from the surrounding 
mountainous region. He tailored his force for the raid, leaving behind his artillery to 
increase his mobility and speed, which was a departure from both the tactics of the time 
and lessons learned by the Russians in the Caucasus.189 Colonel Pichugin also force 
marched his raiders overnight, arriving at the village of Oshoba at dawn on the 18th of 
November.190 Although this move failed to achieve surprise, his forces quickly 
eliminated all resistance and razed the village before marching out of the mountains.191 
The episode bears striking resemblance to Tolstoy’s The Raid and illustrates how much 
influence the campaign in the Caucasus still had on the Army. 
What is more remarkable than Pichugin’s departure from the doctrine is the 
tenacity of resistance to the Russian force. In his own report to Governor General 
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Kaufman, Pichugin states with some measure of surprise that “the women threw 
themselves with knives at the soldiers or threw stones at them from the roofs” and that 
“not one of the [rebels] would surrender.”192 What is clearly visible is the “alarming 
brutality of the Russian campaign of pacification” toward the end of nearly a century of 
warfare in the Caucasus and Central Asia.193 Brutality was the norm and was doing the 
Russians no favors.  
When the peace with Khiva was signed, it was incredibly favorable to Russia, just 
as the treaties with Bukhara and Kokand had been. Three years later, Russia put down an 
uprising in Kokand and in February 1876, Tsar Alexander II “proclaimed the annexation 
of the entire Kokand region.”194 This had the effect of creating a more direct rule by 
Russia over the region. It also signaled to Britain that Russian primacy of involvement 
had been established north of the Amu-Darya.  
In fact, around that same time, Britain was seeking approval to place 
governmental officials in Afghanistan to prevent the Russians from further 
encroachment. Russia eventually made a counter offer to the emir of Afghanistan 
“offering military training and promising to come to the aid of Afghanistan in the event 
of an invasion by a ‘foreign power’ whose identity was obvious.”195  
The Turkoman tribes in modern day Turkmenistan were the last to fall in Central 
Asia. Part of the delay in Russian attention was the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78. The 
war once again showed St. Petersburg that, as compared to other European powers, 
Russia “was not in a financial and military sense the equal of her competitors.”196 This 
was apparent, despite the fact the war was “even more successful” than the war of 1826–
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28.197 An exposure of such weakness only two decades after the same outcome of the 
Crimean War certainly stung Tsar Alexander II and the Russian psyche. 
Despite the delay, Russia did send a military expedition into Transcaspia to 
subdue the Turkomans. The first expedition cornered the semi-nomadic Turkomans at the 
Geok Tepe fortress in the Teke oasis. Hubris on the part of the Russians led to a rushed 
attack and subsequent, brutal hand-to-hand combat. The Russians were forced to retreat 
in disorder after nearly 500 casualties.198 Another operation was launched and the 
Turkomen again retreated to the fortress of Geok Tepe north of Ashkhabad. The 
Russians, not wanting a repeat of the previous engagement, laid classical siege to the 
fortress, finally breaching its walls and, after massive bombardment, proceeding to the 
assault.199 Once inside, the Russians encountered less resistance than had been expected 
as thousands of Turkomen flooded the breaches trying to escape. Unfortunately for those 
in the fortress, “Russian cavalry pursued…and massacred combatants and noncombatants 
alike, killing some 8,000 in all. Approximately 6,500 Turkomans perished inside Geok 
Tepe,” meaning that some 1,500 were struck down outside the fortress walls.200 Russian 
losses for the day’s action were 59 killed.201  
Russian forces captured Merv shortly after the massacre of Goek Tepe in 
1881.202 As a result, Russia achieved its primary goal of intervention in Central Asia, 
namely having a stable, controllable boundary to its Southern Border.203 Russia had 
filled the so-called empty space. It had come as far south as Tsar Alexander II would 
allow, so as not to appear threating to British India. Russia’s financial lagging, as 
demonstrated in both the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War, stood to improve 
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based on the monopoly over trade in the Caspian Sea.204 The outlook was positive for 
future leverage on Iran, which would give Russia greater leverage on Great Britain.205 
There was fleeting hope of large economic development and exploitation, especially the 
hope that the area could be a source of raw cotton, which would challenge the British 
monopoly.206 Fortunately for Central Asia, Russia waited another 40 years before 
beginning the extraction of resources on the scale seen during the Soviet era. This was 
due, in part, to the cash-lacking government’s unwillingness to invest in its new “colonial 
area adjacent to her own territory.”207 
2. Imperial Hubris 
Under the affirmation of Tsar Alexander II, the Turkestan governor-generalship 
was established which centralized all military and civilian authority into a single 
leader.208 The Russian leadership moved deliberately and cautiously as they 
implemented Russian order and administration to the territories and oblasts. They wished 
to prevent a backlash like the Russians felt in the Caucasus. This style of administration 
blended well with how contemporaries viewed the problems they faced. As Stumm puts 
it,  
[t]he conquests and acquisitions of territory, which followed so closely on 
one another, the continual expeditions and small campaigns against the 
restless border tribes, the moulding of so many new and entirely foreign 
elements, and the difficultly of communications with European Russia, all 
combined, threw many obstacles and impediments in the way of a 
completely organized system of administration.209 
Even with the autocratic government under the Tsar, there was not the forcing 
function to get administrators and bureaucrats from Russia to Central Asia in a similar 
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way as there would be under the Soviet regime.210 Some Russian colonization occurred, 
but it was only encouraged and not directly sponsored by the Russian government. The 
Russian governor-generalships established in Central Asia ensured that Russian citizens 
living abroad would be treated according to Russian law (and exceptionally favorable by 
the colonial regime as compared to natives under the same rule).211 
What was to Russia an asset during the conquest of Central Asia, was a hindrance 
to its very own development as a protectorate. Russia was able to control five million 
people with only 31 battalions spread over three million square miles.212 It was able to 
achieve this incredible economy of force because of a lack of nationalist identity around 
which to coalesce a resistance to Russian rule and the undeveloped states of the tribes 
when Russia moved into Central Asia.213 It is also plausible that the Russian approach 
was effective in building a deterrent to would-be insurgents. The unfortunate tradeoff was 
that Central Asia experienced less involvement by Russia, when compared to French or 
British protectorates around the globe, and therefore considerably less development.214  
Throughout the Great Game, Russia sought to enhance its standing through 
territorial acquisition or enlarging influence on its neighboring states. Inasmuch as 
control and influence kept other great powers out of Russia’s sphere of influence, Russia 
was determined to ensure those buffer states remained a stable periphery. Throughout the 
winding course of the Great Game, Russia’s officers and agents abroad consistently 
pursued a deliberate path to ensure greater control, and therefore greater stability, where 
it believed unrest or potential upheaval was a risk. One hears echoes of Putin’s not-so-
veiled threats to current Central Asian regime leaders. 
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In part, the need to continually advance and expand Imperial Russia’s influence 
was driven by a “neurotic obsession amongst ruling elites with the maintenance of 
‘prestige’” and concern over Russia’s great power status.215 It was coupled with a 
significant air of superiority and prejudices—common to most colonial powers of the 
time—which meant that Russian leaders “did not see Central Asia’s states as rational, but 
as savage, backward, unreliable, an amenable only to force.”216 
Russia continuously justified intervention in foreign countries affairs by 
protecting Russian or Orthodox Christian populations. Both Russo-Turkish wars, the 
Crimean War and early intervention in Khiva can at least partly be traced back to 
Russia’s stated desire to protect Russians or Christians. Such a pretext for war has 
amazing commonality to what was publicly stated with regard to the intervention in 
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
Russia also found itself competing against nations with much deeper pockets, 
while simultaneously constantly working against financial limitations. From the scorched 
earth and destruction of Moscow during the Napoleonic campaign to the second Russo-
Turkish war, Russia emerged militarily successful but economically vulnerable.  
C. MILITARY LEGACY 
Russia’s initial forays into Central Asia were failures. Russian officers attempted 
to operate against an irregular enemy in a harsh environment without adapting. Officers 
with experience in the Caucasus, where adaptation was seen as necessary for quite some 
time, brought those tactics to the battle fields of Central Asia and adapted them further. 
The most significant adaptation was the departure from large expeditionary forces. The 
protection of the baggage train internal to the marching column, lightening the individual 
soldier’s load via relaxed marching and uniform standards, the close formations for 
mutual protection were all novel adaptations in the face of an irregular enemy.  
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The use of flying detachments of Cossacks throughout the entire Great Game 
episode is notable as it enabled Russia to use far fewer regular soldiers than it would have 
had to otherwise use. It also provided unmatched flexibility on the battlefield. The 
Cossacks were nearly as nimble as the nomads of the steppes but were equipped with 
modern weapons and military discipline. Although used in various ways throughout the 
century of warfare and expansion, Russia’s use of the Cossacks as a loyal proxy element 
is obviously a tactic not abandoned in modernity.  
The fact that Russian commanders were using forces purpose-built for certain 
missions—and that the commanders on the ground had the operational flexibility to do 
so—allowed those commanders to achieve unparalleled gains with relatively few forces. 
It also facilitated the economy of force strategy by allowing one force to be tailored and 
morphed into an appropriate organization to handle new and challenging circumstances 
as they arose. Both the operational flexibility and the organizational customizability of 
the Russian forces in Central Asia played a key part in Russian victory.  
The strategy employed throughout most of the campaigns in Central Asia was the 
calculated and deliberate use of “shock and awe” followed by a broad and stoic peace. 
The choice to wage a certain style of warfare for psychological benefit thereof shows a 
depth of thought that is not often assumed when the Russian campaigns in Central Asia 
are studied. The choice is, however, exceedingly important in that the effect of the 
deliberate, initial brutality when coupled with kindness may have helped create a 
deterrent, again aiding the economy of force. The opposite is also evident when social 
issues were not addressed and Russian heavy handedness was not followed with 
compassion, insurrection and rebellion occurred.  
Russia left Central Asia with a legacy of harsh autocratic government built on a 
single leader wielding incredible power. Imperial Russia yielded colonies to the Soviet 
Union which were ripe for plunder and exploitation, and later the Soviets did exactly that. 
Today, the mechanisms used by Russia to complete the conquest have their modern 
Russian doppelgangers, and may be useful to gaining a full understanding of Russian 
warfare.  
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IV. FRACTURED EMPIRE 
A. IMPERIAL RUSSIA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
The Russian empire began to disintegrate well before the Germans smuggled 
Nikolai Lenin (later Vladimir Ilich Lenin) into Russia to foment dissension and 
demoralize the Russian Army to the point its army would collapse on the Eastern front of 
the Great War.217 Before Lenin and Trotsky assumed control over all of the various 
Socialist factions and began calling themselves the Bolshevik—or Majority—Party, there 
were decades of upheaval and turmoil in Russia. 
Reform had been slow to come to Russia compared with the rest of Europe. Only 
in the 1860s was serfdom abolished in Imperial Russia, with little practical effect for 
most peasants’ lives.218 Later, the Industrial Revolution took labor from the fields and 
sent it to the factories which in turn created a series of food shortages and still did not 
improve most Russians’ lives.219 Years of a poor economy, exacerbated by the scarcity 
of common food items, and poor performance during the Russo-Japanese War brought 
these governance failures to a head in Russia.220 Calls for reform, representation, and 
elections grew, uniting various sects of the population. On Sunday, January 9th, 1905, 
protests all over St. Petersburg were put down and dispersed with volley after volley of 
rifle fire from Russian troops.221 
As it would later be called, Blood Sunday touched off a string of mass 
demonstrations, riots, and mutinies across Russia which would last over a year. Tsar 
Nicholas II made declarations and proposals in February which “he had intended as 
evidence of magnanimity” but were seen as “cowardice and weakness” which resulted in 
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increasing tensions rather than alleviating them.222 Eventually, Tsar Nicholas would 
deliver his October Manifesto, where during a speech on the evening of October 17th he 
outlined the creation of the State Duma and enumerated the rights of conscience, speech, 
assembly, and association.223 
Although the proclamation was initially well received, instead of quelling the 
riotous attitudes it stimulated them.224 The Tsar enacted a campaign of military 
pacification, largely targeting the peasantry.225 The punishments were public and brutal 
and again served to increase (in places) the desire for workers and serfs to strike and 
protests.226 After a particularly brutal month of state repression, the issues were 
successfully forced underground, only to surface a decade later under the stress of World 
War I.227  
B. IMPERIAL RUSSIA BREAKS UNDER STRESS 
Russia unraveled under the pressure of years of bloody warfare with Germany 
during World War I. The war brought up the tensions which had been suppressed but not 
dealt with a decade earlier. Domestic turmoil under the pressure of a world war gave the 
opportunity to various groups in opposition to the Tsarist government. As historian Allen 
Chew summarized,  
In March 1917 the centuries-old czarist autocracy collapsed under the 
pressure of war, corruption, and social and economic dislocation. The 
inept Provisional Government that replaced the monarchy, plagued by 
internal strife and lacking popular support for its efforts to continue the 
disastrous war, fell easy prey to a Bolshevik military coup in November 
1917. Four months later the Bolsheviks made good their well-publicized 
promise to remove Russia from the war by concluding a separate peace 
treaty with Germany. This “betrayal” caused considerable consternation 
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among Russia’s former allies. They [the Allies] feared that Germany 
might transfer hundreds of thousands of troops from Russia to the western 
front, where the war was still raging. Also cause for alarm was the 
possibility that Allied war materiel in Russia might fall into German hands 
or be used by the Bolsheviks-who espoused the violent eradication of the 
existing international order-to consolidate their hold on the country.228 
As Michel Garder characterized the situation, Russia had been “totally 
disorganized by three years of foreign war and an ensuing year of anarchy.”229 This left a 
significant power vacuum which the Bolsheviks filled with their Marxist government. As 
if the death and destruction of combat during the Great War was not enough, the legacy 
Russia inherited after the Bolshevik takeover was one of “mass violence” distributed 
across the entire society rather than concentrated at the front lines of a battlefield.230 As 
William Weir said of the Russian experience in World War I, “War was hell everywhere, 
but it was more hellish in Russian than anywhere else.”231 The hellishness spread and 
increased during the civil war.  
There was a conglomeration of anti-Bolshevik movements that formed the 
opposition. Because of disunion and lack of coordination, their message—everything 
from competing socialist voices to the so-called Green anarchist groups—was muddled 
and unclear, all the while making the Bolshevik message much clearer by comparison.232  
From the October 1917 revolution placing the Bolsheviks in charge until peace 
was concluded with the Central Powers in March of 1918, the Russian military was 
generally supportive of Lenin’s government.233 However, that is not to say the period 
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was without strife, turmoil, and bloodshed. In point of fact “widespread conflict took 
place between November 1917 and May 1918.”234  
The Allied forces took note of the Bolsheviks’ desire to overthrow the world 
order. In a little-remembered piece of World War I history, the Allied Supreme War 
Council elected to invade Russia in 1918. This decision was made based on the progress 
of the allies, the desire to keep German forces out of Russia, and the series of 
destabilizing events inside Russia which threatened Western Europe.235 
The Allied opposition to the Bolsheviks was not the only issue Lenin had to 
contend with. The Bolsheviks were fighting other Socialists, Finnish nationalists, and 
Russian elements near Arkhangel’sk (in addition to the allied forces); a Czechoslovakian 
Legion on the Volga; an anti-Bolshevik workers’ army in the Urals and Siberia; Don 
Cossacks and Ukrainian nationalists in the south; and “social revolutionaries,” 
“anarchists,” and various groups of anti-Bolshevik sentiment spread across the 
country.236 Regardless of the foe they faced, the Bolsheviks simplified the military task 
of winning the civil war by concentrating heavily on a single front at a time, initially the 
Northern and Eastern fronts, then the Southern front (the Soviets retrospectively listed the 
other major fronts as being the Caspian, Caucasian, and Western).237 
1. Bolsheviks Take Their Gloves Off 
In response to these threats, the Bolsheviks instituted a policy of Red Terror via 
Lenin’s secret police (the Cheka) in September 1917.238 “Workers who refused to work 
were arrested and drafted into the Red Army; peasants who refused to surrender grain 
were shot…soldiers who refused to fight were shot.”239 Lenin gave the Cheka nearly 
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unrestrained power to enforce the Bolshevik will on the Russian people and military. So-
called anti-revolutionaries were rounded up by the Cheka. Those who were not shot on 
the spot were placed in concentration camps.240  
The actions of the Cheka, rounding up and shooting any opposition or deserters 
including whole Army regiments in some cases, signified that “[a]ll moral restraints were 
now cast aside. Anything was permissible in order to stay in power” for the 
Bolsheviks.241 This understanding permeated every organ of the state Lenin employed, 
as well as the enemies they operated against. Everyone in Russia knew the game was 
being played for keeps. As the Red Army’s handbook stated: “our army is so called 
because it spills blood under the red flag…and therefore the color of our banner is the 
color of blood.”242 As the conclusion of the Great War’s eastern front by the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty allowed, the Bolsheviks were able to concentrate on internal threats and 
launched the country deeper into a terribly bloody civil war. 
The burgeoning Soviet apparatus was flexible, following Lenin’s dictum of 
changing the methods to the conditions.243 Although the Red Army grew to five million 
by the end of the civil war, significant initial fighting was unconventional and conducted 
by irregulars.244 As the civil war progressed, partisan groups became indispensable to the 
Red Army’s progress in Ukraine and Siberia.245 
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2. War in the North 
Allied forces landed in the north and gave support to White Russian factions 
centered in Archangel.246 While the intervention was limited in scope (fewer 15,000 
soldiers were employed by either side) and in duration (the expedition lasted from the 
Fall of 1918 to October 1919, which is strange because the armistice ending World War I 
was signed on the 11th of November, 1918)247 it does provide a few examples of how the 
Bolsheviks fought and employed irregular warfare. 
In the northern campaign, neither the allies nor the Reds were particularly well 
equipped to fight in the waist deep snow and temperatures reaching double-digits below 
zero.248 As British General Sir Edmond Ironside noted, except for the Canadians, 
“[t]here were no troops trained to run on skis or snow-shoes” among the allied forces.249 
Because both sides were unprepared for the terrain, they were both forced to rely on 
natives for logistical support and for adjunct guerrilla forces. General Ironside feared that 
the Bolsheviks “might be able to develop a vicious guerrilla warfare against” the allied 
forces.250 While the Bolsheviks did not entirely rely on irregular forces in the northern 
campaign (or any other campaign), irregulars were a critical component of it. 
As the Red and White factions fought in the province, the battle lines solidified 
around the lines of communication in that Northern Province.251 This created a porous 
line, perfectly susceptible to irregular raiding forces. Colonel Moore, the commander of 
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the 339th Infantry, wrote that the front line “did not form a continuous line but were a 
series of occupied positions at vital points, more or less fortified.”252 
Liudmila Novikova’s assessment is that the initial use irregular forces by the 
Bolsheviks in Arkhangel’sk province was limited because the Allied expeditionary force 
re-took the capital city in August 1918, and therefore maintained control of most of the 
province’s population (for two more years).253 While General Ironside suggests that the 
peasants “were anxious to free their own villages, but to free any other village was of 
little interest to them.”254 While the peasantry may have had limited desire to fight 
beyond their own villages, the Bolsheviks were keen to expand and consolidate control 
through any means. However, the main Bolshevik forces—the revolutionary elements of 
the Russian Army combined with the Red Guard—while full of enthusiasm, were drained 
by years of war and ranks filled with “self-formed, self-directed” units.255256 These units 
“were not suitable as a long-range military or militia force” without significant external 
pressure to perform.257  
3. The Population Suffers, But Fights 
Local peasantry living within striking distance of the battle lines suffered greatly. 
Villages were looted and exploited for “food, horses, cattle and fodder” as well as forced 
labor for the Red partisan units in Arkhangel’sk province.258 The Russian peasants found 
that they were unable to maintain their neutrality during the civil war. At best, villages 
could form organic guerrilla units and then give tacit allegiance to whichever master they 
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were under. Peasants would then survive by conducting their own raids—one of the only 
ways to recapture enough foodstuffs to survive through winter—as well as provide local 
security.259 Many of the villagers who suffered at the hands of these marauding bandits-
turned-partisans vowed to protect themselves and their villages in turn, thus growing the 
number of partisan elements on both sides but also increasing the extreme violence and 
brutality that characterized the Russian civil war. In fact, joining in on the raids became 
“a form of self-protection for the local peasantry.”260 It was also seen as a temporary 
allegiance by some of these groups, who deserted, defected or mutinied when it was 
favorable for them to do so.261 
For peasants living under the Whites, anything but active resistance was seen as 
guilt by association when Red forces prowled through the area. In addition to the burden 
imposed by looting and requisitioning food, arbitrary punishment and indiscriminate 
violence wrought by Red partisan elements became so severe that the 6th Red Army 
command had to take action to attempt to curtail the violence.262  
Despite a few local partisan commanders’ censures, “these close-knit voluntary 
units constituted the backbone of the Bolshevik domination in the region, and the Red 
command often turned a blind eye to their atrocities.”263 The Bolsheviks’ need for total 
control was such that they were tolerant of any cost in human life and wanton violence. 
The Reds relied on them so much that they gave them “army food ration and monetary 
allowances” as well as a share of the loot from their successful raids.264 This allowance 
was most likely made because Bolshevik leadership was uncertain how to handle these 
independent forces upon which they relied so heavily.265 The benefits given to and the 
positive handling of these irregular forces was the nascent stages of an answer to the 
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‘military question’—or how the Bolsheviks would re-tool the Red Army so that it was 
more firmly under the thumb of the political apparatus.266 
Once formed, most partisan groups were centered on the defense of their home 
villages. Some groups were motivated to oppose the Bolsheviks by religion, and a few 
were led by Orthodox Priests.267 Just as the Bolshevik forces found out that the Red 
Guard forces were ill-suited to operations, these primary motivating factors for White 
partisans meant that when they were ordered to support the White Army in other 
locations, they deserted in droves, hampering the conventional force they were tasked 
with supporting.268 They could also be exceptionally brutal.  
4. Irregulars Incorporated 
Initially, the Whites were less supportive of the violent, semi-independent, 
irregular forces materializing along the front, perhaps because of the allied support and 
felt lack of necessity. The effectiveness of the irregulars on the battlefield eventually 
drove the acceptance of partisan elements by the Whites.269 For the partisans themselves, 
the motivation was remarkably similar to those who were fighting for the Bolsheviks. 
The peasants-turned-guerrilla fighters wanted to protect their villages, recoup enough 
looted foodstuffs to ensure survival and seek revenge for previous injuries.270 The White 
headquarters also began to offer food and money for the services rendered by the partisan 
bands.271 There were, however, significant costs to using these extremely violent 
elements. 
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One report after a skirmish with a Red patrol stated that the 19 captured “died 
after interrogation”272 Another report acknowledged the 58 captured Red Army soldiers 
were “liquidated.”273 In a particularly gory scene, the White government in Arkhangel’sk 
“received reports of ice holes in the Pechora River that were filled with the frozen bodies 
of Bolshevik sympathizers and Red Army soldiers killed by the White partisans.”274 To 
be fair, the Whites and their irregulars—to the extent they could control them—did not 
have a monopoly on brutality or violence during the civil war, but the Whites’ cause 
probably suffered to a greater extent because of it. 
The unintended consequence of this level of unchecked brutality was that it cut 
off the flow of deserters from the Red Army to the Whites.275 It also provided the 
Bolsheviks with copious propaganda opportunities to exploit, which they were more 
adept at exploiting in the first place.276 Although the White leadership in Arkhangel’sk 
headquarters attempted in vain to stop the terror by the partisan units, it would have little 
effect on what was happening along the front. The White authorities would “tolerate the 
partisans’ brutality because the White defense heavily relied on these voluntary guerrilla 
units.”277 
Despite the limits of peasants-turned-partisans, the Red Army soon began to rely 
on ski detachments of partisan forces for raids and reconnaissance operations. The 
Communist forces found that the local partisans were much more mobile than the Red 
Army’s conventional forces. During one operation, partisans captured the sentries 
guarding an allied garrison. The partisans then guided the Red Army force to their 
objective, achieving a complete route of the French and White Russian troops.278 
Another episode witnessed a particularly brutal operation by Bolshevik irregulars dressed 
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in peasant’s clothes. They approached the sentries as peasants but then the guards were 
“coldly butchered” with axes, save one survivor who was taken prisoner.279 
Another Red Army operation used larger partisan detachments as a 
reconnaissance and raiding force. Detachments of 150 partisans, which were more mobile 
than their conventional counterparts, were given independent military objectives that 
supported the main army’s operation, but were geographically too dispersed to be 
handled by the main force.280 Similarly, Bolshevik forces used “marauding parties…far 
in our rear” to disrupt allied lines of communication.281 They were also used in much 
smaller bands to scout and gather intelligence.282 These independent forces, conducting 
independent but supporting operations echo the flying columns of irregular forces 
Davydov used to whittle away the French army.  
In addition to direct combat support roles, the Red army used partisan forces to 
prepare advanced supply stores in key locations. This included food and ammunition as 
well as medicine and fodder for pack animals.283 Even though the Red army (as well as 
the allied forces) were exposed to the partisan’s use of felt-lined boots, skis, winter 
camouflage, and snowshoes, it took quite some time and probably an unnecessary 
expenditure of lives for the Red Army leadership to acknowledge the necessity of 
incorporating specialized arctic weather training into the army.284  
This independence streak was a sticking point for the communists. Many units 
which tacitly professed loyalty to the Bolshevik cause were only concerned with local 
matters, and “often disregarded an order from Trotsky, the People’s Commissar of 
                                                 
279 Joel R. Moore, Harry H. Mead, and Lewis E. Jahns, The History of the American Expedition 
Fighting the Bolsheviki: Campaigning in North Russia 1918–1919 (Detroit, MI: The Polar Bear Publishing 
Company, 1920), 144, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/scd0001.00019207900. 
280 Chew, Fighting the Russians in Winter, 10. 
281 Moore, Mead, and Jahns, The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki: 
Campaigning in North Russia 1918–1919, 144. 
282 Ironside, Archangel, 1918–1919, 90–91. 
283 Chew, Fighting the Russians in Winter, 10. 
284 Ibid., 13. 
 58 
War.”285 The specter of disobedience and questionable loyalty would greatly affect 
Soviet leadership in the interwar period and the mechanism they would use to control 
partisans during World War II. As Kenneth Slepyan put it, their “experience with partisan 
warfare during the Civil War had demonstrated that partisans were impossible to control 
and that their political reliability could not be guaranteed.”286  
C. FORESHADOWING AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
In the southern campaign, partisan activity behind the lines of the White forces 
played “an important part” in supporting the Red Army.287 The partisan effort in the 
south was a much more accurate foreshadowing of how the Soviets would attempt to use 
partisan forces during the Second World War. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the 
harsh treatment the Whites imposed on Bolshevik sympathizers, and leveraging loyal 
political officers, conducted unconventional warfare by inserting agents into Crimea to 
link up with these disenfranchised populations behind the White forces.288 In one 
example, Comrade Mokrousov, “the organizer of the revolutionary movement in the 
Crimea,” was in charge of several hundred partisans within weeks of being inserted 
behind the Whites.289  
The advancing Red Army “supplied detailed directives to Ukrainian partisans” in 
an attempt to coordinate partisan operations with the Red Army’s advance. Partisans 
were used to scout for advancing units as well as “capture and retain important bases and 
railroad lines, disrupt the enemy’s line of retreat, and prevent the enemy from destroying” 
lines of communication “in the path of the advancing forces.”290 
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While the Whites attempted to link their forces in the south with anti-Soviet 
forces in Poland, the endeavor failed.291 The isolated Whites continued to resist, but 
eventually were defeated. The Soviet history records that this “was the result of the 
accumulation of Soviet forces in this sector of the front and the improvement in their 
combat efficiency.”292 While true, the Bolshevik use of irregular units behind the 
Whites’ lines in Ukraine was significant to the extent that it foreshadowed how Soviet 
partisans would be used during World War II. Trusted political agents would be inserted 
to ensure Soviet allegiance of the occupied peoples and coordinate supporting operations 
with the Red Army.  
The Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1920 “profoundly affected the Red Army. In the 
short term, it was a painful humiliation. In the long term, it was the spur to self-
improvement” prior to the Second World War.293 It was a theater where Charles de 
Gaulle, Wladyslaw Sikorski, and Mikhail Tukhachevsky all participated and which 
“provided an important stimulus to their thinking.”294 It was a theater of conflict which 
relied greatly upon mobility and irregulars. Poles regularly used partisan bands to screen 
their lines, and in one instance, used “a wave of partisan raids on the Soviet rear” to 
paralyze a significant Soviet force.295  
De Gaulle’s impression of the Polish-Soviet War left him with the sense that 
technology would allow forces to combine the high mobility of that theater with the 
firepower seen in the trench warfare of World War I.296 Sikorski’s experience led him to 
correctly outline in Przysla Wojna (The Future War) how Hitler’s Wehrmacht would use 
tanks during blitzkrieg.297 Although Tukhachevsky was somewhat isolated politically 
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within the Soviet hierarchy, his ideas were eventually published—30 years after they 
were written in 1931.298 Each of these military thinkers drew insight from the irregular 
tactics, the speed and the mobility they each experienced during the Polish-Soviet War. 
In addition to the other major campaigns, the Bolsheviks faced the Basmachi 
revolt, other counter-revolutionary obstacles and the threat of British in Central Asia.299 
The Basmachi movement, which had been smoldering for some time, gained significant 
support in 1920 in the Ferghana valley.300 Promised reforms were never carried out by 
the Soviet government and these causes quickly became a rallying cry for disenfranchised 
locals across Central Asia.301 The Bolsheviks were forced by a Muslim army to give up 
control of the countryside around Tashkent, and nearly lost the city itself.302  
In the initial stages of revolt, the Basmachi ranks were flooded with ex-Red Army 
Muslim soldiers who defected.303 After conventional Soviet forces’ pacification efforts 
failed, the Soviet leadership decided to create “detachments of ‘Soviet Basmachis’” that 
were able to fight the natives in the native style.304 The attempt failed, as “they suddenly 
turned their weapons against the authorities” in an episode evocative of the so-called 
green-on-blue that would plague the United States in Afghanistan.305  
By 1922, after years of hard fighting, the Soviets had pacified the Fergana valley 
and killed their leader Enver Pasha (who was originally the Soviet choice to lead a force 
against the Basmachi), forcing much of the movement to the fringes of Central Asia.306 
It took Russia over 100,000 soldiers and over a decade, (as well as the complete political 
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reorganization of the governments in Central Asia) to finally extinguish the Basmachi in 
1933.307  
How the Soviets dealt with the Basmachi revolt is significant in that is shows the 
opportunity cost associated with failing to incorporate the local people into governance or 
to address their concerns and grievances. Much of the eventual success the Soviets had 
was due to Lenin’s economic policies toward the region coupled with a toleration of 
Muslim institutions.308 Had these measures been enacted during the Bolshevik 
revolution, when the peoples of Central Asia were demanding them, the Soviets could 
have likely prevented much of the consternation and revolt they instead fostered by their 
heavy-handed tactics.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The last half-century of Imperial Russia saw the gap between the elite and the 
peasant in Russia narrow little, even though much change had come to Russia and the 
Russian economy.309 With the losses during the Russo-Japanese War and the domestic 
revolt in 1905–06 the Russian government was shaken, but not defeated. World War I 
brought the final blow to the Russia Empire. The Great War created the void 
revolutionaries were looking for; it weakened the “material strength of the government 
and the will of the men” who governed to hold back the tide of change.310 
The Russian people suffered immensely under the pressures of the Great War and 
the social upheaval-turned-revolution afterward. The violence and destruction were such 
that it unraveled Russian society and paved the way for the Bolshevik revolution. The 
years of internal strife and external conflict before the civil war removed any holds on the 
levels of violence that were to be used during the civil war.311  
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Because the military apparatus had been worn so thin and the population stretched 
to breaking, the Russian civil war devolved into a massive, bloody brawl, spread across 
the country. Irregular forces on both sides operated in this context without much (or any) 
restraint or control from a headquarters or central government.  
The Whites were disorganized and uncoordinated, attempting to hold together or 
reconstruct various vestiges of governance which failed Russia up to that point. There 
was no central voice for the Whites. The separate fronts during the civil war had “no 
means of communicating with each other.”312 There were no consolidated offenses, and 
there was, at least initially, a hesitancy to use partisans or other irregulars, at a time when 
any and every opposition to the Bolsheviks was needed.  
Both sides succumbed to the military temptation to replace strategy with violence 
to cow the opposition and subdue the population. In the case of the Whites in the north, 
reliance on irregulars to mete out indiscriminate violence limited and then stopped Red 
soldiers defecting.313 At the same time, this provided the Bolsheviks with ample 
propaganda tying White leadership to “corruption, elitism, and brutality, everything that 
was repressive about Imperial Russia.314 This was, even more, the case with the 
Bolsheviks, as they not only brutalized any opposition but often their own units or 
population if the support rendered to the revolution was not vehement enough. 
The Bolsheviks were able to leverage a decade of preparation against an 
embattled, crumbling political structure. The fanatical Bolshevik leadership accepted 
wholesale violence against every enemy in an effort to sustain their revolution and 
impose their Marxists ideology. The Bolshevik strategy “did not pursue limited 
objectives, but aimed at the total destruction of the enemy.”315  
Thus, militarily, they were opportunistic enough to use whatever forces they 
could muster to defeat every enemy or opponent they had. This included the use of 
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various types of irregular forces filling gaps and important adjunct roles for a tattered Red 
Army and fledgling Bolshevik state apparatus.  
Out of the necessity to consolidate control, they tolerated the independent nature 
of some of these groups, later purging dissidents and carrying forward the lessons in the 
partisan operations of the Great Patriotic War. During the revolution, the irregulars 
bolstered the Communist regime and secured their government in a way that no regular 
force then organized could have. 
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V. PARTISANS IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 
Unconventional warfare has gained in importance along with the increase 
in range and destructiveness of weapons. It was a particularly potent factor 
in several theaters of operations during World War II, but in none did it 
play a more significant role than on the Eastern front during that conflict. 
There the guerrilla movement behind the Axis forces gained in importance 
as the Soviet Army withdrew deeper and deeper into its homeland. 
 
— Edgar M. Howell in 
The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944316 
 
A. CONTEXT IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF WORLD WAR TWO 
The Second World War was truly global. Each front of the war had unique and 
challenging aspects. On the German’s Eastern Front, the vast territory and sheer numbers 
of combatants provided a backdrop which, in places, favored irregular military 
operations. Such was the case during Operation Barbarossa. Germany’s invasion force 
stretched itself into the vastness of European Russia while much of the Red Army 
withdrew, evaporated, was captured or was destroyed. The advance of the German army 
provided ample opportunity for Russian irregular warfare in the occupied territories. 
Even though the conditions favored guerrilla warfare, the opportunity was at first 
squandered.  
Like the war itself, the size and scope of activities of partisans, guerrillas, and 
insurgents in the Second World War was enormous. This work will only consider the 
partisan operations of the Russo-German conflict. Even the topic of partisan operations 
along the Eastern front is broad and deep. As one author characterized the factors facing 
the German forces, “the Soviet borderlands essentially constitute an enormous…range of 
different social and cultural conditions, and” thus met with “varying degrees of success in 
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counter-insurgency forces’ efforts to exploit them.”317 To simplify this topic even 
further, this chapter does not distinguish between the factions that fought both the 
German and Soviet forces, at times creating a three-way war.318 Nor will it attempt to 
illuminate the significant differences between Soviet partisans and Ukrainian 
nationalists319—or any number of other factions fighting the Germans (or Soviets)320—
except to acknowledge the distinctions are real, important, and beyond the scope of this 
work. Instead, the chapter will rely on the oversimplification of the Soviet partisan 
against the German army. 
1. The Call For Sacrifice 
An interesting wrinkle in history has allowed, in this instance, for the loser to 
write much of what is available to the English-speaking world. Most of the first-hand 
reports available in English come in the form of captured and translated German 
documents or operational summaries compiled after the war by German practitioners at 
the direction of the Allies.321 These reports allow for an interesting, albeit biased, 
window into the counterinsurgent’s thoughts about and actions against the Soviet 
partisans. As for the Soviet narratives, the accounts of partisan operations adhered strictly 
to the party line for most of the duration of the Soviet Union.322 
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An internal report put out by the German Army High Command in February 1942 
characterizes Russian soldiers as having “an unheard-of absence of need, making them 
more independent of supplies than we are.”323 One German soldier remarked of his 
adversary “the Russian soldier proved to be an extremely tough adversary who…could 
endure the most adverse of conditions.”324 The same German Army High Command 
report later concluded that two characteristics of Russian personality impacted heavily on 
the partisans Germany faced, namely the  
[e]xtraordinary apathy in bearing all kinds of sufferings, and a naturally-
endowed absence of needs. These characteristics alone make it possible 
for Russian leaders to force the soldiers…to hold out to the point of self-
sacrifice. They frequently ignore every consideration of the factors of 
physical and mental weakness, and enable the command to carry out its 
intentions stubbornly and brutally. Treachery, craftiness, cruelty, lack of 
regard even for a defenseless enemy, and complete indifference for their 
own lives, greatly help them. Men and equipment are recklessly sacrificed 
if the situation requires.325  
The German perspective of their bitter foe was not without reason. Published in 
the last few weeks of 1941, The Partisan’s Companion is a pocket-sized pamphlet 
produced to give “portable training and knowledge in survival and offensive capabilities” 
to the would-be Soviet Partisan.326 The pamphlet’s introduction goes further than simply 
offering advice on combat tactics. It gives the political and ideological underlayment for 
the sacrifice the reader will be called on to make. The introduction states “[t]he purpose 
of your life is to justify devotion to the party. Your life, until the last breath, until the last 
drop of blood, belongs to the party.”327 The Partisan’s Companion continues, stating that  
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[t]he suddenness of the attack, the accuracy of firing, the knife’s blow, a 
bold and daring maneuver, confidence in one’s own forces, and the 
preparation to take any suffering for the motherland in battle either on the 
march or in the hated enemy’s hands, are the distinguishing characteristics 
of the Soviet partisan.328  
It is no surprise, then, that the German High Command held the opinion it did in 
1942 when one considers the language and exhortations of Josef Stalin, the political 
officers of the Red Army, and The Partisan’s Companion.  
2. Soviet Self-Imposed Hindrances 
Stalin’s July 3, 1941 speech demanding that the Soviet population “foment 
guerrilla warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and 
telegraph lines” was fiery but did little to organize effective resistance.329 Early partisan 
warfare was plagued by “ineptness of action (lack of experience), losses, a considerable 
degree of collaboration with the Germans by the population and the collapse of the 
territorial organization set up by the Soviet regime.”330 The reason for such a detrimental 
start was simple. Stalin feared partisan success within the country. He learned from the 
Bolshevik Revolution that partisans could be effective militarily but had to be kept loyal 
to the cause.331 
Stalin’s authoritarian rule crippled preparations even before the war began. 
Stalin’s purges in the 1930s, as well as the Soviet doctrine shift, meant that the 
preparations for partisan warfare on Soviet territory were eliminated well before 
Operation Barbarossa.332 In true Soviet fashion, the preparations were not simply 
stopped, they were erased. The later appointed chief of partisan operations, Panteleimon 
Ponomarenko, stated retrospectively that  
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[d]espite a rich tradition and experience of partisan warfare and 
underground activity in previous wars, we did not have a single academic 
work putting this experience in context. The preparations being carried out 
during peacetime for partisan warfare were cut short in the mid-1930s, and 
caches of weapons, supplies and technical equipment created for this end 
were liquidated.333  
Even worse, “most able-bodied male Communists were usually the first to 
respond to mobilization calls to join the Red Army…consequently, it was the less 
physically fit who joined the partisan bands,” and who were available for conscription 
later.334 The remaining Party members, especially in the countryside where resistance 
would be easiest, were “often unfamiliar with the local conditions,” and often sent 
because of their Communist rather than guerrilla credentials.335 These local Party leaders 
not only “lacked proper weapons” but also “found little support from the surrounding 
Soviet populations.”336 In 1941, this relatively avoidable faux pas lead to several hard 
years for the Soviet partisan operations.  
B. GERMAN FAILURE OF INSIGHT AND APPROACH 
If the Soviets did little to prepare effectively for and instigate guerrilla warfare 
behind an advancing German army, the Germans did less to capitalize on the relatively 
warm reception they received in many places along the Eastern front. The Germans failed 
to capitalize on the harsh treatment of many groups under the Soviets during the inter-war 
period. This was due to Hitler’s goal of destroying the Soviet Army as quickly as 
possible, which in turn meant that “whatever success the partisans might achieve in 
controlling territory or influencing the population was insignificant,” as long as it did not 
detract from the operations at the front.337 As one German intelligence officer stated in 
December 1941, “although Soviet citizens had been willing to support the Germans, the 
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unit’s occupation policies…were leading to an increasing anti-German sentiment.”338 
The Germans clearly missed a classic counterinsurgency opportunity. John Armstrong 
points out that the Germans “utterly failed to take advantage of the chance thus offered 
for winning over the Soviet population.”339 
Even if German leadership recognized the anti-Soviet prevailing attitude of many 
within the occupied territory—and capitalized on the open-arms welcome they received 
in some locations such as the Baltic states and eastern Ukraine340—they still would have 
found themselves vulnerable in most of the occupied Russian territory due to their 
ideologically driven dealings with the locals and local government of the occupied areas. 
The German interaction with the occupied territory was implemented by the Goldfasanen 
(Golden Pheasant), the pejoratively described German ministers who lacked the 
“specialized knowledge and training” required to administer government in occupied 
territory.341  
The fact that the Germans systematically destroyed, rather than co-opted, much of 
the existing governmental structure at the time of occupation made sure Germany would 
have to “rely on natives for tasks of everyday administration and policing.”342343 The 
blatant overlooking of security, “allegiance of the population, maintenance of 
institutional patterns or the traditional social system” gave the Soviet partisan a point of 
access to the population that should have been denied by the German occupation 
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force.344 Nazi ideology brought to the eastern front ideas like Untermensch (The 
Subhuman) which were used by Nazi leaders and Nazi propaganda to justify the 
extermination of “Jews, Communist leaders, and other undesirables.”345 Nazi ideology 
was the reason German leadership were unwilling to listen to suggestions such as “the 
population [in occupied Soviet territory] could easily be split from the Soviet and 
attached to the German cause” and that significant military effort was expended “not by 
military necessity but purely by ideological considerations.”346  
The Germans’ dismissal of the usefulness of the occupied Slavic countries—
except in their use as a source of materials and slave labor—bore fruit, over time, for the 
Soviets.347 Soviet partisans were, therefore, able to perform “one service of incalculable 
importance for the Soviet system,” without much of a competing German narrative, 
namely, “they maintained the Soviet presence in the occupied territories.”348  
Theo Schulte states that the German policy of collective reprisal measures and the 
ability to execute suspected insurgents in the field without access to any justice 
proceedings was the “most damning indictment” of Wehrmacht policies in its rear 
areas.349 Perhaps the Army Group Center Rear Area pamphlet issued in October 1941 
demanding that partisans be “utterly annihilated” is worthy of Schulte’s rebuke, as well 
as other similarly harsh orders given during this period.350 In any case, the end result was 
the same. German Army divisions recorded body counts in the thousands and tens-of-
thousands of partisans shot in October and November 1941.351  
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The German leadership squandered the opportunity presented them by Stalin’s 
harsh treatment of his own population. By not exploiting the rift between leader and 
population and then harshly treating an entire population for activities which were limited 
to the “‘shareholders’ of the Soviet system,”352 they fomented rebellion rather than 
pacified the population. German failure to see the vulnerability created behind their lines 
due to their harsh treatment of the population is matched by the early ineffectiveness of 
the partisan units as they tried to survive the first winter of their war. 
C. EARLY PARTISAN OPERATIONS – FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL 
Even with such treatments being leveled by the Germans, the partisans’ ability to 
garner the population’s support varied widely across the Eastern front. Ideology, 
leadership, and operational areas were key factors in determining the success of the 
relationship between the partisan group and the local population.353 More often than not, 
the match was poor, or the local Soviet leadership was guided by “disregard of suffering, 
which was viewed as necessary for war purposes.”354  
Part of the reason for the poor match between partisan leader and population was 
the simple variety of locations where the partisans (and their leadership) came from early 
in the war. As one Soviet officer complained in July 1941, groups were being “knocked 
together hurriedly” and put into active service behind German lines “after their members 
knew each other for only a few hours.”355 It was hardly an environment which fostered 
unit cohesion or readiness. Party members, NKVD (The People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs) officials, and Red Army officers all became partisan leaders.356 Just as 
their backgrounds were varied, so was their experience, with most having little to no 
practical knowledge of how to wage a guerrilla campaign.357 Couple the leadership’s 
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lack of experience with the deficit of “proper weapons, such as grenades and explosives” 
and then put the groups of partisans into unfamiliar territory where most “knew little 
about local conditions and did not even had maps and compasses” and it is easy to see 
why the Soviet partisan in 1941 could do little else then try to survive.358 
Multiple Central Committee directives instructed Soviet partisans to “destroy 
crops, livestock, machinery, communications lines, public buildings and even private 
houses and barns” that may be used by the German forces.359 This “scorched earth” 
policy, executed by partisan bands, was harshest where the partisan political leadership 
was the most ideologically tied to Moscow and where the partisans had little connection 
with the locals.360 This drove the population away from partisan bands; but without 
options the population was stuck between German cruelty and Soviet repression.  
The partisan fighter of 1941 faced enormous challenges, for which he and the 
Soviet Union were unprepared. Any independence of action by individual partisan 
commanders—which was officially encouraged at least once in July 1941—was quickly 
subordinated by multiple bureaucratic organizations.361 The Red Army created the Tenth 
Department to “organize and direct the partisan units,” which caused considerable tactical 
mismanagement of the partisans.362 The Red Army preferred to use to partisans as 
adjuncts to the operations on the front, directing attacks against German strong points and 
occasionally along the front itself, instead of against the softer communication and supply 
lines extended across the occupied territories.363  
When Soviet partisan bands did try to conduct sabotage and raids against more 
appropriate targets, they were hampered by their “distinct amateurism” and “also limited 
by inexperience, poor or nonexistent training, and a devil-may-care attitude that 
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occasionally brought them success but more frequently led to pointless losses.”364 When 
the partisans struck at the German occupying force, they were largely ineffective, and in 
some cases striking at the Germans invited their own destruction. In four months, from 
September 1941 to January 1942 the number of Soviet partisans dropped from 87,000 to 
30,000 due in large part to effective German sweeps.365  
By October 1941 the German 121st Infantry Division reported that insurgent 
activity near the town of Pavlovsk had dropped considerably because the partisans were 
no longer targeting the Wehrmacht, but rather “collaborators among the civilian 
population.”366 Historian Jeff Rutherford suggests that partisan reprisals aimed at 
collaborators and avoiding the German forces demonstrate the clear lack of support by 
the population for the Soviet partisan late in 1941 as well as the effectiveness of German 
anti-partisan tactics.367  
The effectiveness of Soviet partisans that winter is summed up by historian 
Kenneth Slepyan with the statement that “[t]he partisans of 1941 caused relatively little 
damage to the enemy.”368 The winter of 1941 was clearly the low point for the Soviet 
partisans. To illustrate how dangerous it was, historian V. I. Boiarskii claims partisan 
groups around Leningrad dropped from 287 to 60, with an individual survival rate of 17 
percent during the winter of 1941–1942.369  
This misuse of the partisans by the Red Army was compounded by the fact that 
the partisans had multiple Soviet organs vying for control over them. The NKVD, the 
Party itself, and the Red Army “all established independent command structures” over 
the irregular force, each claiming primacy of jurisdiction.370 These competing interests 
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would plague the partisans throughout the war, making them less effective than they 
could have otherwise been.  
D. PARTISANS EXPAND AND EQUIP 
As the Red Army ground away at the German forces, whose lines were extended 
through vast, occupied territory, Soviet leadership strove to centralize the partisan efforts. 
Increased supplies, coordination, and external support (in addition to the changing 
perception that Germany was invincible) began the shift from ineptitude to effectiveness. 
The partisans, however, were never able to fully realize their potential because of the 
draconian control Stalin placed on them. 
The spring of 1942 brought a glimmer of hope to the occupied Soviet territories. 
The Red Army previously stopped the Nazis from taking Moscow and that spring began a 
counter-offensive. The partisan survivors of 1941 began to receive meaningful support 
from the Red Army by ground and sometimes by air, as well as officers and specialized 
detachments to provide training in “guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subterfuge, 
coordinate them, and enlarge them with local recruits either willingly or press-
ganged.”371 The reduction in German troops to guard the rear area and conduct regular 
anti-partisan operations (due to their being sent forward to blunt the Soviet counter-
offensive) gave most partisan bands the breathing room needed to reorganize and focus 
on the civilian population’s allegiance to the Soviet Party.372  
However, German anti-partisan operations were still able to disrupt partisan bands 
whenever they became too troublesome. This was especially true each winter when the 
swamps froze and partisans were trackable and German anti-partisan operations forced 
partisans to over-winter in a safe area behind the Soviet lines. In some cases, winter saw a 
near 50 percent reduction in partisans in a given area despite strict orders not to 
voluntarily withdraw.373  
                                                 
371 Shepherd, War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisan, 110. 
372 Shepherd and Pattinson, War in a Twilight World, 42–43. 
373 Hill, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45, 211. 
 76 
The same paranoia which caused Stalin to dismantle partisan preparation in the 
inter-war years caused him to desperately want to keep central control over the partisan 
elements. This manifested itself in the creation of the Central Staff of the Partisan 
Movement at the end of May 1942, headed by a close favorite of Stalin, Panteleymon 
Ponomarenko.374 Ponomarenko created multiple subordinate partisan headquarters 
which were to support the appropriate Red Army units formally (as opposed to the 
informal coordination which had occurred until this point).375  
Central control was ideal for Stalin. He kept it by appointing politically-reliable 
leaders, sending inspectors, issuing orders in person by recalling field leaders to Moscow, 
dictating the army-to-partisan operations, as well as being able to earmark disloyal 
partisan bands for destruction.376 This level of control flew in the face of a 
“decentralized organization” as “a necessary feature of all guerrilla warfare.”377 
E. SOVIET PARTISANS NEVER REACHED THEIR FULL POTENTIAL 
All of this central control limited the partisans’ effeteness and capped their 
potential. The newly formed Central Staff of the Partisan Movement also provided 
centralized oversight of the interaction with and propaganda espoused to the local 
population by the partisan units.378 This had the effect, as Alexander Hill points out, of 
distancing “decision making from the Fronts” and hampering “the ability of the 
movement to respond to the needs of the Red Army” in a timely and effective way.379  
More to the point, “the Soviet regime had placed its faith in a strongly centralized, 
rather than decentralized, system of command. Instead of appreciating the advantages of 
decentralization to a guerrilla organization—independence, flexibility, and simplicity—
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the Soviets feared its disadvantages—rebellion, stagnation, and disintegration,”380 
precisely the lessons Stalin learned from the revolution. While these changes in the 
partisan leadership and hierarchy ensured Soviet loyalty, increased supply to the 
partisans, and coordinated partisan operations in support of the Red Army, it did at the 
cost of the overall effectiveness of the partisan operations and the hold they had over the 
civilian population. The level of control placed on the various partisan elements 
prevented their operations from achieving success on par with the guerrilla operations 
studied by Red Army academies, namely those of 1812 or of the Civil War.381  
The propaganda value of German reprisals against the population was such that, 
on occasion, partisans “deliberately provoke[d] vicious German reprisals against the 
population.”382 One partisan leader requested a Communist film crew to record, for the 
propaganda value, the German atrocities.383 The Soviets knew what Otto Heilbrunn later 
pointed out in Partisan Warfare, that “disgust at the treatment meted out by the 
enemy…will win [the partisan] support even from those of their countrymen who have 
not hitherto regarded them with affection.”384 As a peasant leader remarked in 1943, 
“[w]e live between the hammer and the anvil.”385 They certainly did. 
They knew it, but the Soviet centralized control failed local partisan leadership by 
not allowing the flexibility and operational control necessary to capitalize on the diverse 
local situations. A heavily centralized partisan movement equated to fewer battlefield 
effects. As historian Alexander Hill points out, “the casualties inflicted by partisans on 
German and allied forces did not actually damage German front-line operations through 
depriving them of troops committed permanently to security duties, or indeed draw 
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substantial forces away from front-line duty for sustained periods of time, as was the 
Soviet intention.”386  
For their part, the Germans were able to keep enough pressure on partisan bands 
through anti-partisan operations that partisan bands were largely unable to perform at the 
level Soviet historians later credited them with. One such German operation in the spring 
of 1943 claimed to have killed 424 partisans (of an estimated 2,455 active in that area) at 
a loss of only 11 Germans killed and 45 wounded in action.387 The Germans continued 
to conduct large-scale anti-partisan operations, conducting 19 from December 1943 to 
July 1944.388 Nevertheless, as 1943 wore on and Germany continued to lose territory to 
the Red Army, partisan operations increased.  
1. A Valuable Supplemental Effect 
For all of the drawbacks of a tightly controlled and highly centralized 
organizational structure—lack of freedom of action, disallowed tactical withdrawal, 
inflexibility of operational planning—the Red Army did benefit from the partisans’ 
disruptive attacks prior to major operations. In fact, the level of coordination enjoyed 
between the partisans and the Red Army was such that significant increases in partisan 
attacks “usually indicated that the enemy intended to launch an attack against the German 
lines.”389 
Continued combat along the Eastern front drew German security forces away 
from anti-partisan and guard operations in the occupied Russian territory.390 At the same 
time, partisan operations reached their most effective levels of the war largely due to the 
favorable “numerical balance between partisan and security force strength.”391 The 
summer of 1943, through the German withdrawal, saw the partisan bands operating more 
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or less freely and largely in concert with the operations of the Red Army. That summer, 
Ponomarenko dictated that partisans “conduct systematic and simultaneous destruction of 
rails on enemy railways lines” in coordination with the Red Army’s offensive.392  
The result of the so-called “war of the rails” was a significant disruption of 
German rail and communication networks in the occupied area. The Chief of 
Transportation for the German Army Group Center reported that “partisan activity 
increased by 25 percent during August 1943…the daily average amounted to 45 
demolitions” along the rail lines.393 When this level of effective partisan activity 
emerged, it was under incredibly favorable conditions. However, even as coordinated 
attacks increased in the German rear, they never amounted to more than “a valuable 
supplement to the Soviet Army.”394 Although necessary and significant to the reduction 
in supplies received at the front by the German army, the partisan attacks never achieved 
the coup de grâce achieved by earlier Imperial Russian partisans. 
By way of comparison, John Plaster claims that at the high point during 
America’s involvement in Vietnam, one U.S. Soldier operating behind enemy lines was 
able to tie “down six hundred NVA defenders, or about one NVA battalion per SOG 
recon man.”395 In stark contrast, the Soviet partisans enjoyed a 2-to-1 numerical 
superiority by the summer of 1943 but were only able to inflict tertiary damage to the 
Wehrmacht.396  
With a larger force, increased freedom of action, and coordination with the Red 
Army it is an even stronger critique of the overall effectiveness of the partisans that the 
“increased partisan activity does not seem to have had a noticeable impact on Soviet 
losses at the front line.”397 Then, when one considers that nearly 40 percent of the Soviet 
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population lived under German occupation during this time,398 it is remarkable that the 
partisans were not more disruptive to the German occupation and front-line forces.  
2. Latent Potential Remained Untapped 
Both Germany and Soviet Russia failed to capitalize on opportunities on the 
Eastern Front and in the occupied areas. The German counterinsurgency program failed 
as they placed most of their resources behind the conventional military front, harsh anti-
partisan reprisals and ideological Nazi pogroms, rather than engagement with the 
population. The Soviets failed to form an effective guerrilla force for quite some time, in 
the end controlling the partisan units and their leaders at the cost of tactical flexibility. 
Stalin’s orders to dismantle prepositioned stocks of military equipment was a 
critical limiting factor in the initial Soviet reaction to Operation Barbarossa. The stocks 
could have increased partisan effectiveness early on and therefore perhaps softened the 
blow of the German army during and shortly after Operation Barbarossa.  
Even had the Soviets prepared for war in occupied territories, partisan operations 
still would have been restricted by the tight political control sought by Stalin. This 
centralized and byzantine control was compounded by the overlapping command 
structures of the NKVD, the Party, and the Red Army in a “parallelism that debilitated 
the partisan movement throughout the war.”399 The Soviets opted for absolute control 
over the partisan bands and leadership which undoubtedly cost them time and lives. More 
resources could have been diverted by a more effective irregular campaign, bleeding the 
German forces in occupied territory. As late as spring 1943, Ponomarenko admitted to 
Stalin that partisan operations had not yet “reached such an extent as to have operations 
impact on the German front line.”400 Coming from Stalin’s hand-picked man, that 
acknowledgement is stunning. Partisan operations could be summed up by the Soviet 
penchant for loyal party leadership over effective military operations. 
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Even when centralized and coordinated attacks were made, the partisans’ attacks 
were against rear guard and security forces or collaborators and local government 
officials rather than front-line troops—at best an indirect help to the war effort. This 
misuse of partisans’ irregular capabilities stems from the officer corps not understanding 
the role partisans should play as well as the “inability of Red Army officers to assign 
sound targets and advise on appropriate tactics…for conducting a partisan struggle.”401  
The partisans’ operations later in the war were supporting efforts to the Red 
Army’s objectives as opposed to utilizing their unique abilities and leveraging those to 
complement the Red Army’s objectives. Even when partisans were able to achieve 
significant disruption of the German rail and supply system in the summer of 1943, they 
were unable to overwhelm German communications or supply systems. Nor were the 
partisans able to prevent the Wehrmacht from operating effectively at the front or 
diverting significant, additional resources to the lines of communication.  
The organized, determined, and ruthless German opponent was one reason the 
Soviet partisan was unable to contribute more than they did. The other reason was 
Stalin’s need for control. The end result is the Soviet partisans missed more opportunities 
than they took advantage of. The effort to centralize operations made responsiveness and 
flexibility nearly impossible. Consolidation of partisan elements into larger groups 
proved to be easy targets for German sweeps. The impact by the Soviets, “remained 
limited in comparison to the very large numbers of men involved.”402 The smaller bands 
of partisans conducting reconnaissance and raids in conjunction with specialized Red 
Army units showed much more promise early in the war but were abandoned because of 
the Soviet political leadership’s desire for control.  
As is clearly demonstrated by Russia’s conquest of Crimea and the Moscow-
backed separatist in eastern Ukraine, Moscow’s desire for control over irregulars has not 
waned over time. When Russian-backed separatists fired a BUK anti-aircraft missile, 
shooting down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, Russia’s hand in the growing crisis, as 
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well as its control over the separatists, was fully reviled.403 More to the point, after the 
incident, Igor Girkin (the former Russian intelligence officer turned separatists leader 
who was in charge of the downing of flight MH17) was recalled to Moscow over the 
incident.404 If the experience from the Great Patriotic War is still pertinent, as long as 
Russian irregular warfare is pursued from the kremlin, the mechanisms for control over it 
will not be far behind. 
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VI. SOVIETS AS COUNTERINSURGENTS 
The Soviets took to the Afghan battlefield as a “modern, mechanized army [and] 
tried to defeat a guerrilla force on rugged terrain n the middle of a civil war. Despite their 
best efforts, they were unable to achieve decisive military victory and their politicians 
finally ordered them home. Other armies would do well to study their efforts.”405 
A. INCREMENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan began late in 1979 with what can be seen 
in retrospect as a warning to nations getting involved in the business of providing military 
aid and expertise abroad. After Afghanistan refused to join an anti-Communist alliance 
with the United States, an Afghan request for military aid was turned down, leaving an 
opening for the Soviet Union to expand from economic to military aid.406 This 
exchanged led to the Soviets, “who had no intention at first of entering into a full-scale 
conflict,” into an ever more involved presence in Afghanistan, and eventually all-out war 
to protect the investments made and stability of their southern border.407 After two coups 
in the 1970s, the Soviet Union installed the first Communist leader, Nur Mohammed 
Taraki.408  
As the new Communist Afghan government developed and implemented policies 
which ran counter to traditional Islamist customs, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev found 
the Soviet Union being drawn into Afghan domestic turmoil. The Taraki government 
disregarded “the national social structure and mores, [and therefore] the new government 
enjoyed little popular support.”409 The reforms and policies implemented were 
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inflammatory and “the reaction of the rural people and devout Muslims, coupled with the 
inefficiencies of the local bureaucracy, triggered a spontaneous and anarchic rural 
insurgency.”410 As the Communist government lashed out “with mass arrests and 
executions” in an attempt to gain control, the Afghan army “began to melt away, soldiers 
deserting by the thousands, taking their weapons with them.”411  
As violence across the country ramped up, so did Soviet military support. In one 
instance, an entire Afghan division mutinied, killing “one hundred Soviet advisers and 
their families” and parading their heads on pikes.412 The Soviets increased military aid 
and began flying combat missions supporting loyal Afghan units, but the Afghan 
government continued to disintegrate.413 Once the government lost control of two-thirds 
of Afghanistan, and Soviet citizens were killed by mob violence, the Brezhnev Doctrine 
could not abide the black eye that would come from a lost Communist government in 
Afghanistan.414 In an eerie parallel to the United States’ incremental intervention in 
Vietnam, the Politburo’s leadership made the decision to increase involvement from 
military equipment and advisors to full-scale deployment of troops, initially tasked with 
“pacifying and controlling Afghanistan.”415  
1. From Coup de Main to Counter-Guerrilla  
As the Soviet Union found itself forced to execute a “military rescue of a 
beleaguered fellow regime,” it was faced with an unreliable partner whose military had 
been cut in half by desertion.416 The other half of the Afghan military, including entire 
units with their equipment, formed the center of resistance to the Afghan government and 
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its Soviet backers. This resistance was “chiefly conventional” at first.417 The Soviets 
were unconcerned by the threat posed by radical Islamist elements, or any other elements 
relegated to the “remote mountain regions.”418 Nor did they need to be, at least at first. 
One reason for the smooth beginning to the Afghan campaign was the 
thoroughness of involvement by the Soviets in the Afghan military. For a year prior to the 
invasion, a Soviet Spetsnaz battalion was providing personal security for the president.419 
These Soviet Special Forces were from Central Asia and “dressed in Afghan Army 
uniforms and helped secure the official residence.”420 They were not the only Soviet 
troops in disguise in Afghanistan. The Soviet military had a squadron of pilots, also from 
Central Asia, who flew planes with Afghan tail numbers and wore Afghan uniforms prior 
to the invasion.421 
Another reason for such a smooth deployment of troops was the deception 
operations employed by the Soviet advisors paired with conventional Afghan Army units. 
Dealing with the unpredictable loyalty of their Afghan counterparts and fearing that their 
weapons would be used to ‘welcome’ the deploying Soviet troops (a concern that would 
never go away and one that American forces would deal with later), Soviet advisors came 
up with clever ways to neutralize entire units during the initial invasion. In one instance, 
Soviet advisors informed two divisions of Afghan armor that their vehicles were to be 
upgraded and to prepare for that their existing combat vehicles had to be drained of 
fuel.422 In another instance, “Soviet advisers requested an inventory of faulty 
ammunition, which meant unloading tanks of their shells; in another, two hundred 
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vehicles were immobilized by ordering their batteries to be removed for 
‘winterization.’”423 
The initial invasion included a putsch to put a more pliable Afghan leader in 
power, as well as the goal of securing the major cities in an effort to pacify the country 
and thereby give their puppet government room to consolidate control.424 The invasion 
plan “was straightforward and designed along conventional lines.”425 Soviet planners 
estimated that troops would be required for several months, and assumed intervention in 
Afghanistan would play out similarly to other interventions within the Soviet sphere such 
as Czechoslovakia.426 Executed on Christmas Eve 1979, the “invasion was masterfully 
planned and well executed.”427 Spetsnaz forces assassinated Afghan president Hafizullah 
Amin while conventional forces poured in by airlift and ground convoy.428 The Soviet 
forces did encounter some resistance, but those conventional resistance forces were 
swiftly dealt with by the Red Army and within a week all of the major cities were under 
Soviet military control.429  
Having gained their immediate objectives, the Soviets consolidated around “major 
cities, communications hubs, and transportation arteries throughout the country.”430 They 
could now provide the security for the new Afghan government to establish a political 
base and “assume responsibility for the war.”431 That the invasion itself inadvertently 
“linked Islamic insurgency to the cause of national liberation” in Afghanistan only 
became evident later.432 The hostile population in Afghanistan viewed Soviet 
intervention as “committed to the destruction of Islam,” providing a powerful impetus to 
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the insurgency.433 Likewise, the population could not remove the specter of “the 
suppression of Central Asian and other Muslim neighbors by the Tsarist and later Soviet 
forces.”434 These causes invigorated the Muslim world and “more and more Muslims 
from outside the country arrived to join what had by then been termed a jihad against the 
Soviets.”435  
In addition to the overlooked threat building in the countryside, Soviet military 
planners forgot the lessons learned by the British in Afghanistan during the Great Game. 
Both the First and Second Anglo-Afghan wars ended with British designs for 
Afghanistan blunted and her forces beaten and forced to withdraw.436 The Red Army 
would learn firsthand what had been taught to each invader by the disparate tribes in 
Afghanistan: “the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan or the destruction of 
its standing armies has never resulted in the defeat of the nation by an invader. The 
people, relying on their decentralized political, economic and military potential, have 
always taken over the resistance against the invaders.”437 The Soviets faced a growing 
insurgency, amid a civil war, and were not prepared for it.  
2. From War of Movement to Guerrilla Fighters 
The initial combat seen by the Soviets was force-on-force, and it did not take long 
before the Mujahedeen forces which “did not back off from direct contact” were 
destroyed by the Soviets.438 What remained of the resistance were “hundreds of small 
bands” which were part of the popular Afghan discontent with the Soviet invasion.439 
                                                 
433 Alam Payind, “Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (1989): 108. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Gleis, Withdrawing under Fire, 44. 
436 Hy S. Rothstein and John Arquilla, eds., Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for 
America’s Longest War, South Asia in World Affairs Series (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2012), 48–51. 
437 Ali A. Jalali, “Clashes of Ideas and Interests in Afghanistan,” paper given at the Institute of World 
Politics, Washington, DC, July 1995, page 4, as quoted in Jalali and Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain., 
xiv.  
438 The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War, 19. 
439 Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains,” The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 17, no. 1 (2004): 134. 
 88 
These initial guerrilla elements were local Afghans protecting their homes, part of a 
secular revolt against the Red Army, and with their base of support derived from their 
own neighbors and relatives.440  
These guerrilla elements were lightly armed, initially with antiquated bolt-action 
rifles, supplemented by captured government weapons wherever possible.441 The 
Mujahedeen were unpaid and had volunteered as warriors against the soviets, making the 
spoils of war particularly important.442 After the local commander had taken his share of 
the bounty from a successful raid or ambush, the fighters would sell excess weapons on 
the black market, where an AK47 could fetch an impressive $2,800.443  
As foreign countries were looking to support the mujahideen against the Soviets, 
two avenues became apparent, Pakistan or Iran. Pakistan supported seven loose factions 
to which the Pakistan intelligence service funneled foreign aid.444 Iran controlled four.445 
Pakistani intelligence preferred the more radical Islamic groups, giving them the most 
support.446 The foreign aid, and the fundamentalist groups rewarded with it, soon 
undercut “the traditional authority of the tribal and village chiefs” and put it squarely in 
the hands of radical Afghan clerics.447 
The Mujahedeen employed classic guerrilla tactics of striking only when the 
circumstances were favorable and disappearing into the population or rough terrain when 
they were not. Mujahideen groups targeted “Soviet rear guards as well as the Soviets’ 
smaller isolated units, their communications, and the less-trained Afghan forces.”448 As 
these groups became better organized and standardized—to the limited extent they 
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were—they general consisted of a dozen to 50 men, broken down into various subgroups 
by weapon or task.449 These would be varied according to the area they were in and the 
tactical mission they embarked upon, including attacks against lines of communication, 
mining roads, attacking local forces or garrison with the intent to terrorize, or linking up 
with other groups for larger combat operations.450 
The eventual introduction of anti-aircraft and anti-armor weapons such as the 
Stinger missile and Milan rocket, as well as increased logistical support in the form of 
mules and vehicles, gave the Mujahedeen a much-needed boost in capability.451 
However, the increase in supply meant that the mujahideen had to establish “a series of 
supply depots, supply points and forward supply points inside Afghanistan to ease their 
logistics dilemma.”452 These became easy targets for larger Soviet raids and sweeps.453  
Even so, Mujahedeen fighters were still able to bring the fight to the Soviets, on 
their terms and at times of their choosing. Some of the best-trained fighters would attack 
in urban settings—with bombings, kidnapping, torture, and raids—in a deliberate attempt 
to strike fear into Afghan government and Soviet officials.454 
Though they were being well supplied, were veterans in guerrilla warfare and had, 
by some estimates, control over 90 percent of the countryside,455 the Mujahedeen bands 
remained tied to their communities and possessed no strategy beyond driving the Soviets 
from Afghanistan.456 The Mujahedeen were unable to coordinate between their groups in 
a meaningful way outside of immediate tactical support.457  
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The most powerful weapon the Mujahedeen possessed was the ideology and drive 
to continue to fight no matter the cost. If General Theodore Mataxis is correct, that 
“guerrillas do not need [a] military victory. Guerrillas need to survive and endure” to 
outlast the will of their opponent, then the Soviet invasion and counter-guerrilla 
operations were fighting an uphill battle from the beginning. Robert Kaplan captured the 
Afghani sentiment when an old Afghan man said “[m]y God gives me strength. My God 
always helps me…After we drive the shuravi [Soviet forces] out of Afghanistan, we will 
drive them out of Bukhara and Samarkand and Tashkent too. Allahu akbar!”458  
B. RE-LEARNING LESSONS 
It took the Soviet General Staff years to compile a detailed analysis of the Soviet-
Afghan war. In fact, by the time it occurred it was done under the Russian General Staff, 
no longer “Soviet.” Once complete, one of the most critical passages about the Red 
Army’s (lack of) preparation for intervention in Afghanistan was about the historical 
lessons seemingly forgotten or discarded. As the General Staff wrote, “[t]he massive 
experience that Soviet forces gained in their fight with the Basmachi movement was 
simply forgotten. The more recent experiences of Fascist Germany during the Second 
World War and the experience of other armies that conducted counter-guerrilla actions in 
local wars were practically ignored.”459 This organizational amnesia left the Red Army 
having to re-learn through trial and error how to conduct anti-guerrilla operations 
effectively.  
But there were other things that were not forgotten, such as the ability to wage 
guerre à outrance. One of the first things the Soviets did was to attempt to remove the 
base of support from the Mujahedeen through what Louis Dupree termed “migratory 
genocide.”460 The Soviet air force deliberately targeted the rural social system, the 
“irrigation systems, orchards, cropland, farms, villages and livestock,” which limited the 
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guerrillas’ support networks.461 Soviet forces destroyed entire villages and regularly 
burned crops to “force the population—the main source of logistical support [for the 
insurgent]—to flee to Pakistan or Iran.”462 The Soviet forces would conduct reprisal 
attacks against villages suspected of supporting the mujahideen, with the sole purpose of 
“exterminating the local population.”463 They destroyed infrastructure as well as imposed 
conscription creating a massive refugee and internal displacement problem where seven 
million people fled their homes.464 This “scorched earth” attempt at counterinsurgency 
was actually one of the few lessons from Imperial Russia the Soviets had not 
forgotten.465  
Several significant lessons re-learned were identified and published by Douglas 
Hart in 1982. The two most important Hart identified were the need to give operational 
and tactical unit commanders the ability to decentralize command and control and the 
need to adapt units specifically for operations based on local combat conditions. Hart 
quoted Soviet Colonel Ryzhkov making the case for decentralized decision making, 
saying “emphasis on independent action…[with] a certain degree of decentralization of 
troop command and control” is needed and must be complimented by commanders who 
“display greater initiative.”466  
The Soviet forces had to re-learn the importance of organizing a force in an 
appropriate way for the mission at hand. The Soviet units that initially deployed to 
Afghanistan had all of their standard equipment and units attached as if they were going 
to war in the European theater, including units unnecessary and unsuitable for conflict in 
Afghanistan.467 As the war continued, forces adapted to the circumstances they faced. 
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Soviet forces came to “rely on the nimble actions of small subunits of the various combat 
arms” where the Soviet commander had reconfigured “combat units for specific 
missions.”468  
Several examples of Soviet commanders bringing together a makeshift combined 
arms battalion for a “spur of the moment” operation are illustrated as vignettes in The 
Bear Went Over The Mountain, translated by Lester Grau.469 In one example, the Soviet 
commander illustrates how he combined local Afghan security forces with mounted 
infantry forces and airborne reconnaissance to locate, block, and then destroy a guerrilla 
force. The commentator credits the Soviet commander with “decisive, unconventional 
action, a good knowledge of the terrain, and the correct organization” in achieving 
victory.470  
Another re-learned phenomenon was the need to protect against mountain 
ambushes. One of the techniques used in Central Asia, adapted from the earlier 
campaigns in the Caucasus, was to ensure logistics convoys were flanked by security. 
The Soviets eventually “tailored a march formation to provide security against ambush” 
pushing “a reconnaissance patrol…in advance of the main force and was followed by a 
security element.”471 As techniques became more refined, the convoy would contain “a 
company of assault troops equipped with bullet-proof vests, large and small machine 
guns, and grenades,” presumably to counterattack an ambush with considerable 
firepower.472 
The increased flexibility enjoyed by Soviet commanders was complemented by 
significant improvements in and adaptations to equipment. The Soviets adapted the use of 
armored vehicles, without infantry, as an independent element on the battlefield called 
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the bronegruppa (armored group).473 To support this adaptation, they replaced the 73mm 
cannon with an automatic 30mm gun to “achieve an even larger volume of suppressive 
fire.”474 They employed rough terrain and mountain climbing training for certain units 
headed to Afghanistan, as well as specialized mountaineering equipment.475 
The much-mentioned use of airpower and airlift by the Soviets came hand-in-
glove with smaller, specialized units taking tactical primacy while “the role of 
conventional infantry” was being “reduced largely to garrison duty.”476 Not only was the 
airlift required to support the Soviet forces in Afghanistan impressive in its own right, but 
the use of fixed-wing and helicopters, for logistics and fire support, “proved invaluable” 
to the Soviets in the rugged terrain.477  
In Napoleonic times, Davydov flourished under a decentralized command 
architecture. Later in the 19th century, Skobelev encouraged independent action by his 
subordinate commanders in Central Asia. In the Great Patriotic War, though, 
commanders of partisan operations were less independent. But the concept of flexible, 
independent leadership once again gained importance in Afghanistan. One Soviet 
contemporary stated that “a certain degree of decentralization of troop command and 
control is a unique feature of ‘mountain combat operations,’” the nom de guerre for 
operations in Afghanistan.478 The importance of decentralization increased as the Soviet 
forces relied on “small operations by highly trained units.”479  
These small units were normally airborne, air assault or Spetsnaz forces, as most 
of the major Soviet military formations were tied up providing garrison security to the 
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major cities and infrastructure.480 This created a situation where company and battalion 
sized operations were the norm, and “lower level initiative [was] essential for survival 
and success.”481 This was for the better, as far as Soviet forces were concerned, as the 
elite military units favored in this environment “generally proved to be better trained, 
more responsive to the dynamics of battle, and more capable of independent actions.”482 
One type of specialized unit was the obkhodiashchie otridayi (infiltration 
detachment).483 These special operations units were developed to conduct raids behind 
the mujahideen lines at a time when most Soviet forces were stationary or only 
conducting large scale operations.484 These detachments could conduct a verity of 
disruptive operations, but typically operated in conjunction with a larger element which 
would serve as a sort of distraction while the infiltration detachment moved into place.485 
It also created a situation more damaging to the overall Soviet intervention. If the 
Soviet goal was to produce security long enough for an Afghan government to take over 
the fighting, their emphasis on small unit sweeps and raids was not supporting it.486 Their 
operations were not well coordinated with Afghan “territorial units, police forces, and 
local militias” which in turn did not “provide the necessary security solutions 
required.”487  
Instead the Soviet forces, although becoming flexible and more attuned to their 
operating environment, would conduct raids or sweeps and leave little to no presence 
behind after the operation. As noted by historian Robert Baumann, the “Soviet command 
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of an area lasted only so long as its forces remained in physical occupation of the ground. 
As soon as Soviet forces departed, control reverted to the resistance.”488 The Afghan 
Army and police force that the Soviets were attempting to train to take over security 
simply were not up to the security task, and rarely given the opportunity to lead.489 Such 
operations demonstrate what a February 1981 memo circulated among Politburo 
members meant when it said “no military solution to the war was possible.”490 
Unfortunately the recommendation in that same memo to find a political or diplomatic 
solution to the Afghan conflict was not heeded.  
Perhaps the most difficult task and largest failure of the Soviet-Afghan war was 
the failure to deny the mujahideen external support. Despite the Soviets training nearly 
30,000 border forces and enabling a further 70,000 militia along the border regions, the 
border itself remained porous.491 The mujahideen, therefore, retained a safe area and 
access to external support—two critical requirements for the insurgency. Even though the 
Soviets conducted hundreds of air and artillery strikes inside Pakistan, and employed 
major operations against supply depots inside Afghanistan, the Soviets were only able to 
interdict about one-third of the supplies the mujahideen were importing.492  
One area the Soviets had great success in was the arena of intelligence and 
internal secret police. Tapping into the web of Soviet apparatuses, Afghans were trained 
abroad in a number of skills, depending on which department they were in, and then 
returned to Afghanistan and their units to conduct interrogations, identify insurgents, 
develop intelligence, protect key infrastructure or conduct reconnaissance.493 Some of 
these Ministry of Interior troops functioned as highly developed, well equipped special 
                                                 
488 Baumann, “Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan,” 142. 
489 Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience, 40–41. 
490 Artemy. Kalinovsky, “Decision-Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to 
Withdrawal,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 4 (2009): 58. 
491 Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience, 51–57. 
492 Spencer, The Difficult War, 155. 
493 Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience, 28–30. 
 96 
forces units, conducting raids and “small unit actions,” or independent operations to 
“identify and eliminate mujahedeen.”494  
Because these various forces were “generally respected by Soviet advisors and 
viewed as effective,” they enjoyed more success and support than other Afghan 
elements.495 The Soviets used these forces to deepen the already divided and segmented 
nature of Afghan society by using agents to “spread conflict and division among the 
various resistance groups.”496 Even though the Soviets were able to make small 
subversions and disruptions, the overall campaign of “pitting the various mujahideen 
bands against each other proved to be of limited value.”497 Neither the internal security 
forces nor the disruption they caused the mujahideen were enough to save the Soviet 
Union from defeat in Afghanistan. 
While it is true that the Soviets made significant strides in training an Afghan 
security apparatus that would secure the Najibullah government after Soviet forces 
withdrew, the “many deals and alliances that were struck [with various insurgent groups] 
proved short-lived and fluid.”498 The deals, in addition to significant military hardware, 
including four R-300 “SCUD” missile battalions, showed the determination of the 
Soviets to stave off a Vietnam-like withdrawal.499 Olga Oliker gives the Soviets credit 
for creating forces that could protect the government while also criticizing the Soviet and 
Afghan governments for the failure to “build an effective state in Afghanistan.”500 When 
the Soviets carefully orchestrated General Boris Gromov walking the last of the Soviet 
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forces across the Friendship Bridge, they achieved what the United States was unable to 
do departing Vietnam: an orderly withdrawal.501  
However, neither the nine years of training, the military equipment transferred, 
the graduated withdrawal and transfer of the burden of combat, nor the alliances struck 
with warlords were enough to preserve the Najibullah government for more than a few 
years past the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.502 Shortly after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Najibullah government was defunct; the man himself took refuge on a 
United Nations compound until the Taliban finally captured Kabul and executed him.503 
C. FINAL ANALYSIS 
Whether or not expelling the Soviets from Central Asia was ever the broader goal 
of the insurgents in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as the man interviewed by Robert Kaplan 
suggested, is debatable. That Russia currently believes radical Islamists in Afghanistan 
and Central Asia are a threat is not. Russia has spent billions of dollars and continues to 
deploy thousands of troops to help with border security to prevent the current Afghan 
threat from spreading further into Central Asia.504 Russia’s current reaction to the radical 
jihadist problem in Afghanistan is, in part, learned from their Soviet experiences.  
The Soviet Union had significant success in adjusting tactically to the 
peculiarities of war in Afghanistan. Although they had to re-discover some basic lessons 
of Russian irregular warfare, they were very successful at adapting to conditions as they 
found them. The Soviets tested and refined weapons, equipment, and operational 
procedures. They discarded the overly-tight centralized control of the Great Patriotic War 
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in favor of decentralization at the tactical level—giving the ground force commanders the 
flexibility to succeed.  
It is telling that as early as 1980 Soviet military leadership “concurred that there 
was no military solution to the unfolding situation in Afghanistan.”505 They were 
unsuccessful in establishing the security themselves, or the Afghan security forces needed 
to replace their own, to enable the Communist regime’s survival after the Soviet forces 
withdrew. Significantly, they were also unable to control access to the sanctuary 
mujahideen had in Pakistan.  
Despite much blood and treasure, “the Soviets were never able to gain significant 
support from the population or to appreciably delegitimize the cause of the insurgents,” 
due in large part to “the fact that the Soviets could not make an impact in areas where 
they were unable to establish a permanent security presence.”506 After nine and a half 
years of conflict, the Soviets had better military tactics for fighting in Afghanistan but 
still had no military solution. Mikhail Gorbachev, after assessing the conflict, determined 
the Soviet Union would not pay the cost required to continue the war, and ordered an end 
to the conflict. When the last Soviet vehicles crossed the Friendship Bridge leaving 
Afghanistan, the Soviet legacy stood at over 1.3 million people killed and 7 million 
displaced by the conflict.507 
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VII. WAR IN THE CAUCASUS 
The valleys are yours, the mountains are ours. It is you who are a prisoner 
here! 
— Dialogue adapted from 
Prisoner of the Mountains, 1996508 
A. UNIQUE CHARACTER 
The recent Chechen wars reflect a complex struggle of nationalism, 
independence, cultural identity, religious fervor, post-cold war politics, and a proud 
martial history. Making analysis more complicated, the proportionality and significance 
of the motivational factors constantly evolved as the conflicts played out. Any conflict in 
the Caucasus, especially the first and second Chechen wars, cannot be viewed only as 
another counterterrorism battleground, or simply a fight against the ascendance of 
religious fanaticism, or merely a series of nationalist violent outbreaks after the breakup 
of the Soviet Union. The most recent conflicts and the export of fighters from the 
Caucasus is a modern extension of a cultural heritage of irregular warfare that is centuries 
old. 
1. The Social and Cultural Foundation 
As the Russians expanded their empire into the North Caucasus, they encountered 
fiercely independent people. The people of Chechnya, as well as neighboring Ingushetia 
and Dagestan, are some of the most tribal and traditional.509 Indeed, these strong 
organizational and persistent cultural values of Chechen society (and the Caucasus in 
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general) not only impact the lives of ordinary Chechens today, but these values are key to 
understanding the development of insurgency in Chechnya as well.510  
Chechens have retained a complex set of values which, even today, centers a 
person’s identity in the clan (teyp).511 There are divisions and sub-divisions within each 
clan-grouping that create a strong sense of allegiance and identity for the individual.512 A 
person’s identity is then locked into the cultural role by the distillation of the Chechen 
customary law (adat) into the customary concept of honor (siy).513 The concept of male 
honor in Chechen society still requires a male to avenge a wrong done to him or members 
of his clan. In drastic cases this can result in a blood feud (ch’ir) by the male members of 
one clan on the offender or their male relatives (boys and women are generally exempt 
from this part of honor).514  
Additionally, a person’s actions, or lack thereof in situations requiring action, can 
reflect on the clan as a whole. This significant level of normative coherence within 
Chechen culture insures that a person’s individual honor is linked directly to the 
clan’s.515 In the case of violence or blood feud, it also guarantees that a person’s security 
is ensured by the clan; likewise, the clan’s honor is tied to the ability to serve as “the 
main guardian of the safety of individuals.”516 In addition to male member’s honor being 
tied to the clan’s endeavors, there exists a code of silence (däter) which imposes strict 
limits on communication about internal clan business with out-group members.517  
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2. Foundational Guerrilla Warfare 
Although scholars disagree about when the North Caucasus were Islamized,518 
there is no debate about the fact that the people of the North Caucasus, including the 
many ethnic Chechen teyps, have always fought outsiders. Russia’s interaction with the 
people of the Caucasus began in earnest in 1783 when Catherine the Great agreed to 
protect the Orthodox Christian Kingdom of Georgia and, to that end, built a large fortress 
along the Darial Pass in the Caucasus Mountains called “the rule of the Caucasus,” or 
Vladikavkaz.519 Russia committed limited personnel and resources to the Caucasus for a 
number of years, mainly defending a line of forts but occasionally raiding into modern 
day Chechnya or Dagestan.520  
In response, Sheikh Mansur waged a campaign of guerrilla warfare that merged 
obedience to Sufi Islam under the Murid movement with the fierce, independent culture 
of the North Caucasus.521 Noted as comparable to the Wahabi movement which would be 
a prevalent part of the second Chechen war, Muridism implored its followers to realize 
their “most sacred duty and object in life” and “die in battle against the infidel.”522 
During the five years of resistance, Sheik Mansur succeeded in coalescing a disparate 
group of North Caucasian tribes and ethnic groups by championing Islam–a common 
thread over the next two hundred years.523  
In order to project forces South of the Kuban and Terek rivers (the military 
conquest of the Caucasian tribes), General Yermolov began establishing a line of 
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garrisons from which he could conduct raids.524 He then instituted a policy of conquest 
or resettlement, destroying villages and enslaving women along the way, engendering 
few in the Caucuses to the Russian expansion.525 He directed the clearing of large forests 
and building of roads to ease troop movement to conduct further “punitive raids against 
unsubmissive tribes.”526 The decades of fighting and attempting to “crush the 
mountaineers in a single, large-scale campaign ended in failure.”527 After nearly four 
decades of “almost constant guerrilla warfare…the Chechens, Ingush, and Dagestanis had 
learned the need for unity of command.”528 
Imam Shamil was a well-educated, pragmatic, Islamic leader who was able to 
absorb essential lessons of guerrilla warfare and develop a formidable, unified insurgency 
against the Russians.529 This time, in addition to the always popular anti-Russian 
narrative combined with the Islamic imperative to fight, Shamil was able to incorporate 
outside support from the Ottoman Empire.530 Although Shamil was supported financially 
by the Turks, his ability to create a coherent resistance movement out of many separate 
groups is the reason he was successful for three decades, and ultimately why he is 
memorialized in militant Islam circles today.531  
Under Shamil’s leadership he withdrew vulnerable populations deeper into the 
mountains, and created a system of village-to-village support to shelter and feed those 
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harmed by the Russian forces.532 He reinstated the practice of every tenth household 
providing a warrior while the other nine provided for that warrior’s family.533 Shamil’s 
system, based on his leadership and centered in Islam, included taxation, local 
government, and courts; it was this system the Russians would have to replace in addition 
to defeating Shamil if they were to gain control and legitimacy in the Caucasus.534  
Most importantly, he conducted guerrilla operations against the Russians with 
speed, audacity and deception, seizing a number of Russian outposts and garrisons as 
well as keeping initiative in the conflict.535 Although Russian forces conducted raids and 
laid siege to insurgent strongholds, successfully capturing or razing village after village, 
they were only hollow victories, as Shamil’s forces continued to fight.536 The eventual 
realization that the Caucasus could not be dealt with “in a lightning campaign of 
destruction but only through years of patient and methodical effort” took hold.537  
With the end of the Crimean War in 1856, Russia was able to increase the number 
of troops to 300,000 in the Caucasus, an all-time high, to ensure the implementation of 
new tactics and strategy.538 One Russian commander sought to divide Shamil’s command 
by appealing to the tribal and independent nature of Chechens.539 A system of local 
courts provided a mechanism for conflict resolution external to the radical Islam Shamil 
enforced.540 Russian commander of the Left Flank in Chechnya, Bariatinskii addressed 
specific grievances, cultivated the economic relationship and hired local informants.541 
Bariatinskii enforced discipline and the “importance of a close column” to fend off 
                                                 
532 Baumann, “Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan,” 12. 
533 Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, 66. 
534 Marshall, The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1860–1917, 120. 
535 Baumann, “Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan,” 16–19. 
536 Ibid., 17. 
537 Ibid., 34. 
538 Ibid., 5. 




ambushes—something that would become particularly useful in Central Asia.542 He also 
stressed well planned, independent maneuver and deception operations by independent 
columns to “neutralize the superior mobility of Shamil’s guerrillas and deny the 
mountaineers the initiative.”543 The Russian tactics of displacement and scorched earth 
reshaped the environment by removing hundreds of thousands of natives and replacing 
them with Cossack settlers.544 It also fomented opposition to direct Russian rule—a 
legacy alive and well today.545 Only after a “patient, methodical approach to the war with 
a larger commitment of forces” was Russia able to “systematically reduce the territory 
and population under their control.”546 
3. Radicals Rise 
In an attempt to nullify anti-communist resistance early, the Bolsheviks 
incorporated a Muslim Committee as early as 1917.547 The Muslim Committee was 
established to better incorporate Muslims into the revolution by granting those 
participants greater autonomy. This practice tended to promote radical leaders within the 
Muslim community and as the turmoil of the Russian Revolution was coming to a head, a 
prominent Chechen leader, Sheikh Uzen Haji al-Salty declared the North Caucasus 
region an Emirate and declared jihad against the Russian forces (now trying to quash any 
real or perceived threat to power).548 This proclamation by al-Salty again drew support 
from outside of Chechnya. It eventually led Imam Shamil’s great grandson to “travel 
from Turkey to Chechnya in support of the guerrilla war” which highlights the “links 
between external groups in Turkey and the anti-Russian resistance.”549 Uzen Haji died in 
1920 and most of the anti-Russian movement died with him. However, that did not lessen 
                                                 
542 Ibid., 35. 
543 Ibid. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, 61. 
546 Baumann, “Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan,” 5. 
547 Allworth, Central Asia, 130 Years of Russian Dominance, 187–89. 
548 Moore and Tumelty, “Assessing Unholy Alliances in Chechnya,” 79. 
549 Ibid., 79–80. 
 105 
the fractured nature of Chechnya. As Stalin consolidated power, he purged leaders he 
could not fully trust. In Chechnya, that included pro-Bolshevik leaders who were also 
Chechen or Caucasus nationalists.550  
Resistance to Russia and later the Soviet Union lasted in various forms until 
Stalin ordered the deportation of many natives of the North Caucasus (accused of Nazi 
collaboration) in 1944, including most Chechens.551 Deportation and mass murder were 
favorite policy tools of the Soviets under Stalin.552 Estimates vary, but it is reported that 
one quarter of the entire deported Chechen population—nearly 125,000 of the roughly 
500,000 deported—died as a result of the resettlement alone.553 The Soviet military was 
particularly brutal during the forced deportation. They annihilated entire populations that 
refused the order as well as denuded the mountains to deny the historic safe haven to 
would be insurgents.554 Later, this mass deportation would serve as an extremely 
important unifying point for Chechens, but from the deportation until the 1980s, Soviet 
suffocation of Chechnya left Islam as “little more than a household tradition and mark of 
ethnic identity” in the North Caucasus.555  
B. THE NATIONALIST CAMPAIGN, OR “FIRST” CHECHEN WAR 
As the Soviet empire collapsed, Moscow lost temporarily much of its ability to 
control the peripheral states within the union. In Chechnya, that meant the election of 
Chechen nationalist Dzokhar Dudayev in October 1991. Dudayev’s first action as 
president was to declare Chechnya an independent state, which Boris Yeltsin 
subsequently pronounced as illegal and sent 2,500 Interior Ministry troops to bring 
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Chechnya back into the fold.556 Before the troops were employed, the Russian parliament 
rescinded Yeltsin’s order. As a consequence, Dudayev was elevated in stature in 
Chechnya as a leader who stood up to Moscow and won.557 The slight was not forgotten 
by the political elite in Moscow and in November, 1994 (during a Russian election 
cycle), Moscow-loyal fighters tried to overthrow Dudayev.558 The coup did not succeed 
and forced Yeltsin to intervene directly.  
Russian troops were poorly prepared for the combat they faced in Grozny, the 
capital of Chechnya. What followed was brutal urban warfare and guerrilla tactics of the 
first Chechen war. The ex-Soviet force sent into Grozny was told to expect little to no 
resistance.559 The Russian troops were mostly ill equipped and poorly trained conscripts 
fighting in an unpopular war.560 Aslan Maskhadov, the former Soviet artillery Colonel 
turned Chief of Defense for Chechnya, prepared an irregular defense and quickly routed 
the pro-Moscow forces.561  
The resistance fighters were highly networked and lived up to their traditions of 
being fierce fighters and ethno-nationalists, even though many of the leaders had been 
born in exile or lived abroad the majority of their lives.562 The various clans and families 
united against the invading army under Maskhadov’s leadership. The forces were also 
well prepared for the invading Russian army, by some estimates preparing defenses for 
urban combat for over three months.563 The rebels were organized into “small bands of 
lightly-armed fighters.”564 These small groups were exceptionally flexible and able to 
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make full use of the urban terrain, getting very close to and blocking off Russian armored 
columns.565 These independent insurgents “were able to make kill shots” with “shoulder-
fired anti-tank weapons and anti-tank grenades” while suffering relatively few casualties 
because multiple Chechen teams were acting in conjunction with each other while not 
requiring direct coordination.566  
The Russians defended these attacks with several adaptations. They created ad 
hoc combined arms elements called storm groups, bringing massive amounts of firepower 
to a company-sized element.567 They also re-introduced vehicle adaptations from their 
experience in Afghanistan, such as screening around vehicles to protect from anti-armor 
shape charges.568 Russian troops also incorporated heavy weapons with greater capability 
to elevate or depress, enabling forces to fire on Chechen positions.569  
Eventually, Russian forces ground Grozny and the Chechen elements defending it 
down to a point where they took to the safety of the Caucasus Mountains.570 Russia 
pursued a coercive strategy targeting civilians, similar to the early 1800s.571 Russian 
brutality became as notorious as the guerrillas’ (there are videos of Chechen fighters 
beheading Russian soldiers).572 The Russians employed “cleansing” operations 
(zachistka), which were officially house-to-house searches but became “synonymous 
with looting, violence and mass detentions.”573  
Meanwhile, President Dudayev, concerned about lacking significant Muslim 
credentials, appointed Islam Khalimov as a religious advisor to appeal to a broader base 
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of Chechen support.574 As the war progressed and intensified, it strengthened the 
religious nature of the Chechen population and gave rise to Chechnya as a rallying cry 
and cause célèbre for Muslims around the world. This increased awareness by Muslim 
communities drew funding and recruitment from more radical sources abroad.575 
1. The Budennovsk Raid 
Slightly more than half a year into the first Chechen war, it appeared that Russian 
had won. Grozny, what was left of it, was under a Russian flag, as were all towns and 
most of the villages. Russian forces controlled every major crossroads in Chechnya. The 
guerrilla fighters were still conducting harassing attacks in the southwest, small scale 
raids and ambushes, but the main resistance had just been pushed out of the last 
population center under their control. Maskhadov and Basayev had both been in the area 
leading the defenses there, and when it appeared that Russian forces would overwhelm 
them, the conducted a rapid retreat into the mountains.576  
It was during this June retreat that Maskhadov and Basayev, still closely working 
together, planned the operation in Budennovsk. Some question if the hospital in 
Budennovsk was the original target or a target of opportunity. History is not afforded the 
luxury of knowing the selection process of the 150 fighters Basayev took with him, if he 
conducted dedicated rehearsals and reconnaissance prior to the operation or simply piled 
men into vehicles and bribed his way through check points. What is recorded is that his 
raiding force reached the town of Budennovsk, Russia 240 kilometers from their safe 
operating area with the element of surprise intact.  
Once in the town center the fighters stormed the administrative building and the 
police station. The fighters encountered a vehicle with several Russian pilots from a 
nearby air base and shot them. After ransacking the town and murdering dozens of 
innocents, Basayev had his fighters rounded up hundreds of villagers and brought them to 
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the Budennovsk hospital. His fighters found several other Russian airmen among the 
group and executed them as well. Reports vary but Basayev ended up holding over 1,500 
hostages.577  
The Chechen fighters immediately barricaded themselves in the hospital with 
mines, machineguns, rocket propelled grenades and snipers. Basayev demanded that 
Russian cease combat in Chechnya and withdraw its forces. While the Chechen fighters 
hid behind hostages President Yeltsin was abroad, so the authority to deal with the 
growing incident landed in the lap of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.578  
Unlike the more closely controlled access to the conflict in Chechnya, the 
bloodbath in Budennovsk was widely reported and captured the attention of the Russian 
population. Any discourse between Basayev and Russian forces on the ground ended 
with the same demand – remove the Russian troops from Chechnya. So, the elite 
commando unit Alpha led an assault on the barricaded Chechen force. It was bloodily 
repulsed by the Chechen fighters.579  
Quickly, the Russians mounted another assault, this one backed by armored 
vehicles blasting away at the hospital entrances where hostages held white sheets. 
Although the hostages quickly hid during the intense crossfire it did little to reduce their 
casualties. Still, the Chechen fighters held out. The failure of the “Budennovsk jospital 
storming was humiliating” for the Russians.580  
So humiliating was the failure that Viktor Chernomyrdin personally negotiated 
with Shamil Basayev to end the siege. Basayev not only received safe transport back to 
the mountains of Chechnya, but Russia came to the negotiation table under the auspices 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This relatively small tactical 
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victory was also significant in that it marked the first in a long succession of terrorist acts 
outside of the conflict area.581 
In an impressive seizure of the initiative, Chechen guerrillas infiltrated Grozny 
and captured several key facilities.582 Within hours of the initial attack, Russian garrisons 
found themselves cut off and having to attack a well prepared enemy.583 Using similar 
tactics, the Chechen fighters succeeded in sealing off the main avenues of approach to the 
city, “restricting Russia’s ability to reinforce” elements in the city.584 During a previous 
raid three months prior, Chechen fighters had tested infiltration routes, conducted attacks 
to judge Russian response times, and “seized Russian weapons depots, which they then 
cached within the city,” all in preparation for the assault.585 Fighting continued for weeks, 
costing thousands of additional lives before a cease-fire agreement was worked out.586 
The Budennovsk incident and the surprise assault on Grozny, “led Moscow to 
sign the Kasavyurt Accords.”587 The losses on both sides were as staggering as the 
atrocities they committed. As many as 14,000 Russian troops were killed, a figure 
dwarfed by the 50,000 Chechens civilians that were killed.588  
2. Governance Failure and Rise of the Islamic Republic of the North 
Caucasus 
In the end it did not matter how inclusive Maskhadov’s presidency was after the 
conclusion of the first Chechen war, or that he was elected in an internationally 
recognized fair election with nearly 70 percent of the vote. Maskhadov began to lose 
control to criminals, thugs and religious zealots. They rose up because Maskhadov’s 
government was unable to provide services of nearly any kind or improve the quality of 
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life for most Chechens. They were used in some small way during the war, but stayed 
after the war’s conclusion and metastasized into a direct threat to Maskhadov’s 
leadership, changing the very nature of the conflict from nationalist to religious. 
President, Maskhadov was more concerned with national Chechen issues than the 
religious ideologues who immediately challenged him in favor of implementing Sharia 
law.589 Maskhadov, attempting to appeal to the moderate, traditional Sufi adherents, 
moved to expel Salafis (including radical foreign fighters) from Gudermes, Chechnya. 
When Maskhadov’s forces arrived to expel the radicals, his forces were met with armed 
resistance.590 The core of that radical group emanated from a conglomeration of radicals 
including Jordanian, Turkish, Arab and North African Muslims who came to Chechnya to 
fight.  
Those foreign fighters were influenced in large part by Ibn al-Khattab, a well-
connected Saudi living in Chechnya. Khattab had been guided through Afghanistan by 
Hassan as-Sarehi, and knew both Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam. Khattab 
brought those connections to Chechnya where he “emphasized the value of propaganda 
and released dozens of tapes both to frame the Chechen fight as part of a global jihad and 
to describe the plight of the Chechens and the endeavors of the mujahideen.”591 Khattab 
and other radicals were fueled by the millions of dollars in aid given by Muslim charities 
and organizations, as well as had significant connection to many pan-Islamic radical 
organizations, not just al-Qaeda.592 
Later, in an effort to appease the likes of Shamil Basayev, Maskhadov acquiesced 
to their demands and adopted Sharia law across Chechnya. This did little to appease the 
extremists. External, radical influence continued to pour in, along with financing. Sharia 
supporters recruited and incorporated Islamic fundamentalists from across southern 
Russia and Central Asia and set up in radical enclaves for “training as well as political 
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and religious indoctrination.”593 The factions within Chechnya became so polarized that, 
although Maskhadov still had extensive popular support, there were several assassination 
attempts in 1998 and 1999.594 
C. PUTIN’S WAR—THE “SECOND” CHECHEN WAR 
At the behest of Ibn al-Khattab, Basayev directed cross-border raids from 
Chechnya into Dagestan to support several villages which declared allegiance to the 
Islamic Republic of the North Caucasus and implemented sharia law.595 These raids were 
tactical failures; they were quickly rebuffed by Dagestani and Russian security forces.  
Four apartment buildings in Moscow and other towns in Russia were bombed in 
the middle of the night causing hundreds of casualties in the fall of 1999. Days later, two 
suspects were arrested placing sacks of white powder and devices on an apartment 
building.596 The two men turned out to be FSB agents and the bombs they planted were 
real and similar to the earlier bombs.597 The explosives were military grade, as were the 
failed detonating devices.598 But those facts were brushed aside as then-prime minister 
Vladimir Putin expressed outrage at Chechen rebels who were blamed for the 
bombings.599 Later, the agent who had rented the basement where they were caught 
planting the bomb “was killed in a hit-and-run car accident that was never solved;” 
another person investigating the issue was convicted at a secret tribunal; four additional 
people investigating Russian government “involvement were killed under mysterious 
circumstances.”600 Even though any Chechen connection to the four apartment bombings 
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in 1999 is “dubious,” to most Russians this was their equivalent of the 9/11 attacks.601 It 
was used as a rallying cry for the Russian public and a mechanism to smooth the political 
Yeltsin-Putin power transition.602 The raids were used by Vladimir Putin, in conjunction 
with the bombing of the four apartment buildings, as justification for the second Chechen 
war.603 
Russian forces staged in neighboring Dagestan for weeks preparing for the 
invasion, and when they did invade they encircled Grozny instead of driving armored 
columns into the heart of the city, then they pummeled the city with artillery and aerial 
bombardment.604 The initial Russian strategy seemed to be reliant on air and artillery to 
bomb Grozny into submission. That lasted from October until late December, 1999 when 
Russian forces, with significant pro-Moscow Chechen militia help, “fought to capture the 
airport in the Khankala suburb” of Grozny.605  
Once the battle for Grozny was underway in earnest, it became apparent that 
Russia’s invading force had divested itself of cold war tactics. The force of nearly 
100,000 soldiers included Russian spetsnaz and elite infantry forces.606 The Russian plan 
required the forces be broken into attack groups of 30–50 men, supported by air and 
artillery bombardment once enemy positions were identified.607 These groups were 
specifically organized to be mobile and flexible in an urban environment. Each 
detachment had a broad cross section of soldiers and a variety of weapons such as 
sappers, forward observers, snipers, flame throwers and automatic weapons gunners who 
would use impressive fire power to deny any location to a resistance fighter.608 These 
detachments would dig out the remaining resistance once armored elements secured a 
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foot hold in the urban environment.609 Even the motivation of the individual Russian 
soldier was better during the second Chechen war, and when compared to the now 
fractured Chechen resistance, Russian morale was generally higher.610  
This is not to say that Maskhadov, Basayev or their contemporaries were in any 
way defeated from the outset. They certainly still believed in repelling the invading force, 
and established a defense of Chechnya and Grozny to do exactly that. Chechen forces 
successfully bled Russian troops through ambushes and raids in the country side and on 
the fringes of Grozny. While suffering significant casualties themselves, they extracted 
far more on the Russians in the street fighting in Grozny. The Russian forces were only 
able to advance about 100 meters per day.611  
Chechen guerrillas continued to blend into the civilian population and even into 
the Russian soldiery at times. Once Grozny was taken by the Russians, the Chechen 
guerrilla forces melted into the Caucasus Mountains to rely on their support structure, 
take advantage of the terrain and exploit the seams of international boundaries.612 
Maskhadov was hoping that he could hold his forces together long enough and 
inflict significant casualties to bring the Russians to the negotiating table as at the end of 
the first Chechen war. The problem for Maskhadov was that he was fighting to keep his 
divergent group of groups together at the same time he was fighting a guerrilla war 
against the Russian army.613 Maskhadov was employing improvised explosive devices 
against troops and vehicles to great success. He employed a cadre of very well trained 
snipers both in the Russian’s rear areas as well as in support of operations. He directed 
small teams to infiltrate enemy positions and specifically targeted Russian helicopters, 
critical to the tactics employed by the Russian forces, destroying nine helicopters in six 
months of fighting,614 and thirty-six helicopters in three years of fighting. One of the 
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attacks against an Mi-26 transport helicopter killed 127 people. The aircraft was 
overcrowded by Russian commanders because there were only two of the large transports 
in Chechnya at the time.615 
The Chechens’ campaign of improvised explosive devices was so successful that 
Col. Trushkov, head of engineer forces, later stated the explosives caused “roughly 40 
percent of the casualties” Russia suffered early in the second Chechen war. During the 
first year of the conflict, Russian forces were faced with 20 devices a day on average.616  
To counter these threats, Russian spetsnaz and naval infantry developed and 
employed small-unit and insurgent-like tactics.617 Small, highly mobile detachments 
combined with significant intelligence capabilities (via pro-Moscow Chechens) increased 
Russian effectiveness against the insurgents.618 The Russians also used lesson from 
several years of combat as well as former insurgents to defeat improvised explosive 
devices and ambushes.619  
Russian commanders also implemented directives to understand the culture, treat 
Chechens with respect, deal with people calmly, and exercise restraint—all sound and 
basic principals of counterinsurgency.620 Although the impact of such directives seems 
limited outside of elite Russian units, as Human Rights Watch (among others) notes “the 
use of indiscriminate violence, forced disappearances (about 5,000 since 1999), and 
extrajudicial killings” in addition to “theft, torture, kidnapping, and sheer wanton 
destruction.”621  
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Russia switched from a near-scorched earth policy to a divide and conquer policy. 
Moscow directed the transfer of “political power to approved Chechen officials who 
supported the Kremlin’s efforts to keep Chechnya within Russia’s legal fold.”622 Putin 
chose Akhmad Kadyrov, who fought against Russia in the “First” Chechen War, to lead 
the “Chechenization.”623  
As in Afghanistan, after realizing firepower and Russian units alone would not 
achieve the desired results, Russia began the process of turning over responsibility for 
combat operations to local forces. Russia created joint Russian-Chechen and pure pro-
Russian Chechen units in early 2003, eventually shifting most of the zachistki 
responsibility to Chechen forces.624  
To that end, three main types of Chechen forces were employed by the Kadyrov 
government, those who were also loyal to Moscow, those who left the insurgency to 
support the Kadyrov government (both types under the Ministry of Defense), and an 
irregular militia loyal to Kadyrov himself called the kadyrovtsy.625 These all-Chechen 
formations took over direct combat operations, as well as the zachistki operations from 
the Russians.626 Jason Lyall claims that this Chechen-on-Chechen approach led to one-
third fewer post-sweep attacks as compared to when Russian troops swept Chechen 
villages.627  
While the forces led by Maskhadov were busy planting bombs along the roads 
used by Russian forces in Chechnya, Basayev was encouraging his forces to export terror 
to Russia itself to shake the resolve of the Russian people. Unlike Basayev’s raid on 
Budennovsk which led to the negotiation table, his export of terror to Russia proper 
hardened the resolve of Vladimir Putin to continue the war in Chechnya.  
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The first target of terror outside of Chechnya was the now infamous attack on the 
Moscow opera house in October 2002. Russian forces gassed and then stormed the 
building killing all of the hostage takers and a significant number of hostages. There was 
a string of suicide bombings, nine in 2003 alone,628 conducted by the so called Black 
Widows. In August 2004 two Black Widows boarded separate planes and detonated their 
bombs. Thirty Chechen fighters captured over a thousand hostages in what is referred to 
as the Beslan school incident. It too was unsuccessful, not because the raid on the school 
resulted in four hundred hostages dead, but because it redoubled the Russian resolve to 
fight Chechen radicals.629  
In 2004 and 2005 it seemed the harder the Russians pushed the Chechen fighters, 
the wider the conflict was spreading. Raids against Chechen guerrillas were answered by 
ambush and echoed by acts of terror in seemingly safe areas deep within Russia. During 
this horrific spiral of violence Maskhadov continued to seek out an opportunity to 
negotiate peace. In an effort to achieve peace, Maskhadov unilaterally declared a cease 
fire, which may have worked if Maskhadov still controlled all of the rebel Chechen 
factions.630  
Maskhadov was killed under unusual circumstances during a raid. In the death of 
Maskhadov, Russia lost the most mainstream Chechen leader and the resistance 
weakened for want of Maskhadov’s leadership. Resistance to Russian forces and the pro-
Moscow government in Grozny did not vanish but it lessened considerably.631 There are 
still acts of terror in Russia and ambushes on security and police forces in Chechnya but 
they have lost nearly all effectiveness the Chechen resistance forces once had.  
1. Success and Failure in the Caucasus 
James Kiras suggested that the shock and paralysis caused in an enemy by a 
special operation is short and that “the nature of war and friction suggests that there is no 
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way of knowing the depth and duration of its effect.”632 That is simply not the case for 
the Budennovsk raid. The raid achieved its strategic effect when Basayev returned to a 
hero’s welcome in Chechnya. It achieved resounding strategic utility by bringing forcing 
Viktor Chernomyrdin to negotiate. It certainly achieved more than expected when the 
Russians (and Chechens) followed through with the negotiations and peace that followed.  
2. The Dubrovka Theater  
Basayev and other Chechen commanders began to plan and execute operations 
outside of Chechnya frequently during the second Chechen war. The Chechen 
commanders, minus Maskhadov’s following, believed that exporting terror to Russia, 
specifically attacks in Moscow, would turn public opinion in Russian against the war in 
Chechnya.633 This desire to bring the fight to the enemy was also coupled with an 
increase in suicide bombers, which was a direct reflection of radical Islamic influence 
among this segment of the Chechen resistance. So, although captivating and terrible, the 
hostage crisis at the Dubrovka Theater lacked the punch of Basaeyv’s raid on 
Budennovsk. 
Several fighters jumped on stage and fired their weapons into the air during the 
second act of a World War II musical. It took spectators a few moments to realize that 
these were not actors in “Nord-Ost” but were in fact Chechen commandos, and the 
spectators were now hostages.634 The Kremlin was faced with another attack, this time 
there were nearly 1,000 hostages only five kilometers from the Kremlin.635  
The 53 Chechen rebels who stormed the Dubrovka Theater were all volunteers 
from a group called Kamikaze of Islam, led by Movsar Barayev.636 They had been hand 
selected and trained extensively for months prior to the execution. A few members of the 
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group were selected for reconnaissance and preparation of the theater, so they travel to 
Moscow and got jobs as construction workers in the building next door. They attended 
the musical several times, smuggled weapons and ammunitions into Moscow and set up 
caches near the theater.637  
Once the hostages were under control the building was wired with explosives in at 
least 30 locations. All 18 female terrorists were wearing suicide belts. About two hours 
later a prerecorded demand was delivered to Al-Jazeera Moscow stating the terrorists’ 
demand that Russia pull all troops out of Chechnya. The Chechens released nearly 200 
people shortly after the video was aired.638 
There were several tense moments of the next few days, including times where 
hostages tried to escape or attack their captives.639 During all of it the Chechens 
negotiated through interlocutors but stuck to their demand. As the Chechens negotiated 
into the fourth day of the crisis, Russian Spetsnaz prepared to assault the building. Once 
assault teams were in place, they used a gas to incapacitate the terrorists.640 Although this 
certainly alerted the Chechen forces to the pending assault, there was not much the 
fighters could to in response.641 
There were three progressive breaches and based on the reports of gunfire, there 
were still a few Chechen fighters awake and alert enough to shoot back.642 However, 
none of the Chechen explosive devices were detonated. 126 hostages died from exposure 
to that gas used by the Spetsnaz forces, two more were shot to death in the rescue.643  
The Chechen fighters were successful at bringing the war to Moscow, thrusting 
the war into the public and at sacrificing for their cause, but that is where their success 
ends. They failed to embarrass Russian leadership. When Shamil Basayev released a 
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statement stating that “Russian leadership will without mercy slaughter its own citizens in 
the middle of Moscow,” it failed to resonate with Russians. He was trying to duplicate his 
past success of showing the Russians as ruthless, bringing the Chechen conflict to the 
forefront of the Russian psyche and ultimately bring Moscow to the negotiation table.  
There were several flawed assumptions which went into the planning of this 
mission. The first problem with Basayev’s strategy is overuse causes desensitization. As 
James Kiras stated, “shock is a short lived phenomenon,”644 and a spectacular attack 
ceases to be spectacular if it occurs regularly. A raid such as the Dubrovka Theater attack 
ceases to have much if any strategic value if it cannot produce the intended deep 
emotional and psychological reaction in the enemy or target audience. The second issue 
is that Russian leadership had changed, had learned from the previous Chechen war and 
vowed not to be weak in the face of terrorism. Third, the Dubrovka Theater incident not 
only failed to force Russia to the negotiation table, but it allowed the Russian leadership 
to frame Chechen groups in terms of the global war on terror and thus garner 
international support against part of its domestic problem. 
Overall, the Chechen force certainly exercised a high level of economy of force. 
While the operation was very well planned, rehearsed and executed, it had significantly 
less shock value because it came on the heels of other similar operations In this case, 
Russian Spetsnaz used gas to subdue the Chechen terrorist causing tactical failure on the 
part of the Chechens. The Chechen operation also failed to achieve their strategic goals. 
Because Chechen leadership miscalculated their opponent’s actions, they conducted an 
operation that ended with strategic disutility. Moscow became even more resolute in their 
fight against the Chechen rebels. Russia enlisted international help in tracking and 
defunding Chechen terrorist groups. Putin began working with Moscow-friendly 
Chechens and a campaign of leadership targeting which together decimated Chechen 
insurgent leadership. The Dubrovka Theater hostage incident backfired on the Chechen 
terrorists.  
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3. Conclusion of the “Second” Conflict 
The failure of Aslan Maskhadov to hold a cohesive Chechen government together 
is a great tragedy by an otherwise phenomenal leader. As Anatol Lieven put it, Aslan 
Maskhadov was a “rare and original genius – which makes his failure to ensure stability 
or effective government in post-war Chechnya all the more tragic.”645 The fractured 
nature of the Chechen resistance after the introduction of radical Islam became too much 
for Maskhadov.  
It was this split which allowed for the increased use of terror tactics in Russia and 
the incorporation of suicide attacks. In Putin’s Russia and the post-9/11 world, 
connections to radical Islam and terror tactics made Chechen groups more of a legitimate 
target rather than less of one. As Akhmad Kadyrov (later Ramzan Kadyrov, after his 
father’s assassination) consolidated power by making alliances with other strong tribes in 
Chechnya, Putin began to transfer significant sums of money to the Kadyrov government 
to rebuild Grozny and Chechnya.646  
Chechen units, supported by Russian intelligence, continue to make progress 
against the insurgents.647 In 2015 there were only fourteen people killed by the 
insurgency, a drop from 82 in 2012, and from 95 in 2011.648 The problem is, as Varvara 
Pakhomenko stated, that “Chechnya [now] is Russia’s avant-garde.”649 While there may 
be militant Islamic Chechen fighters involved in conflicts globally, there may also be 
kadyrovtsy prowling around, henchmen loyal only to Kadyrov and by proxy, Putin.  
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D. WHERE DOES IT GO FROM HERE? 
In 2014, Chechen fighters took part in the conflict in Ukraine. Volunteer elements 
fought on both sides of the conflict, and at times, against each other.650 In 2015, a grisly 
video was released showing a pro-Islamic State Chechen in Syria behead another 
Chechen, presumably working for the Russian forces on the ground.651  
When Russia invaded Ukraine, a significant number of Chechen diaspora 
population traveled to Ukraine to fight the Russians in several Chechen battalions. 
Interestingly, a small number of people who fought with the Chechen battalions were 
from other ex-Soviet states. All were Muslim and as the commander of the Sheikh 
Mansur battalion said, “The war for us never ended. We like to fight the Russians, we 
always fight the Russians.”652 
At a time when most of Europe was unwilling to support Ukraine with anything 
other than words, the fact that militant Muslims were willing to travel to a war zone and 
fight Russia should be noted. If the United States or others were willing to use a proxy 
force against Russia in Ukraine, the Chechens have shown themselves willing and able to 
do so. Although the latent potential is probably somewhat limited, it does exist. And after 
all, as Isa Munayev said in his interview with Andrew Kramer, “It’s beneficial for Europe 
that we fight here as volunteers. But not everybody understands.”653  
Today, as Russian forces continue to have success targeting the leadership of the 
Islamic Caucasus Emirate in the Northern Caucasus, Chechens continue to travel to and 
fight in Syria.654 Once there, some groups have supported Al Nusrah Front and others the 
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Islamic State.655 The problem is that what happens in Syria does not stay in Syria. After 
these fighters receive additional radicalization and significant front line military 
experience, many of them depart Syria. Some of the fighters have recently moved from 
the Syrian battlefield to Ukraine.656 This move bolsters the Chechen units which have 
been fighting in Ukraine for a year. It also directly serves the Islamic State’s desire to 
establish the Qoqaz, or a unified Northern and Southern Caucasus caliphate. Lastly, the 
move from Syria to Ukraine shows how well connected many of these Chechens have 
become and how pervasive a problem they could be. 
The cellular network, based on deep tribal and familial ties may spread with these 
fighters, or it may become a less potent organizational tool for Chechen fighters going 
abroad. It is a potential that, in addition to novel tactics and hardcore fighters exported by 
these natural irregular warriors, these global connections infused with the Chechen sense 
of community leads to a heretofore unheralded brand of international terrorism. Any 
direction these now-globally networked fighters take will be a threat to Russian interests 
and possible to the west in general. One should expect Russia to attempt to counter the 
globalization of the Chechen network insofar as they are able. 
Perhaps predictably, the linkage of ISIS-affiliated Chechens returning home, or 
roaming Ingushetia, or Dagestan and linking back to the Levant has Russia so worried 
that Moscow has asked Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov to employ hunter-killer 
teams on the ground in Syria, which he did.657 This divide-and-conquer move continues 
to export the Chechen-on-Chechen violence across the globe, rather than diminish it. It 
may have been an effective tool in the middle of the nineteenth century, but it has had 
limited effect as of late. As was recently demonstrated—by the video released of an ISIS 
affiliated Chechen beheading a Kadyrov-loyal Chechen—this hatred runs deep.  
                                                 
655 Ibid. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Theodore Karasik, “Chechens Face an Epic Battle in Syria,” Al Arabiya, 22 September 2015, 
accessed December 15, 2015, http://ara.tv/v8bbn. 
 124 




VIII. RUSSIAN IRREGULAR WARFARE IN UKRAINE 
The post-Cold War “peace dividend” shifted the United States’ focus from 
competition to cooperation with the former Soviet Bloc. Later, the War on Terror shifted 
the U.S. Military’s focus to the Middle East. A decade of neglect plus the Obama 
Administration’s reset with Russia in March of 2009 gave Russia room to expand 
influence in Europe and Central Asia. In Ukraine, Russia’s influence and media 
campaign laid the groundwork for and directly supported their irregular military 
operations in 2014.  
A. RUSSIA FILLED THE POST-COLD WAR INFORMATION VACUUM  
While the U.S. was focused elsewhere, Russia revamped its military, applied the 
lessons from the Chechen Wars and the conflict in Georgia in 2008, and simultaneously 
expanded its ability to project a Russian-favorable narrative to the world.658 This 
combination of lack of U.S. attention with a strong pro-Russian narrative laid the 
groundwork for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other actions in Ukraine. The Central 
tenet of Russian irregular warfare against Ukraine is the control of the conflict’s 
narrative.659 Russia used information to cause confusion within the international 
community long enough to secure strategic objectives with irregular military forces.660  
As noted in a February 2016 Congressional Research Service report on Ukraine, 
Russia controls Crimea and nearly one-tenth of Ukrainian territory is occupied by 
Russian-supported separatist elements. The ceasefire agreement, Minsk-2, has not done 
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much beyond the cessation of major hostilities as both sides continue to fight from 
“heavily entrenched positions using a cocktail of snipers, machine guns, artillery and 
occasionally even tanks.”661 Despite the selective visa bans against Russian citizens, non-
lethal aid to Ukraine, and asset seizures and sanctions against key destabilizing figures in 
the Russian oligarchy, the Crimea remains in Russian hands and there is little hope of a 
resolving the conflict on the horizon.662 It appears that the conflict in Ukraine will be 
added to the list of “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet Bloc.663 
1. Russia Owned the Narrative Prior to Ukraine 
Russia’s narrative has dominated throughout the Ukraine conflict. This was in 
part due to Russia’s focus on international broadcasts targeting Russian and non-Russian 
speakers through Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today, also known as RT) as well as outlets 
like Sputnik in the decade leading up to the conflict in Ukraine.664 Just as the United 
States reduced public diplomacy through international media, Russia ramped up their 
efforts.665  
Reports suggest that Moscow has placed renewed emphasis on international 
media operations, “which [in 2014 accounted] for 34% of total central government media 
spending, compared to 25% a year ago.”666 International versions of key domestic 
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programming with mixed entertainment and news coverage are available to over 30 
million Russian-speaking people outside of Russia in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia.667 This is exceptionally problematic for western and United States interest as those 
broadcasts “were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine” 
and “control is exerted directly by the [Russian] Presidential Administration.”668  
2. Waning U.S. Interest Prior to Invasion 
Since the Cold War, the United States has reduced the U.S. Government’s 
communication to international audiences while Russia has intensified and expanded 
their outreach and messaging.669 In 1998, as a dividend of the Cold War, the U.S. 
Congress passed legislation disbanding the United States Information Agency—the focal 
entity for U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War—and split the organization 
between the Department of State and a Broadcasting Board of Governors. In addition to 
this restructure was a significant reduction in budgetary allocation.670  
The U.S. information retreat did not stop at the turn of the century. In testimony 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April of 2015, Helle Dale stated that “the 
BBG has over the past decade shut down language services and radio transmissions.”671 
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Even after the 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia, the BBG continued reductions.672 
Voice of America, controlled and budgeted for by the BBG, remains the primary conduit 
to “convey America’s message of liberty, democracy, and free speech” to the world, 
broadcasting in 43 languages and reaching an estimated 141 million people weekly.673 
However, as noted in Dale’s testimony, there is no Voice of America shortwave, AM, or 
FM broadcasting to Russia (Voice of America, because of Russian contract disputes, 
moved to podcasting material online).674 Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State 
for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, tacitly acknowledged the extent to 
which Russian information had diffused during testimony before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee in March 2015 when she stated that “the Kremlin’s pervasive 
propaganda campaign” was “poisoning minds across Russia, on Russia’s periphery and 
across Europe.”675 
B. RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE INVASION 2008–
2012 
Russia made attempts to modernize its military force several times after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The need for military reform manifested itself when Russia 
was defeated in the “First” Chechen War. However, it was not until the war with Georgia 
in 2008 that the need for change overcame Russian bureaucracy.676 During the five days 
of ground conflict inside Georgia, an estimated 40,000 Russian or Russian-allied ground 
forces fought up to 15,000 Georgian forces.677 The Russian troops “relied heavily on 
massive artillery and aircraft barrages (as opposed to precision targeting)” while fighting 
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from Soviet doctrine in large maneuver elements to overwhelm the Georgians.678 But 
Russia also blended hallmark Soviet tactics with the introduction of military forces 
pretending to be peacekeepers and proxy local forces, in addition to bringing further 
troops into the area during military exercises.679 Russia also employed “cyberwarfare and 
strong propaganda to neutralize Georgia’s warfighting options and to vilify them in the 
press as aggressors,” as well as selectively managing reporting from the conflict area.680  
Even though the Russo-Georgian conflict was a solid victory for Moscow (having 
soundly defeated the Georgian army and taken significant territory), it demonstrated how 
little progress had been made in reforming the military. While pointing at the need to 
continue modernization efforts the Georgian campaign also reinforced the use of proxy 
forces, the success of public denial and obfuscation, and preparation of target audiences 
(e.g. Russian speakers in living abroad) through propaganda.681 Among other things, 
wide-spread introduction of professional service members (rather than conscripts), a 
“major reshuffle” of cabinet ministers, and “replacement of a large number of Russia’s 
most senior military commanders” completed the Russian military’s transformation.682 
These reforms and lessons drawn from the Russia-Georgia conflict were internalized and 
used to some success against Ukraine. 
1. Russia’s View of its Vulnerability 
The media dominance of Russian-favorable information is only part of the 
Ukraine story. Certainly the Soviet Union’s fear of internal domestic uprising was 
manifested by the current Russian oligarchy in its concern over the Color Revolutions. In 
2014, as reported by Anthony Cordesman, the Belarusian Minister of Defense linked 
domestic uprisings in The Czech Republic, The Balkans, Georgia, Ukraine (2004 and 
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2014), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan (2005 and 2010) and Belarus with support or instigation 
from outside the state and blamed on the West.683 He characterized the Color 
Revolutions as disastrous for the state in which they occurred and for the international 
community.684 Margarete Klein, commenting on Russia’s 2014 military doctrine, stated 
that Russia fears “the possibility of ethnic and religious strife escalating and eroding the 
internal cohesion on the multi-ethnic state” and that Russia sees itself “as the target” of 
Western influence especially from the allegedly externally instigated Color 
Revolutions.685  
Charles Bartles writes that it is easy to understand why, when characterizing the 
perceived threats to Russia, Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery 
Gerasimov, outlined his view of the threat that Russia and Russian allies would face in 
the future. He stated that the Russian government must adapt its methods because 
the pattern of forced U.S.-sponsored regime change has been largely 
supplanted by a new method. Instead of an overt military invasion, the 
first volleys of a U.S. attack come from the installment of political 
oppositions through state propaganda (e.g. CNN, BBC), the Internet and 
social media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). After 
successfully instilling political dissent, separatism, and/or social strife, the 
legitimate government has increasing difficulty maintaining order. As the 
security situation deteriorates, separatist movements can be stoked and 
strengthened and undeclared special operations, conventional, and private 
military forces (defense contractors) can be introduced to battle the 
government and cause further havoc…Eventually, as the government 
collapses and anarchy results, military forces under the guise of 
peacekeepers can then be employed to pacify the area.686 
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In an amazing instance of mirror imaging, General Gerasimov outlined to a 
domestic audience how NATO and the U.S. could, through a Color Revolution, threaten 
Russia or a Russian ally with domestic intervention. While “Gerasimov is simply 
explaining his view of the operational environment and the nature of future war,”687 he 
gives the world a glimpse of Russia’s interpretation of how the West will fight in the 
future based on his characterization of the nature of future wars. That interpretation 
comes with the imperative that Russia needs to implement what it perceives the West has 
been doing for decades. It also gives a clear picture of how Russia approached its 
intervention in Ukraine. More to the point, as Margarete Klein points out, Russia’s 
military doctrine calls for the “integrated use of military force and of political, 
informational, and other non-military measures. This approach is supplemented by 
indirect and asymmetrical forms of deployment…the use of special forces, armed 
irregulars and private military companies. These means permit an open military 
intervention to be disguised.”688 
2. Duel for Control Leads to War 
Russian-backed Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich felt immense pressure 
during the winter of 2013–2014. His refusal to sign an agreement associating Ukraine 
with the European Union caused the growth of protestors in Kiev’s Independence Square 
from under 100,000 to nearly 800,000 people in early 2014.689 As pressure continued to 
mount, Putin accused the United States and the European Union of trying to destabilize 
the country and encroach on the Russian “sphere of influence.”690 Despite political and 
economic maneuvers by both Yanukovich and Moscow, it was clear in early February 
that Yanukovich lost control in Ukraine.691 February 18th began a two-day death knell for 
Yanukovich, when 76 protestors were killed by police, allegedly with the help of Russian 
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Federal Security Service personnel in Ukraine trying to manage the protests.692 As 
violence spread throughout the country in response to the massacre, Yanukovich fled to 
Crimea. He later fled to Russia.  
The focus for both Russia and Ukraine shifted from the protests in Kiev to 
Crimea. Russia has a significant history of ownership of Crimea dating back to Empress 
Catherine II’s declaration in April 1783 annexing Crimea.693 Certainly in 2014, the 
Russian interest in Crimea was not historical alone. In the lead-up to the 2008 conflict 
with Georgia, Russia issued passports to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, then used the 
fact that those “Russian citizens” were threatened by Georgia as a rationale to invade 
Georgia.694 Russia has attempted a similar policy in Crimea in order to thinly justify 
annexation. Indeed, the convenient Russian State policy “‘on Compatriots Living 
Abroad’…provides the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of 
threat to their rights or physical well-being”695 gives a blank check for Russian 
intervention nearly anywhere it has issued passports. Intervention to protect its citizens 
outside of Russian borders is nothing new. As has already been demonstrated, it was a 
major reason for further expeditions into Central Asia in the nineteenth century. 
This self-imposed duty of the Russian state worked nicely for Russia with the 
importance of the anchorage for the Black Sea Fleet to create an impetus for deeper 
involvement in Ukraine. In the past, ships based in Crimea and Sevastopol projected 
Soviet naval power in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf as well as the 
Indian and Atlantic oceans.696 The importance of a Crimean naval base for Russian 
power projection was not lost on Moscow. As Dmitry Boltenkov records, Moscow 
negotiated with Ukraine in 2010 to extend basing rights for another 25 years and to invest 
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86 billion rubles by 2020.697 With Russian information strategy in Ukraine faltering and 
the threat of the self-titled Maidan protests loudly heard, Russia felt as though it had to 
act or potentially lose one of the most significant ex-Soviet states to the European Union 
and possibly NATO. In fact, Russian leadership may have thought the base so vital to 
they were willing to annex Crimean when faced with its potential loss at the hands of a 
hostile government in Kiev.  
C. RUSSIAN IRREGULAR WARFARE IN UKRAINE 
Maria Snegovaya argues that the Russian information campaign in the context of 
its war with Ukraine centers around four Soviet approaches. Namely, Russia dismissed 
facts and events, distorted information, distracted from Russian action and caused dismay 
(and therefore inaction) in potential adversaries.698 Russia’s first use of military force, or 
as Anton Lavrov calls it, “the active phase of its operation”699 came under the cover of a 
large military drill in the Central and Western Military Districts.700 Applying the Soviet 
information obfuscation approach to the events in Ukraine, the military exercises that 
overshadowed Moscow’s first use of Special Operations Forces distracted Ukrainian and 
Western leaders long enough for Moscow to militarily achieve what it had failed to do 
with other instruments of power up to that point.  
The exercises undoubtedly were meant to signal to Ukraine the overwhelming 
power Moscow had at its disposal and could bring to bear against Ukraine if necessary. 
Deliberately and effectually showing Kiev what the cost of escalation would be while 
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simultaneously denying involvement created hesitation in the brand new Ukrainian 
government.701 
1. Crimea—Coup de Main 
On the 25th of February, a Russian ship unloaded 300 armed soldiers in Ukraine. 
A move which had not been approved or coordinated with Ukraine.702 On the 26th, the 
same day Putin ordered the large exercises, three armored vehicles with seven additional 
trucks blocked the runway at Belbek airfield (home of 45 Ukrainian MiG-29 fighters 
which amounted to the bulk of Ukrainian airpower in Crimea).703 Additional troops were 
tasked with seizing airports and controlling other key infrastructure in Crimea.704 Some 
of these forces were Russian Spetsnaz who were given the mission to secure the Crimean 
parliament building, which they did at 4:25 am on the 27th of February.705 A day later, 
three transport helicopters escorted by eight attack helicopters sneaked into Ukraine 
without Ukrainian authorization and landed at Kacha airfield (a Russian-leased 
airfield).706 As part of the lease agreement, attack helicopters were not allowed in 
Ukraine. With Ukrainian aircraft successfully grounded and Russian anti-armor capable 
helicopters in Crimea, Russia had a huge advantage over Ukraine.707 On February 28th, 
Russia directed 8–10 transport aircraft from Anapa (where they were taking part in the 
exercises Putin directed on the 26th of February) to an airfield near Crimea’s capital, 
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Simferopol, and only 50 miles from the port city of Sevastopol. This airlift would have 
been enough to land nearly 1,500 Russian Spetsnaz in Crimea.708 While other reporting 
suggests that there could have been a blend of Spetznaz, the newly formed Special 
Operations Forces, naval infantry and intelligence operatives,709 the purpose of any and 
all such forces was the same. They were the Russian irregulars that would operate 
without governmental acknowledgement enabling a swift and bloodless usurpation of 
Crimea.710  
Moscow continued to dismiss reports coming from Crimea about its involvement. 
While Russian unmarked troops in unmarked vehicles were busy seizing key 
infrastructure like the state-run television company during the aforementioned operations, 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet was denying the involvement of any of its troops.711 At the 
same time, Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, alluded to 
“visitors” who portended to know the direction Ukraine wanted to go (toward the West) 
and that it was the impact these “visitors” had which may have caused the crisis. During 
the same press conference at the United Nations Security Council, Churkin stated any 
troop movements in Crimea were “within the framework” of the basing agreement 
between Ukraine and Russia – a statement which was patently false, demonstrated by the 
presence of Mi-35M attack helicopter’s arrival that morning.712 These misleading 
statements and denials of involvement were designed to create space and buy time for 
Russia to secure its goal of acquiring Crimea. They were also the culmination of years of 
preparation and saturation in the information realm. 
Within days, Putin received an authorization for the use of force in Ukraine from 
his parliament and the Crimean peninsula had been effectively blockaded from the air, 
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land and sea by Russian and pro-Russian forces.713 By March, Russia had gained control 
over all 193 military facilities in Crimea.714 When Crimea was annexed on the 18th of 
March, two days after a hasty referendum, 22,000 Ukrainian troops were left in Crimea. 
Of those Ukrainian troops, over 9,000 servicemen and nearly 7,000 contractors swore 
oaths to Russia and accepted Russian citizenship.715  
Putin admitted in April 2014 that Russian troops were, in fact, involved in the 
operations within Crimea.716 On May 9th, 2014, some of the units that had taken part of in 
the annexation of Crimea marched in the annual Victory Day parade in Moscow’s Red 
Square.717 Putin’s acknowledgment of involvement, after such strong protests at all 
levels of the Russian government that Russia was not involved despite copious amounts 
of evident to the contrary, confirmed statements made by the headquarters of the Black 
Sea Fleet a month earlier.718 The effect of Russia’s openness, post-annexation of Crimea, 
was to diminish the effectiveness—to the point of ridiculousness—of its future denials of 
involvement in eastern Ukraine. 
2. Eastern Ukraine 
Perhaps because Russia’s interest was less direct, its involvement in Eastern 
Ukraine followed suit. Russia again used intelligence officers and Spetsnaz forces in 
Eastern Ukraine.719 Russian forces in the east used “bribery or intimidation to coerce 
local officials” and amplified or created tension in many of the towns.720 Again Russian 
or Russian-supported forces captured administration and governance buildings. They 
seized television and radio stations, replacing Ukrainian programming with pro-Moscow 
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broadcasts and Russian television.721 Russian forces trained, equipped and accompanied 
militias, adventure seekers, and Cossack volunteers.722 Russian specialists operated 
technical equipment, such as the BUK surface-to-air missile system which downed 
Malaysian airlines flight MH17 killing all passengers aboard.723 Even as Ukraine claimed 
that significant portions of the anti-Ukrainian forces in the East were Russian soldiers, 
Moscow denied any involvement.724  
Moscow’s covert support to the separatist regions in eastern Ukraine seems to be 
linked to their success. As long as the separatists were making gains with only equipment 
and advisors from Russia, Moscow did not become overtly involved. However, when 
Ukrainian rebels were being pushed back in July and August, Russia became directly 
involved with overt military expeditions backing the rebels. Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. 
ambassador to Ukraine, stated that when Russian advisors and military aid stopped being 
sufficient for the rebels to defend against Ukraine, Putin authorized “an increasing 
number of Russian troops [who] are intervening directly in fighting on Ukrainian 
territory.”725 
In fact, even after Ukraine captured 10 Russian paratroopers deep inside Ukraine 
who were actively involved in combat, Moscow claimed the soldiers were lost and had 
crossed the border by accident.726 At other times, when confronted with destroyed 
versions of Russian military equipment inside Ukraine—equipment that had not been 
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exported—Russia continued to deny supplying arms or other support to the anti-Kiev 
forces in the east.727  
Although leaders in the Kremlin continued to deny any involvement, it was clear 
to the international community that Russia was involved in supporting the rebels. NATO 
Secretary General Anders Rasmussen stated that “we saw a Russian incursion, a crossing 
of the Ukrainian border. It just confirms the fact that we see a continuous flow of 
weapons and fighters from Russia into eastern Ukraine and it is a clear demonstration of 
continued Russian involvement” there.728 Despite an avalanche of reports, photographs, 
and released satellite imagery, a spokesman for the Russia Defense Ministry stated in 
retort to the NATO claim that “[w]e no longer pay attention to the allegations made by 
Mr. Rasmussen and his press secretary.”729  
The combat stress on Ukraine combined with the international pressure on both 
sides to end the conflict. The cease-fire agreement was arranged in September and called 
for international monitoring from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), exchanges of prisoners and the withdrawal of armed groups from 
Ukrainian territory.730  
This initial agreement halted conflict only for a while. There were several, 
significant flare-ups of the conflict before violence subsided to some degree after the 
signing of the second cease-fire. Between the implementation of the first plan in 
September 2014 and the second plan in February 2015 there were an additional 1,300 
deaths caused by the conflict.731  
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D. IRREGULAR WARFARE AT THE COST OF CREDIBILITY 
If Alexei Levinson is correct in arguing that “Russia’s new propaganda is not now 
about selling a particular worldview, it is about trying to distort information flows and 
fuel nervousness among European audiences,” then in the case of Crimea, Russia’s 
disinformation campaign supported its irregular warfare with great success. Muddying 
the water gained the Kremlin just enough plausible deniability to confuse the 
international community for the time needed to achieve its military goals. The problem 
for Russia, as it quickly found out, is that “disinformation campaigns erode over time.”732  
In the case of the rest of the fighting in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s constant denial 
of its involvement became so trite that it would have been laughable if it were not such a 
serious matter. As Maria Snegovaya said, “[o]nce the initial effects of unpredictability 
and confusion wear off, the credibility of the side applying disinformation starts to 
decline dramatically.”733 One Gallup poll taken in April of 2014 stated that only two 
percent of Ukrainians listed Russian broadcast sources on their top three important 
sources of information.734 In August of 2012, 32 percent of respondents had a favorable 
view of economic union with the EU, while 42 percent favored Russia; by March of 
2014, 52 percent favored the EU and only 27 percent favored Russia.735 An August 2015 
Pew Research Center captured the trend aptly in the title of their report “Russia, Putin 
Held in low regard around the world.”736 However, in that same report, Putin pulls an 
impressive 88 percent favorability rating domestically.737 
Clearly if Russia intended information and propaganda to change the attitudes and 
minds of Ukrainian people, or the West, the policy failed. If, however, all Russia wanted 
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to do was to create an air of momentary indecision, second guessing, and international 
hesitancies to enable a larger irregular warfare strategy, then Russia’s operations in and 
prior to Ukraine were very successful. Putin created the time and conditions necessary to 
conduct a covert military action in Crimea. He consolidated a near-bloodless military 
victory when he annexed Crimea. However, as time wore on the value of the Russian 
misinformation deteriorated quickly. So much so that a German newspaper said that 
Russia’s Sputnik Deutschland “can hardly be called successful” and that it “does not 
enjoy large outreach.”738 A comparison the of international news channel’s twitter 
followers show a 7 million follower lead by BBC over RT, and CNN’s nearly 15 million 
followers dominate RT’s 815,000 followers.739  
Even patently false “news” can be distributed quickly, something Moscow will 
continue to rely on, as demonstrated by a November 2016 false RT news story about 16 
American soldiers killed and 27 wounded battling ISIS in Mosul.740 So, while reports 
coming from Russian sources continue to lose credibility, Moscow will continue to count 
on diffusion across the web and social media to carry its narrative.  
Indicative of the biggest irony of the entire campaign, Russia’s approval rating in 
Ukraine plummeted nearly 90 percent.741 This is in large part because Russia annexed 
Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, meaning the sympathetic or pro-Russian 
population remain out of control of the Ukrainian government (as well as the reach of 
pollsters).742 So, while the irregular warfare campaign was a success, the information 
component wore thin quickly and disintegrated altogether eventually. After a thousand 
years as the “Mother of Rus Cities,” Russia has replaced its once-special relationship 
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with Kiev with a hostile government and alienated people.743 Clearly there is a price to 
pay for incorporating so much false information for so long to scantily cover a large 
irregular warfare operation. 
The experience in Ukraine clearly demonstrates that, under Putin’s rule, Russia is 
prepared and willing to use irregular warfare to achieve desired objectives. The conflict 
in Ukraine displays Russia’s use of information operations and covert action, both backed 
by swift, decisive conventional military force when necessary. Irregular forces, denied by 
Moscow, delivered a coup de main and the annexation of Crimea. Covert support given 
to proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine led to another “frozen conflict” in the former Soviet 
sphere. The Russian-backed separatists provide Moscow a leverage point for years to 
come. 
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In the 1812 campaign, flexibility, mobility and decentralized command allowed 
Davydov to flourish against Napoleon’s better trained and more disciplined cavalry. 
Those same characteristics, when discarded, hampered the Soviet partisans’ operations 
during the Great Patriotic War. Gratuitous usage of firepower and retaliatory raids or 
strikes can be seen from the Russians’ earliest interactions in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia through their involvement in Syria today. More significant, though, is the deliberate 
transition from Russian-led to surrogate-led warfare in Central Asia, in Afghanistan as 
well as in the latter stages of involvement in the Caucasus. In those cases where Russia 
transitioned from scorched-earth to counterinsurgency, Russia largely succeeded. 
A. SUMMARY  
In 1812, it was only after the Russian army was nearly exhausted that its 
leadership allowed a different type of cavalry officer to exploit French weakness that the 
regular troops could not. Davydov’s purpose-built forces incorporated Cossack 
formations successfully and garnered support from local peasants to ensure freedom of 
action on the battlefield. Through flexibility, decentralized command, and innovative 
tactics Davydov showed how an irregular force was able to achieve a spectacular impact.  
Novel tactical and operational adjustments often allowed Russian forces to 
achieve significant military victories over inhospitable natives in unforgiving terrain. 
During the late 19th century, tailored unit structures and deviations from long-standing 
European norms allowed Russia to achieve results with relatively few forces in Central 
Asia. As the Russian Empire expanded deeper into Central Asia, stability came through 
the employment of locals in irregular, combined units, further amplifying the economy of 
force Russia achieved. 
In the wake of World War I, through trial and error and over several years of 
tough combat during the Russian Civil War, irregular units proved themselves invaluable 
to Bolshevik leadership. Partisans and other irregulars provided local knowledge of both 
the human terrain as well as techniques for operating in Russia’s varied harsh climates. 
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Guerrilla fighters once again proved the importance of decentralized command and 
flexibility while operating toward a clear objective; this was true both for the Reds and 
for the Whites operating against them.  
While Soviet historians oversold the impact of partisans in World War II, they 
accomplished much. Soviet partisans demonstrated the effectiveness of well-organized 
guerrilla forces fighting in occupied territory. Partisan operations clearly demonstrated 
the need for knowledgeable, trained leadership to be available before the need arises. 
Stalin purposefully curtailed readiness because of the perceived political danger to his 
regime. Thus, in the end partisan impact was limited by Stalin’s overbearing control. 
In Afghanistan, Russia’s old habits died hard. The policy of removing insurgent 
support networks by eradicating villages caused massive civilian hardship, displacement, 
and death. The cold, calculated approach to propping up an inherently unstable central 
government in Afghanistan through massive bombardments finally gave way to a more 
Afghan-centric approach. Emphasis on training Afghan intelligence, police, and military 
units enabled the Soviets to turn the responsibility of the war over to the same. The policy 
was successful in that it allowed an organized Soviet disentanglement from Afghanistan 
and ensured stability until, after the dissolution of the USSR, when military support was 
no longer given.  
Russian involvement in the Caucasus both in the 19th century and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was initially characterized by extreme brutality. Only after 
complete saturation of 300,000 troops was Imperial Russia able to claim victory in the 
19th century. And that did not last. Russian failure to adapt from conventional to irregular 
warfare made its army extremely vulnerable during the 1994–1996 war. During the 
“Second” Chechen War beginning in 1999, Russian troops eventually adopted the 
irregular techniques of their opponents, and in so doing found success. However, it was 
the deliberate selection of a strong Moscow-loyal Chechen leader and the brokering of 
deals within the Caucasus’ tribal structures that led to Chechnya being brought back 
under Russian rule. 
 145 
Using the lessons of Chechnya and Georgia, the Russian military significantly re-
tooled itself. The force that invaded Ukraine incorporated lessons from history, taken 
from victories and defeats alike. In the Crimea, they were decentralized and swiftly 
achieved their military objectives. Irregular warfare was skillfully applied by Moscow to 
achieve a near-bloodless annexation. The Russian forces that conducted the irregular 
campaign were supported by a state-led narrative and significant propaganda. At critical 
junctures, they were even supported by conventional Russian forces. Even though that 
narrative was thin, it was enough to push international decision cycles past the time it 
took Russia to make the gains from an irregular operation permanent. However, less 
success was achieved in Donbass, in part because this current form of irregular warfare 
had lost some of its quality of surprise. 
B. APPLICATION 
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter may have been correct labeling Russia the 
number one threat to the United States in 2016. As demonstrated by their campaign in 
Ukraine, the Russian government under Putin has the ability and willpower to conduct 
irregular warfare. Russia is comfortable conducting irregular warfare as a significant 
policy tool. It is, then, imperative to know the roots of Russian irregular warfare, to 
understand its current usage and think about ways to counter it. 
It is important to avoid labeling Russian tactics in Ukraine as new. Rather, they 
should be seen as an extension and full realization of the Russian irregular warfare 
experience. Russia continues to study, refine, and adapt warfare techniques to gain 
advantages; looking back, as well as projecting forward, to drive readiness and meet 
future challenges head-on. It is striking that both Russian General Gerasimov and 
American General Joseph Votel acknowledged and predicted most future conflict will, at 
least in large part, be irregular. 
Granted that each case is unique to its own circumstances, there are still common 
threads that link Russia’s long and storied history of irregular warfare experiences with 
current challenges. Although future challenges will undoubtedly be different and unique 
in their own right, understanding the roots of Russian irregular warfare may help clearly 
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identify and enable us to counter irregular warfare conducted by other elements or 
governments, especially Russian. It may also help sharpen U.S. irregular warfare options. 
As General Gerasimov said, “no matter how well-developed his forces and means 
of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found.”744 To 
that end, understanding the roots of Russian irregular warfare—their experiences and 
how they adapted to unique challenges—could prove invaluable to understating the 
future of conflict. 
                                                 
744 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand 
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” trans. Robert Coalson, Military-
Industrial Kurier, February 27, 2013, 29http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/
MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf. 
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